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Abstract 
 
 During the Second World War, the British Government established the 
Special Operations Executive (SOE) for the purpose of coordinating ‘all action, by 
way of subversion and sabotage, against the enemy overseas’. Although the overseas 
operations of this branch of the British Secret Services are relatively well known, no 
previous study has assessed the organisation’s UK based infrastructure. This thesis 
represents the first time the entire UK property portfolio of a clandestine government 
agency has been assessed. By addressing this gap in our knowledge, this thesis has 
increased the number of identified properties operated by SOE by 30%. This was 
achieved by undertaking a desk based assessment which combined pre-existing 
historical and archaeological methodologies.  
 At the start of the Second World War, there were few existing facilities 
established within the UK to support clandestine operations. As the conflict 
progressed, in parallel to learning the operational procedures of their trade, SOE also 
had to rapidly expand their support infrastructure. The organisation could only 
effectively function by establishing facilities dedicated to training, research and 
development, supply, transportation, communication and command and control. 
These facilities, when required, combined reflectivity and innovation. It was, 
however, SOE’s preference to utilise pre-existing structures, where feasible, instead 
of erecting new buildings. Those facilities which were constructed were generally 
unique to the organisation. By assessing SOE’s UK property portfolio, this thesis 
goes some way to countering the often held notion that the organisation was 
‘amateurish’. 
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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
 
‘An organisation is being established to co-ordinate all action, by 
way of subversion and sabotage, against the enemy overseas. This 
organisation will be known as the Special Operations Executive’.1 
 
 Within the field of archaeology, the study of twentieth century military 
heritage is a relatively recent phenomenon.
2
 In comparison, scholarly research into 
the British Secret Services has a long and distinguished history. This thesis, 
therefore, sits between two complementary historiographies to produce, for the first 
time, a holistic assessment of the entire infrastructure of one of Britain’s Secret 
Services. By studying the Special Operations Executive’s (SOE) UK based support 
infrastructure,
3
 the extent of the organisation’s capacity and capabilities can finally 
be understood. The historical, archaeological and cultural heritage context in which 
this thesis sits will be discussed in Chapter II.  
 Although some authors have previously tackled aspects of SOE’s support 
infrastructure, no comprehensive assessment of the organisations capacity within the 
UK has been undertaken.
4
 It was only in 2004 when the Council for British 
Archaeology (CBA) published Modern Military Matters that SOE was first 
identified as an important field of study.
5
 This report identified that initial research 
                                                          
1
 TNA CAB 301/51 Report to the Minister of Economic Warfare on the Organisation of SOE p. 1 
2
 This has been pioneered by English Heritage. See John Schofield, Modern Military Matters: 
Studying and Managing the Twentieth-Century Defence Heritage in Britain: a Discussion Document 
(York, 2004).  
3
 Infrastructure is defined by NATO as ‘the static buildings, facilities and other permanent 
installations required to support military capabilities’ (NATO, AAP-06 NATO Glossary of Terms and 
Definitions (NATO 2013), p. 2-1-4) 
4
 See Ian Valentine, Station 43: Audley End House and SOE’s Polish Section (Stroud, 2004), Des 
Turner, Aston House Station 12: SOE’s Secret Centre (Stroud, 2006), Bernard O’Connor, RAF 
Tempsford: Churchill’s Most Secret Airfield (Stroud, 2010), Bernard O’Connor, Churchill’s School 
for Saboteurs: Station 17 (Stroud, 2013), Patrick Yarnold, Wanborough Manor: School for Secret 
Agents (Guildford, 2009), Edward Wake-Walker, A House for Spies: SIS Operations into Occupied 
France from a Sussex Farmhouse (London, 2011) and Nigel West, Secret War. 
5
 John Schofield, Modern Military Matters pp. 40, 49-53, 55-6. SOE fits under the following 
priorities: A7 Intelligence and Infrastructure, D1 The roles of excavation and analytical survey, D2 
Social archaeology and interpretation of layout, D3 Oral history, D4 ‘Personality’ of military areas, 
E1 Terminology, F1 Local level, F2 Regional level, F3 National level and F4 International level.  
2 
 
into this organisation should focus on published literature and documents held in 
archives. By undertaking this thesis, the author has addressed this research priority.  
 Over SOE’s operational life, it was to become one of the most controversial 
of Britain’s Secret Services.6 The organisation’s post-war legacy has also been beset 
by allegations of incompetence particularly advocated by the Secret Intelligence 
Service (SIS). Today, accusations of ‘amateurism’ still appear in press. On 7 July 
2014, Hugh Reilly, writing in the Scotsman, referred to SOE as ‘that derring-do 
bunch of toff idiots, recruited Boy’s Own types whose intellectual capacities were on 
a par with Frank Spencer’.7  
 The historiography of SOE has, however, not remained static (see pp. 5-8). 
Richard Deacon, a historian of the British Secret Services writing in 1969, stated that 
‘in achievements, in professionalism, and in organisation it never matched up to SIS; 
in many respects it was downright inefficient, wasteful, and even damaging to the 
war effort … [Others regarded the organisation as in a constant] departmental 
muddle, overwork[ed] at headquarters, inefficiency [sic] of wireless and security 
staffs, and amateurishness’.8 By 2005, Neville Wylie, a professor of international 
political history, regarded ‘the amateurishness for which SOE was routinely 
maligned had probably as much to do with any innate or institutionalized 
incompetence as with the legendary informality of the organization and the self-
proclaimed “revolutionary” nature of the warfare it espoused’.9  
 In contrast, David Stafford, who is regarded as making as great a contribution 
to our understanding of the organisation as SOE’s official historian, MRD Foot,10 
advocates a far less critical assessment. Although he accepts elements of the 
‘bumbling amateurishness of the British public school tradition, the muddling 
through, the inefficiency, the eccentricity [Stafford presents this] ... as the strategic 
disguise for what was in reality the clandestine arm of a determined attempt to 
                                                          
6
 Nigel West, Secret War: The Story of SOE: Britain’s Wartime Sabotage Organisation (London, 
1992) p. 1 
7
 Hugh Reilly, ‘I Spy an Espionage Opportunity’, www.scotsman.com/news/hugh-reilly-i-spy-an-
espionage-opportunity-1-3469341 (accessed 7 July 2014) 
8
 Richard Deacon, A History of the British Secret Service (London, 1969) p. 563 
9
 Nigel Wylie, ‘Introduction: Special Operations Executive – New Approaches and Perspectives’, 
Intelligence and National Security 20.1 (2005) p. 11 
10
 Mark Seaman, ‘A Glass Half Full – Some Thoughts on the Evolution of the Study of the Special 
Operations Executive’, Intelligence and National Security 20.1 (2005) p. 33. MRD Foot was the 
official historian of SOE in France and one of the most accomplished historians of the organisation.  
3 
 
further British interest in Europe’.11 This interpretation regarded SOE as actually 
functioning efficiently within the paralysing limits imposed by the Foreign Office 
and the SIS. The organisation was assessed to have accomplished its role as 
effectively as any other branch of the British war effort.
12
  
 SOE’s official historian, on questioning whether the organisation was any 
good, answered ‘with an emphatic Yes’.13 This view was also championed by Mark 
Seamon, an historian based at the Cabinet Office, who was of the opinion that 
although ‘short-lived and frequently (and inappropriately) labelled “amateur” by its 
detractors, SOE nevertheless acquired a prominent position in most theatres of 
operations and exerted British influence on a truly global scale’.14  
 The study of any Secret Service is, however, not straightforward. Due to the 
clandestine nature of these organisations, these conclusions are based on partial and 
incomplete documentary records (see pp. 5-8). Previous studies into SOE have also 
generally focused on the ‘glamourous’, frontline activities of the organisation.15 
Although not as prestigious as acts of sabotage, SOE’s UK based infrastructure was 
vital to the operation of the organisation.
16
 For the first time, this thesis has 
addressed this significant gap in our knowledge of SOE. By utilising pre-existing 
desk based assessment methodology,
17
 this study brings a new dimension to the field 
of SOE.  
                                                          
11
 David Stafford, Britain and European Resistance 1940-1945: A Survey of the Special Operations 
Executive with Documents (London, 1980) p.5 
12
 David Stafford, Britain and European Resistance 1940-1945 pp. 5, 7 
13
 Michael Foot, ‘Was SOE Any Good?’, Journal of Contemporary History 16.1 (1981) p. 179 
14
 Mark Seaman, ‘A Glass Half Full …’ p. 28 
15
 For published material on SOE’s activities within specific countries see Charles Cruickshank, SOE 
in Scandinavia (Oxford, 1986), Michael Foot, SOE in the Low Countries (London, 2001), Michael 
Foot, SOE in France (London, 1966), Marcel Ruby, F Section SOE: The Story of the Buckmaster 
Network (London, 1990), Denis Rigden, Kill the Fuhrer: Section X and Operation Foxley (Stroud, 
2002), Roderick Bailey, The Wildest Province: SOE in the land of the Eagle (London, 2008), 
Malcolm Tudor, SOE in Italy 1940-1945: The Real Story (Newtown, 2011) and David Stafford, 
Mission Accomplished: SOE and Italy, 1943-1945 (London, 2012). For research on agents see Marcus 
Binney, The Women who lived for Danger: The Women Agents of SOE in the Second World War 
(London, 2002), Marcus Binney, Secret War Heroes: Men of the Special Operations Executive 
(London, 2006), Bruce Marshall, The White Rabbit: The Secret Agent the Gestapo could not crack 
(London, 2002), Sarah Helm, A Life in Secrets: The Story of Vera Atkins and the Lost Agents of SOE 
(London, 2006), Henri Raymond, ‘Experiences of an SOE agent in France’ in: The Fourth Dimension 
of Warfare: Vol. 1 Intelligence/Subversion/Resistance, ed. Michael Elliott-Bateman (New York, 
1970). 
16
 Without training, research and development, supplies, transportation, communication and command 
and control facilities, SOE could not have undertaken the wide range of operations they conducted on 
a global scale.  
17
 This thesis is not utilising an innovative, new methodological approach. Desk based assessments 
are a tried and tested method of studying twentieth century military heritage. See pp. 8-14.  
4 
 
 In order to contextualise the contribution of this thesis to the study of this 
organisation, this chapter will examine the role of SOE, its evolving historiography 
and the value of built heritage as an historical source. The methodology employed 
within this study will also be examined. 
 
SOE’s Function 
 
 Over the course of the Second World War, SOE was one of several of 
Britain’s Secret Services. Although each organisation was allocated a different 
function, they often came into conflict due to overlapping interests. SOE’s sister 
organisations included the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), the Secret Service 
(MI5), the Government Code and Cypher School (GCCS) and the Political Warfare 
Executive (PWE). It was the function of SOE to ‘co-ordinate all action, by way of 
subversion and sabotage, against the enemy overseas’.18 
 The organisation was formed by the British Government to operate along the 
lines of the Sinn Fein movement in Ireland and Chinese guerrillas fighting the 
Japanese. Inspiration was also taken from the Spanish Irregulars who fought 
alongside Wellington.
19
 In order to achieve this, SOE was provided funding through 
the Secret Vote.
20
 By April 1942, their expenditure was approximately £2,500,000 
per annum.
21
  
 SOE, which only operationally existed for 71 months,
22
 grew to a size where 
it employed a maximum of 10,000 men and 3,200 women.
23
 Of these, one in four 
men and one in eight women were of officer status.
24
 Under their control were tens 
of thousands of resistance fighters operating on a global scale.
25
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SOE: An Historiography 
 
 In order to provide context for this thesis, a brief historiography of the 
organisation is presented below.
26
 Over the past decade in particular, the academic 
study of SOE has undergone a substantial transformation. The gradual release of 
classified documents into the public domain, combined with a more rigorous 
academic interpretation, has enabled scholars’ opportunities to question initial 
preconceptions.
27
  
 The first attempt to record SOE’s past occurred prior to the organisation’s 
disbandment. As the war came to an end, a series of ‘in-house’ histories were 
commissioned.
28
 The primary purpose of these documents was to ensure that SOE’s 
hard learnt lessons were not forgotten. These reports also provided an historical 
record of the organisation’s achievements.29 Although the quality of these documents 
varies significantly by author, they offer scholars a useful narrative.
30
 The task of 
combining these disparate accounts together into an ‘official’ history was allocated 
to William Mackenzie. As a political historian who had worked as a civil servant in 
the Air Ministry during the war, Mackenzie was ideally suited for this complex task. 
In order to facilitate his work, complete access to SOE’s surviving archive was 
granted.
31
 Mackenzie was also given the authority to request any document from 
other governmental departments which he could not locate within SOE’s files.32 On 
completion of his monograph, it was to remain classified until finally being 
published in 2000.
33
  
 The size of SOE combined with the public appetite for tales of clandestine 
operations, meant it was inevitable that agents’ ‘accounts’ rapidly appeared in press 
after the war. Before Germany had surrendered, the War Office had cleared the first 
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of these for publication. George Millar’s Marquis, written shortly after the author 
returned from operations in France, eventually ran to 70,000 copies.
34
 Agents ‘have 
[however] not always found it possible to keep to the unvarnished truth [in writing 
their memoires]. A sort of declension can be observed: from minor inaccuracies due 
to misinformation, or brought in to heighten the tone’.35 Much of the early accounts 
of SOE were characterised by courageous stories. This appealed to the public’s 
desire to read about adventures and helped book sales.
36
 Post-war British culture 
was, therefore, inundated with tales of daring which has done much to shape public 
perception of SOE.
37
  
 This period coincided with an increased public scrutiny of SOE’s activities in 
France. During the mid-1950s, reporters found that articles on the controversies 
which surrounded the organisation sold newspapers. Features and exposés, therefore, 
began making regular appearances in the popular press. In an attempt to address the 
accusations and counteraccusation of incompetence, Whitehall commissioned Foot 
to write the official history of SOE in France. Despite having access to the 
organisation’s archive, his attempts to undertake interviews with key figures were 
severely restricted. The monograph, which was published in 1966, was the first 
publicly available scholarly study of SOE.
38
  
 During the period SOE was making newspaper headlines, there was a gradual 
deterioration of relations between East and West. This was a time when the 
Comintern was threatening to initiate a global workers revolution. British troops 
were also regularly deployed to undertake counterinsurgency operations against 
communist guerrillas.
39
 Techniques and procedure which had been perfected by SOE 
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were now threatening British global interests.
40
 These circumstances go some way to 
explain why the organisation gained such a bad post-war reputation.  
 By 1950, Basil Liddell Hart, one of the leading figures on military strategy, 
was condemning British support for the European Resistance during the war. It was 
his belief that it had a ‘wider amoral effect on the younger generation as a whole to 
defy authority and break the rules of civic morality’.41 It was inevitable that an 
organisation which had supported, equipped and trained radicals would become the 
focus of criticism when the new threat became Soviet revolutionaries. Within this 
new geopolitical environment, intelligence became an increasingly important 
commodity. The promotion of SOE as an irresponsible and amateurish organisation 
was, therefore, beneficial to the Secret Services trying to justify their own existence 
in a post-war world.
 42
 
 The second official history of SOE was not commissioned until 1980. By 
then, the controversy which had surrounded Foot’s SOE in France had died down 
sufficiently to enable Charles Cruickshank to begin work on the organisation’s 
activities in the Far East. In 1986, Cruickshank published the next instalment of 
SOE’s official histories focusing on Scandinavia.43  
 Following the gradual release of SOE’s files into the public domain from 
1993, a sea-change in the way the organisation was studied occurred. Since then 
there has been a proliferation in the quantity and quality of popular and academic 
studies into the organisation. Researchers must, however, ‘be reconciled to the fact 
that the ravages of time and policy have ensured that the archives are unlikely to 
provide all that is required’.44 Those files which could have offered a comprehensive 
assessment of SOE’s strategic value have by now been destroyed (see pp. 8-10).45 
 Unsurprisingly, the vast majority of studies into SOE have focused on the 
‘glamourous’ exploits of the organisation’s agents abroad. Research into SOE’s 
Country Sections is so firmly entrenched into the mentality of SOE scholars that 
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there is a danger that topics which do not fit into operational boundaries will be 
overlooked.
46
 It is, however, only with a comprehensive overview of an organisation 
in its entirety that a balanced assessment can be made. To further our understanding 
of SOE, scholars have called for ‘greater attention … to be given to … non-
geographical sections’.47 This thesis takes as its subject SOE’s UK based 
infrastructure.   
 
The Methodological Approach to Researching SOE’s Built 
Infrastructure 
 
 To facilitate the study of SOE’s UK based support infrastructure, an 
interdisciplinary approach has been employed by this thesis. Through a combination 
of archival research, aerial photographic transcription, architectural surveying and 
ground based reconnaissance, this study has attempted to negotiate the difficulties 
posed by relying on SOE’s surviving documents.  
 One of the greatest challenges faced by scholars of the Secret Services is that 
‘unless a secret service remains secret, it cannot do its work. As it has to remain 
secret, it ought not to keep any sort of records in the field. Even at its home base, 
security risks are not needlessly multiplied by putting more than necessary on paper 
… the traces left for him [the historian] to study are likely to be few’.48 In the case of 
SOE, this is compounded by the chaotic nature of the organisation’s surviving 
archive.
49
 
 The origins of this confusion can be partly attributed to the haphazard nature 
of the organisation’s formation. On the combination of SIS’s Section D, Military 
Intelligence (Research) (MI(R)) and Department EH (see pp. 21-5), SOE failed to 
establish a central registry.
50
 Each section and sub-section was, therefore, 
responsible for organising their own filing system. In 1945, further confusion was 
introduced when SOE imposed a top-down approach to departmental filing based on 
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thematic topics. This reorganisation had, however, only just scratched the surface by 
the time SOE was disbanded in 1946. For a brief period thereafter, a small body of 
staff were retained to complete this undertaking. When financial support was finally 
withdrawn, only 25% of the archive had been reorganised. SOE’s surviving archive, 
therefore, comprises of two overlapping, yet incomplete filing systems.
51
  
 Further challenges faced by SOE scholars are associated with periodic 
episodes of widespread destruction of the organisation’s files. Within the Secret 
Services, there exists a tendency to avoid record keeping. Only documents deemed 
operationally essential are favoured for preservation. As the Second World War drew 
to a close, reports began to circulate of bonfires of documents originating from 
within SOE’s outstations. During these burnings, it is known that significant 
quantities of files produced by the UK based Special Training Schools (STSs) were 
also incinerated. There is also a report of a large fire occurring in SOE’s Baker Street 
headquarters in February 1946.
52
   
 By the middle of 1946, plans were in hand to transfer SOE’s remaining files 
into the care of the SIS. In preparation for this move, it was necessary to reduce the 
size of the archive. Between August 1946 and May 1947, 119 filing cabinets were, 
therefore, destroyed (Table 1). Of those documents incinerated during this purge, 
66% related to the organisation’s administration, stores, training and 
communications. These files predominately dealt with the daily running of SOE in 
support of their agents aboard. Further episodes of destruction subsequently occurred 
so that by the 1950s over 87% of SOE’s original archive had been lost.53 By the 
1980s, many aspects of SOE’s operational history had become public knowledge 
despite the organisation’s archive remaining classified. It was not until 21 October 
1993, however, that the first of SOE’s files were released to the National Archives 
(TNA).
54
 Selective declassification can, however, distort ones interpretation of the 
organisation.
55
 This process of releasing documents is still ongoing.  
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Category  Number Destroyed Percentage of cabinets 
Stores and Supplies 20 16.81 
Middle East 20 16.81 
Signals and Telegrams 14 11.76 
Training 14 11.76 
Admin and Organisation 11 9.24 
Far East 9 7.56 
War Diary 9 7.56 
French 7 5.88 
European Countries General 6 5.04 
Scandinavian 3 2.52 
Central Europe 2 1.68 
Italian 2 1.68 
Belgian 1 0.84 
Dutch 1 0.84 
Total 119 100 
Table 1: The number of filing cabinets containing SOE files destroyed between 1946 
and 1947.
56
 
 
 Over 450 files held by the National Archives were consulted. This was 
equivalent to approximately 40,000 pages of primary documents. As the post-Second 
World War destruction of files concentrated on SOE’s administrative activities, any 
study assessing the organisation’s UK based infrastructure will inevitably have to 
rely on the official histories.
57
 As these were written as reflective documents, they 
provide a useful narrative to the organisation’s evolution.  
 Through an in-depth analysis of SOE’s surviving archive, this thesis was able 
to compile a gazetteer of the organisation’s UK property portfolio (see Appendix A: 
Gazetteer). In order to ascertain the current knowledge of these sites, the Ordnance 
Survey (OS) six-figure grid references for these facilities were checked using the 
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‘Heritage Gateway’ website.58 This database was searched for all records dated 
between 1939 and 1945 within 1km of the centre point of each of SOE’s facilities.59 
The outputs were then consulted for any reference to the organisation. When the 
results of the HERs and Pastscape were combined, only 6.7% of SOE’s UK property 
portfolio were recorded as such on Heritage Gateway. References to the 
organisation’s facilities were also noted whilst the author undertook research using 
secondary literature. Based on these, this thesis has increased our knowledge of 
SOE’s UK infrastructure by approximately 32%.60  
 
 Number of Sites 
Features Visible on 1945 Google Earth 9 
No Features Visible on 1945 Google Earth 19 
No 1945 Coverage 76 
Total Sites Outside of London 69 
Table 2: As the gazetteer of SOE sites was compiled, Google Earth historical aerial 
imagery was consulted for each location. Only 28 of SOE’s properties, located 
outside of London, were covered by this dataset. 
 
 During the compilation of the gazetteer, historical aerial imagery from 1945 
was consulted (Table 2).
61
 This data source, which is freely available from Google 
Earth, enabled a preliminary assessment of the nature of these sites to be conducted. 
By consulting these images, a rapid and comprehensive initial examination of SOE’s 
property portfolio was achieved. The incomplete nature of Google Earth’s 1945 
coverage and the poor quality of the reproductions, however, meant accurate surveys 
could not be undertaken using this data.  
 Once the initial assessment of SOE’s properties had been completed using 
Google Earth, sites which were identified as of interest were subjected to an in-depth 
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aerial photographic study. In total, 1,500 images held by the National Monument 
Record (NMR) in Swindon were consulted. These photographs covered 36 of SOE’s 
facilities which represented 20% of the organisation’s property portfolio.62 As only 
sites located outside of London were chosen for photographic analysis, this thesis 
assessed 35% of SOE’s country facilities.  
 When physical or topographical features, associated with activity during the 
Second World War, were identified on the photographic images, these prints were 
selected for rectification. The transformations were then carried out using the 
University of Bradford’s Aerial 5.29 photographic rectification program. All digital 
transformations are, therefore, accurate to within 5m of true ground position and 
typically less than 2m to the base map. The transcriptions were then produced in 
AutoCad by tracing features from the transformed and georeferenced aerial images.  
 Of those sites which were assessed using Google Earth’s historical imagery 
or the NMR’s aerial photographs, 69% had no features which could be attributed to 
SOE. The category of site which was least likely to have purpose built infrastructure 
visible on historic aerial images, was the organisation’s training facilities. In 
comparison, all of SOE’s communication centres contained purpose built structures 
(Table 3).  
 
Site Type Features Visible No Features Visible 
Training 1 3% 30 97% 
R&D 3 75% 1 25% 
Supply 5 56% 4 44% 
Transportation 1 100% 0 0% 
Communications 6 100% 0 0% 
Total 16 31% 35 69% 
Table 3: Of the sites assessed using Google Earth and NMR aerial, only 31% had 
features visible which could be attributed to SOE.
63
  
 
 Despite the general absence of purpose built facilities visible on historic 
aerial imagery, this methodological approach remains a vital tool in assessing the 
infrastructure of the Secret Services. Certain properties operated by SOE were found 
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to have extensive infrastructure (see Appendix C: Site Plans).Without undertaking a 
rapid assessment of historical aerial imagery, these might have been overlooked.  
 Aerial photographic surveys also provide important data for sites which have 
undergone redevelopment or demolition. For properties belonging to the Secret 
Services, original site plans are unlikely to be accessible. This source of information 
might provide the only data relating to these facilities. Historical aerial photographs 
should, therefore, be a central component to any future study of the infrastructure of 
the Secret Services. 
 When features which could be attributed to SOE were identified, every 
feasible attempt was made to view them from the ground. Time constraints, refusal 
to access private property and the ephemeral nature of SOE’s support infrastructure 
limited the majority of this thesis to a desk based assessment (DBA).
64
 The value and 
contribution DBAs can make to the study of twentieth century military heritage has 
been demonstrated numerous times before.
65
 Pioneered by English Heritage in the 
1990s (see pp. 16-20), this methodological approach can contribute much to our 
knowledge twentieth century military heritage. DBAs also provide a strong 
foundation on which future research can be conducted.  
 At SOE’s Station 53B Transmitter Complex at Godington, Oxfordshire, 
surviving physical remains were identified. Access was also granted for the author to 
undertake a full architecture survey of the site. This was conducted at a field scale of 
1:100 using standard graphical techniques according to guidelines set down by 
English Heritage. The cross sectional drawing of the main room of the Transmitter 
Building was formed from a composite created from fixtures observed on individual 
panels. Access to the roof was not viable due to health and safety considerations. The 
roofline and any features above were estimated based on ground observations. The 
survey plan was completed using AutoCad software.  
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 The thesis’ multidisciplinary approach, incorporating archaeological and 
historical methodologies, was the only viable method for assessing the infrastructure 
of one of the British Secret Services. In studies where a gazetteer of sites has yet 
been assembled, it is inevitable that primary sources are a central component of the 
research. It is only through extensively studying an organisation’s primary 
documents that it is possible to compile a database of facilities.
66
 This information is 
unlikely to be found elsewhere. Without access to SOE’s surviving archive, this 
thesis would not have been possible. 
 Although the primacy of the organisation’s primary documents to this study 
is evident, not all information could be obtained from this source. Archives 
containing papers associated with the military during the twentieth century are often 
incomplete, restricted or chaotic in nature. In these situations, the physical 
infrastructure offers an independent source of information against which the 
accuracy of the archives can be assessed. By examining the archaeological record, 
change of function, adaptions and phases of construction, for example, can be 
determined. Although these events might also be recorded in the archives, outcomes 
can differ from intentions. Infrastructure, therefore, provides a physical 
representation of the actions of an organisation.  
 It is essential that any future studies on the infrastructure of the Secret 
Services utilises a multidisciplinary approach incorporating historical and 
archaeological methodologies. Extensive primary documentary research enables a 
gazetteer of sites to be complied. Archaeological techniques can then target sites 
which have been identified in the archives. It is only through the combination of 
these two disciplines that a holistic assessment of the organisation can be achieved.  
 
Built to Resist: Thesis Structure 
 
 To effectively relate the results of this study, this thesis has been arranged 
into thematic chapters. Each chapter addresses a specific function of SOE’s UK 
based support infrastructure. In Chapter II, the historical context in which this thesis 
                                                          
66
 For some of SOE’s smaller properties, the only reference to them might be in the heading of a 
correspondence. Without extensively examining the organisation’s archive, these facilities might have 
been overlooked.  
15 
 
sits will be presented. The origins of SOE’s formation will briefly be examined as 
will the organisation’s internal hierarchy. Central figures within SOE’s history will 
also be introduced and the organisation’s operational procedure examined.  
 The order of this thesis then reflects a logical progression through SOE as the 
organisation prepared agents and equipment for operations. In Chapter III, the 
infrastructure of SOE’s training facilities will be examined. Due to the nature of this 
training, any purpose built equipment was of an ephemeral nature. This chapter, 
therefore, is reliant on SOE’s surviving archive. By examining the organisation’s 
syllabuses, it will be demonstrated that, when required, SOE devised innovative 
training facilities which integrated intelligence gathered from the field.  
 On the formation of SOE in July 1940, it rapidly became apparent that 
equipment specifically designed for clandestine warfare was essential to the 
organisation. Chapter IV will examine the organisation’s heavy investment in 
devising a wide range of innovative and deadly equipment. Once these new items 
had been designed, it was essential that they were manufactured and prepared for 
transportation. Chapter V will examine the breadth of SOE’s supply chain.  
 In order to deliver supplies to the field, it was essential that SOE established 
transportation links with occupied Europe. Chapter VI assesses the organisation’s 
changing relationships with the RAF and the Royal Navy through the nature of 
SOE’s transportation hubs. To arrange for these supplies to be delivered to where 
they were required, it was essential that SOE could communicate with their agents in 
the field. Chapter VII demonstrates that once the organisation gained control of their 
wireless networks in 1942, SOE invested in state-of-the-art facilities. To effectively 
run the organisation, it was essential that SOE established an efficient command and 
control infrastructure. Chapter VIII will examine this aspect of the organisation and 
demonstrate that SOE was controlled from London. In Chapter IX, wider notions of 
the archaeology of clandestine warfare and the Secret Services will be discussed. 
This thesis will then be drawn to an end with Chapter X which will conclude the 
major findings of this study.  
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CHAPTER II 
Historical and Archaeological Context 
 
 To provide historical context for this thesis, this chapter will examine SOE’s 
formation, the characters central to establishing and running the organisation and its 
internal hierarchy. In order to appreciate the range of facilities required by SOE, it is 
essential to have some prior understanding of the nature of their operations. This will 
be presented in this chapter along with an outline of the facilities inherited by the 
organisation on its formation. Although some of this has been covered by more 
distinguished scholars, the following synthesis provides the context in which SOE’s 
property portfolio can be assessed.
1
 First, however, the archaeological context in 
which this thesis sits will be discussed. This will provide an important overview of 
the development of modern conflict archaeology as a discipline.  
 
Archaeological Context 
 
 Even before the Treaty of Versailles had been signed ending the First World 
War, the historical value of military material culture was already being recognised. 
Whilst fighting was still going on, depots were established in France to collect 
artefacts for what was to become the Imperial War Museum. Shortly after the 
Armistice, the first tourists also began visiting the battlefields. These initial visitors 
were, however, driven by acts of commemoration and remembrance rather than 
historical curiosity.
2
  
 During the inter-war period, the significance of military monuments from the 
recent past was beginning to be recognised. Prior to the outbreak of the Second 
World War, discussions over whether to provide First World War gun emplacements 
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with statutory protection had been initiated. Although these deliberations were 
unsuccessful, the value and significance of modern military infrastructure had, 
however, been appreciated.  
 It was not until the 1960s and 1970s, however, that the first study into 
twentieth century military structures occurred. This coincided with a period of 
increasing leisure time and a greater interest within sections of society towards 
archaeology. It was during this period that amateur archaeologists began the first 
sustained surveys of aspects of Second World War heritage. Out of this research 
came the publication in 1985 of Henry Wills’ book ‘Pillboxes’.3  
 By the late 1980s, professional archaeologists had also begun showing an 
interest in this field of study.
4
 This coincided with the development of archaeological 
resource management and the need to ‘value, prioritise and manage our cultural 
heritage’.5 Finally in the 1990s, the first projects to record twentieth century military 
remains were initiated: studies were undertaken by the Royal Commissions in 
England, Wales and Scotland.
6
 This coincided with Historic Scotland commissioning 
a number of regional assessments of the survival of twentieth century defences.
7
 
During this period, Roger Thomas was also employed to study the military remains 
located in Pembrokeshire.
8
  
 In 1994, the Royal Commission on the Historic Monuments of England 
undertook the first dedicated archaeological survey of a twentieth century military 
site.
9
 The focus of this study, a Second World War Heavy Anti-Aircraft Battery, was 
also one of the first sites to be scheduled under English Heritage’s Monuments 
Protection Programme. During the same year, all the effort from the preceding 
decades culminated in two national initiatives: the Defence of Britain (DoB) Project 
and a series of related studies commissioned by English Heritage.
10
 In 1996, English 
Heritage also commissioned the CBA to undertake a ‘survey of documentary records 
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for 20th century fortifications’.11 This decade also saw national heritage agencies 
beginning to highlight the recent history of properties in their care. The sites at the 
forefront of this were Dover Castle, Kent, and Fort George, Inverness.
12
   
 The national surveys which were conducted during the 1990s initially 
focused on analysing the documentary records. This enabled the researchers to 
quantify the original site population. By achieving this, the necessary data was 
available to assess the survival and preservation of sites.
13
 The surveys, therefore, 
provided a baseline from which future studies could build. This initial research also 
enabled subsequent fieldwork to be undertaken in a more structured and systematic 
way.
14
  
 It was not until 2003 that the first study on the monuments of the Cold War 
was published. This project, undertaken by Wayne Cocroft and Roger Thomas and 
commissioned by the Royal Commission on the Historical Monuments of England,
15
 
represented the first time many of these facilities were available to study. Prior to the 
publication of this work, monuments of the Cold War were poorly understood and 
badly represented in the NMR. Unlike the previous studies commissioned by the 
national heritage agencies, this project focused on the physical sites. As the primary 
records were still restricted, it was inevitable that the military infrastructure was the 
main source of information.
16
  
 As has been discussed, the utilisation of the built heritage as a source to study 
the contemporary past is not a new methodological approach.
17
 Although this thesis 
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employs a tried and tested methodology, this is the first time it has ever been applied 
to the entire property portfolio of one of Britain’s Secret Services. By undertaking 
this research, the true extent of SOE’s infrastructure can, for the first time, be 
comprehended.   
 
Dates Age Evidence 
1974-2004 Prehistoric Archaeological evidence 
No access to oral history (Official Secrets Act) 
No access to documents (30 year rule) 
1934-1974 Modern Archaeological evidence 
Oral history 
Primary sources 
1900-1934 Historic Archaeological evidence 
No oral histories (except those previously recorded) 
Primary sources 
Table 4: The ‘ages of war’.18  
 
 Despite being a ‘text aided period’, documents relating to the military in the 
twentieth century can be problematic to access. It is helpful, therefore, to view this 
period using Schofield’s ‘ages of war’ (Table 4). Retention of ‘sensitive’ files, the 
upholding of the Official Secrets Act and the heavy censoring of declassified 
documents can significantly impact the validity of academic research. The act of 
staggering the release of key documents can also lead to an imbalance in the archives 
of intentions verses outcomes.
19
 In situations where ‘documents and oral historical 
evidence are not available, [material culture] ... provides a viable alternative’.20  
 
                                                          
18
 John Schofield, Combat Archaeology p. 39 
19
 Ibid pp. 35, 37, 39 
20
 Ibid p. 37 
20 
 
 
Figure 1: Magazine at the Office of Strategic Service’s (OSS) ‘Area H’. The 
extensive vegetation growth within this facility has resulted in the rapid 
deterioration of the surviving structures.
21
  
 
 Although the Secret Services can be regarded as ‘prehistoric’, they also sit 
across Schofield’s classifications. SOE can simultaneously be placed within the 
prehistoric, historic and modern categorisations. It is, therefore, essential that all 
sources of information are utilised when studying the Secret Services. The nature of 
SOE’s infrastructure has inevitably meant this thesis has had to rely on the 
organisation’s surviving documentary records. Without this archive, the full extent of 
SOE’s infrastructure could not have been determined. As will be demonstrated, 
infrastructure associated with the Secret Services is only unique when it fulfils a 
specific role exclusive to that organisation. Built heritage alone cannot always 
determine a site’s association with the Secret Services during the Second World 
War. It is only through archival research that this can be confirmed. Due to the 
rapidly deteriorating state of ‘temporary’ wartime structures, this research into 
SOE’s infrastructure is timely (Figure 1). 
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SOE’s Historical Context 
 
 On 27 September 1938, the British Cabinet took the important decision to 
organise a Department of Propaganda to Enemy Countries. To run this new 
organisation, Whitehall approached Sir Campbell Stuart.
22
 Previously, Stuart had 
been responsible for controlling the British propaganda effort during the final years 
of the First World War.
23
 With the signing of the Munich Agreement three days 
later, the British Government postponed the formation of this new organisation. It 
was not until 23 December 1938, when Stuart was appointed chairman of the 
propaganda sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, that the issue was 
once again raised.
24
  
 On 3 April 1939, Stuart moved his operations into Electra House,
25
 Victoria 
Embankment, which also housed the Imperial Communications Advisory Board.
26
 It 
was from this new accommodation that Stuart’s Department EH inherited its name.27 
Prior to their mobilisation on 1 September 1939, the department existed on a purely 
informal basis with no Treasury grant. At the outbreak of hostilities, 60 members of 
Department EH’s staff immediately relocated to offices in the Riding School at 
Woburn Abbey.
28
 
 At the start of the Second World War, duplication of Department EH’s remit 
was unknowingly being undertaken by a section within SIS.
29
 In 1938, SIS 
established Section D and tasked it with researching subversive methods of warfare 
and investigating ‘every possibility of attacking potential enemies by means other 
than the operations of military force’.30 By 5 June 1939, Section D was already 
experimenting with clandestine propaganda.
31
 In parallel to the work being 
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undertaken on propaganda, Section D was also examining the prospect of 
undertaking raids on enemy installations. Operational plans had been devised for the 
seizure of oil-wells in Romania and disrupting the enemy’s vital communications 
immediately following the outbreak of war.
32
 By the end of the month, SIS staff, 
operating under the cover of the British Embassies’ Passport Control Offices, were 
informed that there existed a ‘centrally controlled organisation which is already 
equipped with arms and explosives, and prepared for action at ten days’ notice’.33 
 Section D had, however, been preceded by two years by a similar department 
within the War Office. Established in 1936, the War Office’s General Staff 
(Research) (GS(R)) only comprised of a major from the Army Education Corps and 
his typist for the first two years of its existence. In 1938, Major Jo Holland RE took 
over the post. Deciding to concentrate his meagre resources on researching 
unorthodox methods of warfare, Holland focused his efforts on examining Boer 
tactics, Lawrence of Arabia, the Russian and Spanish Civil Wars and the British 
experience in Ireland. Following the War Office splitting operations and intelligence 
into two new departments in the spring of 1939, GS(R) was renamed Military 
Intelligence (Research) (MI(R)).
34
   
 By the middle of the winter of 1939, discussions between Section D and 
MI(R) were ongoing as to the future division of labour between the two competing 
organisations. Eventually, it was agreed that MI(R) would focus on operations which 
could be undertaken by troops in uniform, whilst Section D would devise procedures 
which could not be officially acknowledged.
35
 This distinction was not, however, 
always clear to military commanders. In January 1940, the Czechoslovakian Chief of 
Staff, Colonel Hutnik, requested MI(R) supply his agent in Belgrade with explosives 
intended to sink German barges stuck in ice on the Danube.
36
 Although MI(R) were 
concerned that this ‘business is really D’s pigeon, and not an M.I.R. matter, but as 
the Chief of Staff came to me officially about it, we must take it up and pass it on’.37 
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 As early as 25 May 1940, the Chiefs of Staff had foreseen the collapse of 
France.
38
 In this situation, the creation of widespread revolt within German occupied 
territories was to become a major British strategic objective. The overlapping roles 
of Department EH, Section D and MI(R) inevitably led to infighting over who 
should retain responsibility for clandestine warfare in this scenario. Lord Hankey, 
the first formal secretary of the cabinet, was charged with facilitating a settlement. 
At a meeting held on 13 June 1940, Hankey persuaded Major Grand, head of Section 
D, and Holland that raiding and subversion had to be co-ordinated by a single 
ministry.
39
 This was confirmed on 1 July when Lord Halifax,
40
 Lord Hankey, Lord 
Lloyd,
41
 Dr Hugh Dalton,
42
 Sir Alexander Cadigan,
43
 Gladwyn Jebb,
44
 Sir Stewart 
Menzies,
45
 the Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) and Sir Desmond Morton
46
 
agreed that subversive warfare needed to be controlled by a single body with 
‘dictatorial’ powers.47 The following day, Dalton wrote that: 
‘We have got to organize movements in enemy-occupied territory 
comparable to the Seinn Fein movement in Ireland, to the Chinese 
Guerrillas now operating against Japan, to the Spanish Irregulars 
who played a notable part in Wellington’s campaign or – one might 
as well admit it – to the organizations which the Nazis themselves 
have developed so remarkably in almost every country in the world. 
This “democratic international” must use many different methods, 
including industrial and military sabotage, labour agitation and 
strikes, continuous propaganda, terrorist acts against traitors and 
German leaders, boycotts and riots’.48  
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Figure 2: The history of SOE’s formation in July 1940.49  
 
 On 10 July, Lord President of the Council, Neville Chamberlain, presented 
SOE’s founding Charter to the War Cabinet. Six days later, Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill invited Dalton to take charge of the new body.
50
 The charter was approved 
on 22 July and Section D, MI(R) and Department EH were subsequently 
amalgamated into SOE (Figure 2).
51
 
 In the month following SOE’s formation, Dalton appointed Sir Frank Nelson 
the task of running the daily operation of the organisation. Nelson and Dalton, 
supported by Jebb, who was there to report back to Halifax on Dalton, immediately 
dismissed Grand. The new organisation was arranged into three branches: SO1 
responsible for propaganda, SO2 for active operations and SO3 for planning and 
administration.
52
 
 Interdepartmental rivalries over who should control propaganda continued 
despite the formation of SOE. Internally, both SO1 and SO2 maintained the right to 
undertake ‘covert’ propaganda.53 Concerns were also raised as to whether it was 
feasible to divorce covert from overt propaganda, the latter being the responsibility 
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of the Ministry of Information (MoI).
54
 Eventually, it was decided to form a new 
independent executive under tripartite Ministerial leadership. Operational control of 
the Political Warfare Executive (PWE) was to be entrusted to Robert Bruce Lockhart 
whilst the ministers in charge were Sir Anthony Eden, Foreign Office (FO), Dalton, 
Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW) and Brendon Bracken, MoI.
55
 On 12 
September 1941, Churchill announced to Parliament that PWE had been established 
which formally split SOE in two.
56
  
 
SOE’s Central Characters 
 
 In the turbulent history of SOE, there are a number of key figures who 
deserve specific mention.
57
 One of the greatest and most important figures in the 
history of the organisation was Winston Churchill. On various occasions it was only 
through Churchill’s influence that SOE survived attacks by her sister organisations. 
Fascinated by the ‘cloak-and-dagger’ world of the Secret Services, Churchill was no 
stranger to clandestine activities. Early in his early career, he had been shot at by 
Cuban guerrillas and escaped from a Boer prisoner-of-war camp.
58
 As Home 
Secretary, he had also been involved in the creation of Britain’s intelligence 
community and ensured Vernon Kell, head of its counter-espionage section, which 
later became MI5, was provided with surveillance equipment.
59
  
 Whilst employed at the Admiralty during the early stages of the Second 
World War, Churchill became aware of a plan by Section D to seize Swedish ore 
fields. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and the Cabinet were, however, dragging 
their feet over giving permission to initiate the operation. Losing patience, Churchill 
summoned Grand to the Admiralty and demanded an explanation for the delay. On 
hearing Grand’s version of events, Churchill cornered Chamberlain and persuaded 
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him to lift the veto against the mission. The disastrous ineptitude of Section D’s 
subsequent operation was to reflect both badly on them and SIS. With the enduring 
memory of bureaucratic procrastination, it took Churchill only two months, after 
becoming Prime Minister, to establish SOE as an independent executive. His lifelong 
interest in unorthodox warfare ensured that the European Resistance was supported 
throughout the war. This network, under the control of SOE, remained a beacon of 
hope for those living under German occupation.
60
  
 It was the responsibility of Desmond Morton, an SIS officer who had fed 
Churchill intelligence throughout the 1930s, to act as the conduit between the Prime 
Minister and the Secret Services.
61
 Morton’s close connection with SIS meant that he 
was only too eager to draw Churchill’s attention to SOE’s failures.62 Despite his 
personal bias, the Prime Minister still tasked Morton with ensuring the survival of 
the fragile peace which existed between SOE and SIS.
63
  
 At the head of SIS throughout the Second World War was Sir Stewart 
Menzies, also known as ‘C’. This position had previously been held by Sir Hugh 
Sinclair who died on 4 November 1939. Two days prior to his death, Sinclair had 
written a letter pressing the case for his deputy Menzies to be his successor. With 
various suitable candidates in the running for the position, it took until 28 November 
for the Prime Minister, the armed forces and the Foreign Secretary to come to an 
unanimous agreement in favour of Menzies. Despite knowing little about 
intelligence gathering, Menzies was, however, a shrewd bureaucrat. Without the 
responsibility of disseminating GCCS’s ULTRA decrypts, it was highly unlikely that 
Menzies would have kept his position. Whilst head of SIS, he managed to forge 
strong alliances with the Foreign Office who agreed that SOE would only ever be a 
wartime organisation.
64
  
 Menzies’ opposite number in SOE, known as ‘CD’, changed three times over 
the course of the Second World War. On being appointed minister in charge of SOE, 
Dalton’s first task was to find a strong man to take operational control of the new 
executive. Originally Dalton had intended to give the position to Brigadier General 
Sir Edward Spears. He was, however, passed over in favour of Sir Frank Nelson, a 
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56 year old former Indian merchant and seven year Conservative backbencher. This 
choice gained C’s approval.65  
 In February 1942, Dalton was removed as Minister of Economic Warfare and 
replaced by Lord Selborne. Almost immediately, Selborne noticed that Nelson was 
no longer fit to continue as CD. His deputy, Sir Charles Hambro had already proven 
his capabilities and replaced Nelson in April 1942. Before joining SOE, Hambro had 
had a varied career which included working as a merchant banker and acting as the 
director of the Bank of England. Following his appointment, Selborne and Hambro 
arranged to meet on a daily basis. This allowed the minister to keep abreast of SOE’s 
activities which enabled him to support the organisation politically.
66
  
 This close relationship did not last long and eventually the pair fell out. The 
key area of contention was Hambro’s preference for maintaining SOE’s 
independence. He was also keen on keeping Selborne at arm’s length from the 
organisation’s operational procedures. Following a ministerial meeting in which 
Selborne was humiliated as Hambro had withheld important information, the 
decision was taken to find a new CD. In September 1943, Major Colin Gubbins was 
appointed as Hambro’s replacement.67 Joining MI(R) in 1939, Gubbins had been 
involved in the Norwegian Campaign and been a central figure in establishing 
Britain’s resistance network, the Auxiliary Units.68 He was, therefore, the ideal 
candidate for the position. As Gubbins was a regular soldier, he also agreed with 
Selborne that in a conflict zone, SOE should be sub-servant to the battlefield 
commander.
69
 Gubbins was to remain CD for the remainder of the war.  
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Figure 3: SOE’s internal organisation in the summer of 1943. Over the duration of 
the Second World War, this hierarchy underwent various alterations. This figure, 
however, illustrates the various sections established within the organisation.
70
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SOE’s Internal Organisation 
 
 Over the course of the Second World War, SOE’s internal hierarchy 
underwent various alterations. Despite these reorganisations, the basic structure 
remained relatively consistent (Figure 3).  
 Operational control of SOE was in the hands of CD directly under who was 
his deputy, D/CD. The organisation was then arranged into seven sections whose 
functions included dealing with security, liaison, research and development, 
supplies, finance and administration. Sub-sections which dealt daily with activities 
within mainland Europe were known as the Country Sections. These sub-sections 
were tasked with recruiting and arranging the training of their own agents. It was 
also the responsibility of Country Sections to coordinate, arrange and undertake 
operations in mainland Europe.  
 
SOE’s Operations 
 
 On 14 June 1940, Dalton advocated the establishment of a ‘democratic 
international’. The function of this organisation would be to coordinate all acts of 
subversion and sabotage against the enemy overseas. This idea was to eventually 
become SOE. Throughout the Second World War, the organisation was involved in 
undertaking a wide range of clandestine operational activities. These included 
sabotage, assassination, intelligence gathering and coordinating the activities of 
indigenous resistance networks.  
 One of SOE’s most famous acts of sabotage was undertaken as part of 
Operation GUNNERSIDE. On 16 February 1943, Lieutenant Joachim Ronneberg, 
Captain Knut Haukelid and Privates Fenriks Fredrik Kayser, Kasper Idland, Hans 
Storhaug and Birger Stromsheim from the Norwegian Independent ‘Linge’ Company 
parachuted onto the frozen Bjarnesfjord, Norway. Their task was to attack the Norsk 
Hydro Plant, Telemark.
71
 Lying in a remote valley 150 miles west of Oslo, this 
factory was the world’s largest producer of heavy water. As an essential element in 
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controlling nuclear reactions, the German order that the plant should increase its 
output to 10,000lbs (4,536kg) per annum was a strategic concern to the British.
72
  
 Attempts by Combined Operations to insert troops into Norway to destroy 
the factory failed in November 1942. Following this disaster, SOE was tasked with 
the next operation.
73
 As local defences had been strengthened, the sabotage team 
decided the only way to access the factory was via the sheer cliff face atop which the 
plant had been constructed. Entering the compound on the night of 28 February, the 
demolition parties entered the facility and set their charges within the electrolysis 
chamber without raising the alarm.
74
 This operation was a clear success for 
clandestine warfare.  
 Sabotage was not the only ‘ungentlemanly’ activity undertaking by SOE. 
One of the most audacious plots devised by SOE was that of Operation FOXLEY. In 
the summer of 1941, Section X, the German Country Section, was given the green 
light to begin assessing the feasibility of assassinating Hitler. It took them until the 
autumn of 1944 to accumulate the intelligence necessary to contemplate undertaking 
a serious attempt on Hitler’s life. The methods they devised included infiltrating 
snipers into the vicinity of the Berghof, RAF bombing raids and targeted biological 
weapons. Debates surrounding the strategic value of assassinating Hitler continued 
until his suicide on 30 April 1945.
75
  
 Whilst undertaking their allocated missions, SOE’s agents were also required 
to pass on all intelligence collected in the field to SIS. In certain regions, the 
resistance were the only allied forces operating and were, therefore, the sole source 
of SIS’s information.76 One of the most successful intelligence collaborations 
between SOE, SIS and the European Resistance was Operation MOST III.
77
 In the 
spring of 1944, a V2 rocket fired from a test range near Blizna, Poland, fell into the 
bank of the River Bug. Discovered by the Polish Home Army, the rocket was 
quickly hidden before the Germans could reclaim it. On being disassembled, the 
components were smuggled into Warsaw where scientists managed to extract the 
fuel and send samples back to London. SIS was determined to see the rocket and in 
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collaboration with SOE and Polish intelligence they arranged for it to be airlifted to 
the UK in July 1944.
78
 Operation MOST III demonstrated that the strategic value of 
the resistance could be enhanced if their activities were coordinated. Arranging for 
the airlift could only be undertaken with efficiently and reliably communicate with 
the networks on the ground. To achieve this, SOE embedded wireless operators 
within the resistance. 
 In order to ensure the resistance were working towards strategic objectives 
and not their own personal agendas, SOE also inserted their own commanders into 
local networks. These agents were specially trained in the art of clandestine warfare 
and could ensure a more professional organisation answered to the allies. The 
operational procedures and the agents’ roles necessary to embed within the 
resistance took time to identify. Some of these techniques and skills were, however, 
inherited from the organisation’s predecessors.  
 
SOE’s Origins: The Facilities of MI6’s Section D, MI(R) and 
Department EH 
 
 On the formation of SOE in July 1940, the organisation inherited a 
foundation on which to build. The organisation had been created from the 
amalgamation of Section D, MI(R) and Department EH. Although the activities of 
these organisations were limited in scope, they had begun developing operational 
procedures and clandestine equipment. In order to achieve this, it was essential they 
established their own property portfolio. On the formation of SOE, a number of these 
facilities were passed to the new organisation. From this small foundation the new 
clandestine body rapidly expanded their property portfolio to meet their increasing 
global demands. 
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Section D 
 
 Section D’s first headquarters were established in 2 Caxton Street, London. 
This grand Victorian red-brick, hotel was conveniently located for the infant section 
being a mere 100m south of SIS’s HQ in Broadway Buildings (Figure 4).79 One of 
the first ‘operational’ facilities occupied by this section was SIS’s communal 
accommodation at Bletchley Park (Figure 5). By mid-1939, the organisation had 
constructed a small magazine for explosives and incendiaries in the grounds. These 
facilities enabled Section D to initiate full-scale experiments with primitive sabotage 
weapons.
 80
 With war appearing imminent, the section saw the need to expand their 
property portfolio. On 26 August 1939, the hotel staff of The Frythe, Welwyn, were 
informed that the building was being requisitioned. Section D quickly acquired the 
use of this property to accommodate their wireless research department.
81
   
 
 
Figure 4: St Ermin’s Hotel, 2 Caxton Street, the first headquarters of SIS’s Section 
D.  
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 With war declared on 1 September 1939, Section D’s five officers at 
Bletchley Park were forced out by the rapidly expanding Government Code and 
Cypher School (GCCS). Two months later, Section D’s research section relocated to 
Aston House, Stevenage. The function of this new facility was expanded from 
merely research and development to also include manufacturing and storage of 
equipment. To facilitate this, machine and carpenters’ shops were constructed in the 
grounds. In order to prepare and pack explosive charges, a miniature filling factory 
was also erected. It was not long before the storerooms at Aston House were holding 
several tons of high explosives and incendiaries. The ad hoc training of saboteurs 
was also conducted within the grounds of this facility.
82
  
 
 
Figure 5: Bletchley Park, home to Section D until lack of space forced them to 
relocate to Aston House. Within the grounds, Section D constructed magazines. The 
facility was also used to conduct experiments with sabotage weaponry.  
 
 It took Section D until June 1940, however, to establish a specific industrial 
sabotage school.
83
 Known as Station XVII and located at Brickendonbury, 
Hertfordshire, this facility was run by Commander Peers, RN. The instructional staff 
included Major Hill, Mr Philby, Mr Burgess and Professor Paterson whose aim was 
to train European exiles to act as instructors and recruiters. On returning to mainland 
Europe, these agents would be able to raise resistance networks and commit specific 
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acts of sabotage.
84
 Despite the limited size of Section D’s property portfolio, The 
Frythe, Aston House and Brickendonbury, were all to become important centres 
within SOE. 
 
MI(R) 
 
 Unlike Section D who mainly established facilities associated with research 
and development, MI(R)’s limited property portfolio was aimed towards training 
agents. By May 1940, MI(R) had already established a Special Training Centre 
(STC) at Lochailort, Scotland, to provide Polish wireless operators instruction in 
their new transceivers (Figure 6).
85
  
 
 
Figure 6: Lochailort, home to MI(R)’s Special Training Centre. Here Polish wireless 
operators were trained so they could establish W/T stations behind enemy lines in 
occupied Europe.  
 
 MI(R) also established a training facility at Arisaig House, Inverness-shire, 
which was commanded by Major Munn (Figure 7). It was the function of this site to 
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train students in demolitions, weapon training, combined operations, forward 
reconnaissance and clandestine intelligence work. Following an inspection of the 
local area by Major Davis and Major Wilson, Inverie House, Rhubana Lodge and 
Meoble Lodge were all requisitioned to serve as satellites to Arisaig House.
86
 The 
clustering of MI(R)’s training facilities in the highlands of Scotland was to have an 
important impact on the later development of SOE’s paramilitary schools.  
 
 
Figure 7: Arisaig House, home to a MI(R) training facility. The facility was 
expanded with the requisitioning of Inverie House, Rhubana Lodge and Meoble 
Lodge to serve as wings to Arisaig House.  
 
Department EH 
 
 Department EH inherited its name from Electra House, London, in which 
they were accommodated from 3 April 1939 (Figure 8). Within Room 207, a 
Reuter’s tape machine, wireless equipment, maps and other relevant resources were 
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all provided. Department EH was also provided with the services of a stenographer.
87
 
At the time of the organisation’s mobilisation at 10:00 on 1 September 1939, Stuart, 
his personal staff, the chief printing officer and the Military Wing were all based at 
Electra House. Whilst Stuart’s deputy along with the Planning, Editorial and 
Intelligence sections were all based at Woburn Abbey Riding School.
88
  
 
 
Figure 8: Electra House, home of Department EH, and from which the organisation 
inherited their name.  
 
 Department EH’s connection with Woburn Abbey, Bedfordshire, was 
serendipitous. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, concerns over the threat posed to 
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London by the Luftwaffe were rife within Whitehall. Government departments, 
therefore, began searching for potential safe refuges in the countryside far from the 
dangers of bombing. Department EH identified Woburn Abbey as suitable for their 
needs and immediately initiated negotiations with the Duke of Bedford’s 
representatives.
89
 Although unwilling to lease the Abbey, the Duke eventually 
compromised and allowed the organisation access to the Riding School and the 
stable block.
90
  
 In preparation for their staff relocating to Woburn Abbey, Department EH 
began alterations to the Riding School in August (Figure 9). Cubicles were created 
by inserting partitions whilst sleeping accommodation was arranged on the second 
floor of the stable block.
91
 Initially, however, the organisation had to share the 
grounds with various other governmental departments.
92
 It was not until later in the 
war that the estate became Department EH’s sole preserve.  
 
 
Figure 9: The Riding School, the linear building at the back of the photograph, at 
Woburn Abbey. At the outbreak of the Second World War, Department EH relocated 
to this property.  
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 Within close proximity to Woburn Abbey, Department EH acquired the use 
of The Old Rectory, Eversholt, Paris House (Figure 10), Foxfield and Maryland.
93
 
These properties could be used to accommodate visitors and ‘where discussions with 
them can be held. Certain senior members of the staff not only live there, but do a 
considerable part of their work there’.94 On the formation of PWE in 1941, 
Department EH’s property portfolio passed from SOE to the new executive. 
 
 
Figure 10: Paris House, Woburn Abbey, one of the main buildings acquired by 
Department EH on the Duke of Bedford’s estate which were utilised as offices and 
accommodation.  
 
SOE’s Property Portfolio: An Overview 
 
 Before the formation of SOE in July 1940, her predecessors had begun 
establishing their own property portfolios. Although limited in extent, these sites 
were to form the core of SOE’s later expansion of facilities. This thesis has identified 
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that over the course of the Second World War, SOE operated 176 facilities across the 
UK.
95
 The nature of these sites varied from office blocks located within central 
London, through large private properties up to stately homes. In common to all sites 
requisitioned by SOE was the organisation’s requirement for land. This provided the 
organisation with space to train their agents, test their equipment and stockpile 
supplies.  
 
 
Figure 11: A composite map of SOE’s property portfolio during the Second World 
War. For the first time, this thesis has mapped all known facilities operated by SOE 
in the UK during the Second World War.  
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 By undertaking this study, a composite map of SOE’s entire property 
portfolio within the UK has been produced for the first time (Figure 11). The 
greatest concentration of SOE’s sites were found within reach of the organisation’s 
command and control facilities located within central London. Facilities found on the 
periphery were generally associated with specialised activities, training or 
operational necessity. The transportation hubs located within Cornwall and the 
Shetlands were ideally situated for their area of operation in Brittany and Norway 
respectively. The clustering of training facilities in the Scottish Highlands had 
historical connotations for SOE. This was where MI(R) had previously established 
their bases for instruction in clandestine warfare. The following chapters will assess 
the nature and development of this portfolio with reference to the various aspects of 
SOE’s operation.  
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CHAPTER III 
Training 
 
 Central to the survival and potential operational success of SOE’s agents 
working in occupied Europe was their training. Prior to the establishment of the 
organisation, comprehensive instruction in subversive warfare had never been 
attempted by the British Government. By the time SOE was disbanded in 1946, the 
organisation had devised a flexible training regime, indispensable to those operating 
abroad.
1
 Despite the fundamental importance of training to the successful outcome of 
an operation, no published account exists on the activities of the Special Training 
Schools (STSs), SOE’s primary vehicle for instructing prospective agents.2 William 
Mackenzie, SOE’s official historian, puts this failure to the fact that there was ‘no 
centralised responsibility for the whole of SOE training … [therefore] it is not easy 
to give a comprehensive picture of its methods and output’.3  
 SOE’s prospective students came from all walks of life: professional soldiers 
might respond to adverts on regimental notice boards, bored housewives could be 
approached by the ‘man from the Ministry’ or linguists responding to newspaper 
advertisements. On determining a candidate’s potential suitability and the 
completion of a background check, SOE would request their presence at an interview 
conducted in London by the relevant Country Section’s Recruiting Officer. This 
provided the recruiter an opportunity to assess the candidate’s character and their 
potential as an agent.
4
 On successfully being enrolled into SOE, a student was 
subjected to continuous assessment as they navigated the organisations training 
hierarchy. SOE’s STSs were designed to act as a ‘set of sieves’ which only allowed 
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the most competent students to progress towards becoming operational agents.
5
 
These stages included Preliminary, Paramilitary, Finishing and Specialist schools.  
 The provision of training was essential to the survival of SOE’s agents in 
hostile territory. Failure to provide the necessary skills essential to ‘pass’ in occupied 
Europe could lead to mission failure, security implications and loss of life.
6
 To 
ensure students were provided with up-to-date intelligence, information gathered 
from debriefing returning agents would be fed into the training programme. The 
smallest piece of intelligence overlooked by the instructors could undermine the 
security of an agent. Operatives in France, for example, could have compromised 
their cover if they attempted to order a ‘café noir’; as milk was rationed, coffee was 
always served black.
7
 Returning agents were, therefore, often reassigned to act as 
instructors.
8
 This ensured that the training offered was reactive to the current milieu 
in occupied Europe.  
 Over SOE’s lifetime, the organisation ran an estimated 13,500 ‘courses’ for 
6,800 students of various nationalities. SOE also provided SIS agents and SAS 
troopers with instruction in subversive warfare. At its peak, between 1,200 and 1,400 
officers, NCOs and other ranks were employed by the Training Section.
9
 As the war 
progressed, the number of STSs increased (Figure 12). This was related to SOE’s 
increasing political support and the need to train a greater number of agents in 
preparation for Operation OVERLORD. Of SOE’s 176 facilities, approximately 38% 
were dedicated to training. This clearly demonstrates an appreciation of the value of 
instructing agents in clandestine techniques to the success of the organisation.  
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Figure 12: As the war progressed, the number of STSs increased. This was in 
relation to the greater political support offered to SOE from the end of 1941. 
Following the success of Operation OVERLORD, the number of training facilities 
operated by SOE rapidly decreased.
10
  
 
 The focal point of SOE’s STS distribution was Greater London (Figure 13). 
This inevitably supported the top-down approach to agent selection. It also ensured 
constant and close supervision of student training by the organisation’s support 
staff.
11
 The Home Counties, however, were not suitable for every aspect of the 
training regime. Paramilitary instruction was offered in the wild and rugged Scottish 
Highlands whilst parachute training was provided at the RAF’s parachute school in 
Manchester.  
 Training was not, however, restricted to SOE’s field agents. On 5 November 
1941 a memo informed the heads of all sections that ‘[i]t has been agreed by C.D. 
and the Daily Council that all newly joined officers of S.O.E., and other officers who 
have not yet taken a comprehensive training course, should do so in the future’.12 
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The first programme of instruction was to start on 30 November and run until 7 
December.
13
 This intensive seven day course was designed to cover nearly all 
aspects of life as an agent operating within an enemy occupied country.
14
 By 
providing their backroom staff with an appreciation of life in the field, SOE hoped 
that their UK based organisation structure could provide appropriate support.  
 
 
Figure 13: A composite map of the distribution of SOE’s STSs. Throughout the war, 
the functions of STSs occasionally changed.   
 
 This chapter will demonstrate that over the course of the war, SOE developed 
an exceptional training package. The organisation provided their students with state-
of-the-art equipment and a regime characterised by its flexibility, professionalism, 
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continuity and its appreciation of up-to-date intelligence. This training equipment 
was of an ephemeral nature and is unlikely to survive.
15
 To accommodate students 
and provide lecture facilities, it was essential that SOE requisitioned large houses 
with extensive estates. It was these pre-existing structures which have endured. 
Initially, this chapter will present an historical narrative of SOE’s training regime. 
This is followed by a section on the physical nature of the equipment utilised by the 
instructors in preparing students for life in occupied Europe.  
 
SOE’s Training Regime: an Historical Context 
 
 On the formation of SOE in July 1940, it was abundantly clear that if they 
were to achieve the objectives Churchill had set, the organisation must have at its 
disposal a continuous stream of professionally trained agents. As the organisation’s 
predecessors had demonstrated limited interest in providing their agents training, 
SOE was effectively starting from a blank canvas.
16
  
 On joining SOE in the autumn of 1940 from MI(R), Major Davies was 
immediately allocated the vital task of devising a training regime for prospective 
agents. Completing his paper by 12 October 1940, Davies’ ideas were immediately 
adopted by the organisation. Although undergoing minor reactive alterations, his 
broad training principles remained relatively unchanged throughout the course of the 
war. Davies’ envisaged a four tier system comprising of Preliminary, Paramilitary, 
Finishing Schools and Holding Schools. Each Country Section would also have a flat 
in London which it would use for the final briefing and dispatch of agents.
17
 The 
following subsections examine the history, function and nature of SOE’s hierarchical 
training regime.  
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Preliminary Schools (Group C) 
 
 Following selection, the first stage of a student’s training was undertaken at 
the Preliminary Schools. Here, instructors focused on basic physical fitness, map 
reading and elementary firearm handling.
18
 The syllabus also instructed in basic 
demolition, elementary wireless communication, fieldcraft and close combat.
19
 As 
the vast majority of SOE’s students lacked any previous military experience, this 
stage of their training was essential to future deployment.
20
  
 By 1941, the syllabus taught at Preliminary Schools lasted one month and 
was designed ‘to test out the student[’s] … “guts” … [and to] weed out those who 
are in any way unsound’.21 One unorthodox technique employed to test their 
character was to assess the student’s alcohol tolerance.22 Following attendance of a 
lecture on the security implications of excessive drinking, instructors would then 
take the students to a local bar. At these establishments, Security Officers would ply 
the recruits with free alcohol to test their willpower and observe their inebriated 
state.
23
 The attention paid to the less obvious aspects of a student’s character reflects 
the professionalism of SOE’s instructors. This attitude ensured only the most able 
graduated to work as agents in the field.  
 Within months of SOE establishing their new training regime, the standard of 
instruction at the Preliminary Schools was already being commended. By 19 April 
1941, the Paramilitary Schools Commandant was of the opinion that ‘No.1 Special 
School [Brock Hall] deserve great credit for the manner in which the students had 
been prepared for their Paramilitary. They were found to be about one week in 
advance of most parties arriving here. They are about the best lot I have yet 
encountered, always cheerful and on the whole very keen. In fieldcraft and guerrilla 
warfare they are excellent’.24 Despite this internal praise originating from within the 
Training Section, Preliminary Schools were often the focus of organisational 
criticism. The provision of training whilst maintaining total operational secrecy 
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proved difficult. Country Sections were also concerned of the four week delay 
imposed by this initial stage in training.
25
  
 Unable to appreciate the importance of continual student assessment, Country 
Sections demonstrated total faith in their Recruiting Officer’s decision. In the case of 
SOE’s French F Section, Captain Selwyn Jepson was solely responsible for 
recruiting students.
26
 As a student progressed through the organisation’s training 
programme, the greater the security risk they posed if they were eventually deemed 
unsuitable.
27
 During their time with SOE, failed students would have gained 
knowledge of their peers, instructors, techniques and potential targets. Identifying 
individuals early who were unlikely to graduate as agents was, therefore, vital to the 
organisation. The inclusion of Preliminary Schools as a form of student assessment 
was essential to the security of SOE. Up until the summer of 1943, this remained the 
main point of entry. Eventually, they were replaced by the Student Assessment 
Board (SAB) which was a compromise between the Country Sections and the 
security of the organisation.  
 
Student Assessment Board 
 
 It was inevitable that not all candidates sent to the Preliminary Schools by the 
Recruiting Officers were the right calibre. Instructors often found it difficult to 
convince the Country Sections that they had made a mistake. In an attempt to 
address the security concerns associated with failed students, SOE established the 
‘ISRB Workshop’, Inverlair, known as ‘The Cooler’ (Figure 14). At this facility, 
individuals who had failed to complete their training were detained until they no 
longer proved a risk.
28
 By 1943, the student dropout rate was too great to continue 
with the current system. It was, therefore, decided to replace the Preliminary Schools 
with the SAB.
29
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Figure 14: Inverlair Lodge, the ‘Cooler’. It was here that failed students were 
accommodated until they were no longer deemed a security risk.  
 
 At the time of this decision, the Country Sections concerns with the time 
students spent in preliminary instruction was now shared by the newly appointed 
Director of Training, Lieutenant Colonel Woolrych. The solution was the 
introduction of a bastardised War Office Selection Board for Officers.
30
 Initial 
student assessment would now be based on a combination of physical and 
psychological tests as well as interviews which span four days.
31
 Potential candidates 
would still, however, be selected by the Country Section’s Recruiting Officer.32   
 Replacing Preliminary Schools with a selection board inevitably resulted in 
the desired reduction in the initial stage of training. To pacify those concerned with a 
decline in the length of time students underwent instruction, the syllabus at the 
Paramilitary Schools was extended. Overall, however, the training syllabus was 
successfully reduced. This had the duel benefit of enabling greater numbers of 
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students to pass through SOE’s STSs whilst, concurrently, releasing properties 
previously utilised as Preliminary Schools for more pressing training requirements.
33
  
 By March 1943, Gubbins was presented with the finalised plan for the new 
selection board. The following month, the necessary arrangements had been made 
for the replacement of the Preliminary Schools in favour of the SAB. Lieutenant 
Colonel Charley, from SOE’s Security Section, was appointed the first president of 
the board. To accommodate the SAB, Preliminary School STS4, Winterfold, was 
chosen and renamed STS7.
34
 On 5 April 1943, all regional heads and Country 
Sections were informed that the Preliminary Schools were no longer accepting 
applicants.
35
 The SAB finally welcomed its first party of prospective students in 
June.
36
  
 The first stage of the SAB involved every candidate being interviewed by 
either the board’s president or deputy-president. This provided a base line from 
which the prospective students could be assessed. Candidates would then be 
subjected to a series of psychiatric interviews and psychological and physical tests. 
By comparing these with the personal records of those students who went on to 
become field agents meant the SAB’s tests could be tailored to individuals.37 These 
records were also of value ‘when an agent, as a result of his experience was in need 
of psychiatric treatment, which was carried out as far as possible by the psychiatrists 
of the SAB’.38  
 By the autumn of 1944, when the end of the war was in sight, SOE 
dramatically reduced the scope of their training programme. On 16 November the 
SAB was finally closed. SOE did, however, retain the services of one psychiatrist 
and a sergeant to administer remedial treatment to returning agents.
39
 
 SOE’s introduction of the SAB resulted in a ‘marked decrease in the numbers 
of men rejected from training, and most Country Sections expressed themselves well 
satisfied with the system. This satisfaction was not however, unanimous, and it was 
held by some that the SAB constituted a bottleneck, which was holding up 
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operations, and a number of applications were made for candidates to be excused 
passing through the SAB’.40 
 
Paramilitary Schools (Group A) 
 
 Students who successfully graduated from the preliminary stage of training 
relocated to Scotland for an intensive three to four week course in paramilitary 
instruction (Figure 15).
41
 Security and the hostile environment made the Scottish 
Highlands the ideal setting for this stage of the students training. The Defence 
Regulation of 1939 empowered by the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act designated 
the whole of north-west Scotland, above the Great Glen, as a ‘Protected Area’. 
Although intended to enhance the security of the strategically sensitive coastline and 
naval base at Scapa Flow, it had the added benefit of providing a secure locality for 
clandestine training.
42
 Following a failed operation to Sognefjord in 1940, 
Lieutenant Colonel Bryan Mayfield and Captain William ‘Bill’ Stirling, of SAS 
notoriety, in collaboration with MI(R) established an irregular warfare school at 
Inverlochy Castle. Topographically and climatically, the hostile environment was 
ideal for instructing students in fieldcraft and survival skills (Figure 16).
43
  
 SOE’s predecessor’s connection with the Scottish Highlands gave the 
organisation a foothold in the area. To accommodate the number of students SOE 
sent for paramilitary training, it was inevitable that the number of STSs in the region 
would have to proliferate. At these schools, candidates were physically prepared for 
operating within an hostile environment. Students were instructed in fieldcraft, map 
reading and ‘living off the land’.44 By 1941, the syllabus also included weapons 
training, demolitions, grenade throwing, wireless telegraphy (W/T) and close 
combat.
45
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Figure 15: Distribution of SOE’s Paramilitary Schools in the Scottish Highlands. 
These facilities were all clustered around Loch Morar with the exception of 
Inverlochy Castle. This facility was inherited by SOE on its formation.  
 
 The paramilitary instructors ensured that the students attending the schools 
were pushed both mentally and physically. Before breakfast, a series of physical 
exercises had to be successfully completed. The remainder of the day involved 
attended lectures, undertaking courses and practical fieldcraft instruction. To provide 
students with practical experience of self-sufficiency, the instructors would also 
leave the students in the wilderness with dummy explosives and a target to attack. 
Over the following days, the candidates had to survive by poaching and foraging.
46
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The development of extended exercises allowed students to transfer theoretical skills 
learnt in the lecture hall into practical experience.  
 
 
Figure 16: The landscape of Scottish Highlands is bleak and unforgiving. It was 
within this environment that SOE sent their students to learn how to live off the land. 
These exercises could last several days and were designed to test various skills 
learnt during their training.
47
  
 
 Whilst attending the Group A Schools, courses were also provided in 
paranaval activities. Instruction was given in simple navigation, elementary sailing, 
boat maintenance, use of underwater containers, beach reconnaissance and visual 
signalling.
48
 To aid the instructors, SOE supplied a number of small vessels.
49
 On 23 
February 1941, it was proposed to increase the size of this fleet by the purchase of a 
West Coast fishing drifter which would be used for landing exercises.
50
 Despite SOE 
providing the necessary resources, the paranaval instruction was the source of 
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criticism. Techniques taught were occasionally reproached for being 
‘impracticable’.51 This was because the infancy of paranaval operations meant 
instructors often had to learn techniques in parallel to providing training.  
 To train students in the art of paramilitary activities, SOE recruited 
instructors with diverse backgrounds. It was felt that the innovative nature of 
clandestine warfare required new thinking untainted by the traditional military 
establishment. Although some instructors had previously served as soldiers, the 
organisation also employed those who had practical life experience.
52
 One of these 
was the Sandringham estate’s gamekeeper who taught fieldcraft. When employing 
instructors, SOE identified those candidates with exception skills. Although SOE’s 
Major Sykes, previously of the Shanghai Municipal Police Reserve Unit, personified 
a stereotypical ‘country rector’, he was deadly in unarmed combat.53 It was the 
organisation’s desire to employ the best instructors for their students despite their 
backgrounds: an unorthodox method of warfare required unconventional thinkers.  
 
Finishing Schools (Group B) 
 
 Following the successful completion of paramilitary training, students were 
sent to Beaulieu, Hampshire, for a six week ‘finishing’ course.54 It was here that 
prospective agents were taught how to ‘pass’ everyday scrutiny when living in 
enemy territory. Failure to act like a native would draw unwanted attention to an 
agent’s activities.55 At these schools, students were instructed in how to be an ‘agent’ 
instead of just a ‘saboteur’.  
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Figure 17: Distribution of SOE’s Finishing Schools in the Beaulieu area. This 
location offered SOE numerous large properties within close proximity. These 
facilities could provide accommodation, office space and large estates necessary for 
the training of students.  
 
 By the autumn of 1940, it was decided to locate the Finishing Schools in an 
area where numerous suitable properties were conveniently located around a central 
headquarters (Figure 17). This arrangement would enable students to be segregated 
by nationality whilst pooling specialist instructors.
56
 By centralising their instructors, 
SOE could offer a high standard of consistent training. The property chosen to 
accommodate the tutors was Beaulieu Manor (Figure 18).
57
 Within close proximity 
there were a variety of suitable properties which could also be requisitioned. These 
                                                          
56
 Cyril Cunningham, Beaulieu p. 18 
57
 Michael Foot, SOE p. 85 
55 
 
offered a wide range of accommodation from small properties which only billeted 
four students through to much larger facilities which housed specialised 
instruction.
58
  
 
 
Figure 18: Beaulieu Manor, Hampshire. This provided accommodation for the 
instructors at SOE’s Finishing Schools.59  
 
 On first arriving at the Finishing Schools, students were lectured on the 
facilities security regulations. This included a strict ban on leaving the boundaries of 
the STSs.
60
 Despite this warning, students regularly wandered off. It was the 
responsibility of SOE’s Security Officers to monitor conversations in local pubs and 
to return those students found outside the confines of the schools.
61
 The confining of 
students in a small location would inevitably result in some form of fraternisation 
between parties. Security implications associated with this were clearly outweighed 
by the advantages of centralising highly specialised instructors.  
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 Whilst attending the Finishing Schools, the students’ syllabus included 
robbery, burglary, forgery, ‘black’ propaganda, blackmail, cyphers, pigeon handling, 
invisible inks and the German counter-espionage agencies.
62
 To provide students 
with applied, as well as theoretical instruction, three categories of practical exercises 
were devised.
63
 These were indoor, outdoor and 96 hour schemes. Indoor, ‘Y’, 
exercises enabled students to practice topics covered in lectures which might include 
concealment, body searches and personal disguises. In contrast, outdoor ‘X’ schemes 
gave prospective agents a taster of clandestine life.
64
  
 By introducing a 96 hour scheme, SOE’s instructors devised an exercise 
which tested a student’s ability to survive in enemy territory over an extended 
timeframe. ‘Agents’ would be dispatched to a large conurbation with the objective of 
reconnoitring a specified target.
65
 In order to achieve this, contact had to be made 
with a known ‘sympathiser’ who was ‘favourable to the cause. The student [then] 
has to ... give him a definite job in the organisation, and train him not only for this 
job but also in general security precautions. In addition he has to arrange clandestine 
communications with the contact’.66 To ensure a heightened level of realism, the 
‘agents’ would be under police surveillance. Those who successfully lost their tail 
would eventually be ‘arrested’ and subjected to interrogation.67 2nd Lieutenant T 
Brooks recalled that:  
‘About two o’clock in the morning we were woken up by batmen 
and mess waiters we recognised but dressed as German troops with 
tin hats on and rifles with bayonets. We were thrown out of bed, 
told to wrap ourselves up in our blankets and marched out barefoot 
across the parade ground into the garage where Sturmführer Follis 
was wearing his SS uniform. We were told to stand up and were 
harangued in broken Kruat, which became English, and taken 
through our training cover stories and I played it straight … This 
was a very valuable experience’.68  
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 To instruct the students in the way of ‘passing’, SOE employed a group of 
‘pretty odd fish’.69 These included John Wedgwood, of the pottery family,70 Bill 
Brooker, a European Nestlé salesman, Paul Dehn, a Sunday newspaper film critic, 
Kim Philby, who proved to be a communist spy, and Johnny Ramenski, an ex-
convict SOE released from prison.
71
  
 
Holding Schools (Group C) 
 
 The penultimate stage in a student’s training before graduating as an agent 
took place at Holding Schools. As accommodating those awaiting deployment at 
Finishing Schools proved impractical, Holding Schools were established to fill this 
requirement.
72
 These new facilities were dispersed throughout the Home Counties 
isolated from SOE’s other STSs. This distribution illustrates a desire within the 
organisation to isolate agents awaiting operational clearance. By imposing physical 
segregation, SOE ensured there could be limited fraternisation between agents. This 
acted as a security precaution which ensured sensitive operational details could not 
be compromised by the capture of one of their operatives.  
 Initially intended to house agents segregated by nationality, this rapidly 
proved impractical. As the number of operatives belonging to each of the Country 
Sections fluctuated over time,
73
 SOE could not feasibly allocated specific Holding 
Schools to individual nationalities.
74
  
 Despite this reluctance, the organisation did allocate accommodation for the 
Norwegian contingent at Fawley Court, Buckinghamshire. By November 1941, SOE 
determined that this facility was detrimental to the agents accommodated there. It 
was deemed that the environment of the Home Counties was impacting the pre-
deployment conditioning of their operatives. In an effort to ensure the Norwegians 
were in peak operational condition, SOE relocated their Holding Schools to 
Aviemore, Scotland.
75
 These facilities were, after all, intended as ‘pools in which 
trained agents could be held in conditions of comparative security and in which 
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undue deterioration of their physical condition could be avoided’.76 Despite this 
function, this stage in SOE’s training regime was routinely criticised. Many felt it 
was difficult to effectively plan work programmes for agents under such conditions. 
Country Sections also demonstrated a preference for accommodating agents in 
London for briefings.
77
  
 Although originally coming under the direct control of the Training Section, 
by August 1942 it was decided that Holding Schools required closer supervision than 
currently available. Major Spooner, Commandant of STS45, was, subsequently, 
promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and appointed as Inspector of Schools. This 
coincided with the combing of Preliminary and Holding Schools into Group C 
facilities. Although Spooner was tasked with ensuring a high standard of instruction 
within this group of schools, his remit was extended to safeguard the proper 
coordination of training throughout a student’s career.78 
 Despite the appointment of Spooner, Holding Schools were still criticised. In 
December 1942, it was brought to the attention of General Ingr that morale amongst 
the Czechoslovakian agents accommodated at STS46, Chichley Hall, was 
deteriorating.
79
 Tasked with investigating these reports, Colonel Moravec determined 
that although morale was good, there was a lack of military discipline. The decline in 
morale which had been observed was the result of ‘the fact that these men had been 
too long at STS46’.80 Independently, SOE concluded that this deterioration was 
because of the failure of the Czechoslovakian headquarters to develop a firm 
operational programme. Instructors at Holding Schools were thus presented with 
agents who lacked specific operational roles and timeframes for deployment. In 
SOE’s view, it was ‘this complete lack of direction that the decline in morale must 
be attributed’.81  
 The lack of initiative in developing innovative training packages at Holding 
Schools was attributed to the Country Sections’ negative attitude. By not 
acknowledging that the stagnation of agents in these facilities was the result of their 
indifference, Country Sections underestimated the potential value of these STSs. As 
the deterioration of agents could not be allowed to continue, the Training Section, in 
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collaboration with the Country Sections, gradually began making improvements. 
Throughout 1942 and 1943, the elderly commandants of the Holding Schools were 
replaced by younger, more dynamic officers. It was hoped that these officers, who 
had experience of contemporary training techniques, might bring new and 
unorthodox ideas to the criticised STSs.
82
 
 The exception to this universal criticism of Holding Schools was STS45, 
Hatherop Castle. At this facility, ‘a comprehensive and graduated programme of 
training was put into practice, due mainly to the energy and foresight of Major 
Spooner and to the co-operative attitude of the Danish Country Section’.83 STS45’s 
principle was that a student’s training should revolve around the Holding School. 
From there they ‘went to the specialised courses in other schools, but returned each 
time to consolidate the knowledge they had gained and to integrate it into their 
general plan of training which was based on their probable mission’.84 It was this 
energy and dynamism that SOE hoped to install into the other Holding Schools by 
appointing Spooner Inspector of Schools. Despite efforts to improve the quality of 
Holding Schools, these facilities were replaced with Operational Holding Schools 
following the formation of the SAB in 1943. 
 
Operational Holding Schools (Group C) 
 
 With the formation of the SAB, SOE combined the remnants of the 
Preliminary Schools with the Holding Schools to form ‘Operational Holding 
Schools’, also known as Group C.85 Despite the abolishment of the often criticised 
Holding Schools, there was still ‘little real co-operation … reached with the Country 
Sections who persisted in withdrawing their students at the shortest notice, making 
the preparation of a training programme extremely difficult, or even in keeping them 
entirely in London [out of the Operational Holding Schools]’.86  
 In keeping with the individualistic nature of agents’ roles in occupied Europe, 
training at Group C Schools was ‘derive[d] from the operational role of the student, 
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and the previous instruction he [or she] had received’.87 Individualised training 
programmes were developed to address the weaknesses identified in the student’s 
report card. Instructors also took into account the agent’s mission and estimated 
timeframe until departure.
88
 By providing tailored training at Operational Holding 
Schools, SOE tried to eradicate the belief within Country Sections that agents 
stagnated whilst awaiting deployment.  
 Before the introduction of the Operational Holding Schools, their 
predecessors have attempted to establish ‘extended’ exercises for agents awaiting 
deployment. These were, however, not without their critics. Moravec felt these 
schemes ‘encouraged the [Czechoslovakians] students to sit about in pubs and did 
little to improve either their conspirative skill or their morale’.89 By January 1943, 
however, Morvac was eventually persuaded that extended exercises had benefits.
90
 
The introduction of the Operational Holding Schools saw these exercises replaced 
with the ‘Group C Continuation Schemes’. Based on the Finishing Schools’ 96 hour 
exercises, the Continuation Scheme was designed to test group dynamics. Whilst 
participating, agents were expected to utilise the full range of skills they had learnt 
from their training. In parallel, those awaiting deployment were also continuously 
subjected to exercises which covered all aspects of clandestine living.
91
 The realism 
of the exercises arranged by the Operational Holding School illustrates SOE’s desire 
to ensure their agents were prepared for all eventualities.  
 With the end of the war in sight by the autumn of 1944, SOE disbanded their 
Paramilitary Schools. To ensure the organisation did not lose the function of these 
facilities, the Operational Holding Schools inherited their syllabus. With the nature 
of the war changing, SOE also realised there was no longer a need to supply the 
resistance with support staff. What they required were professionals to lead guerrilla 
activities. SOE, therefore, increased its recruitment of officers with experience of 
modern warfare. As the situation in Europe was changing on a daily basis, it was 
essential that the training became even more flexible. Students now had to be rushed 
through the training programme with some courses lasting only seven days. 
Following the liberation of France and Belgium, paramilitary training at Operational 
                                                          
87
 TNA HS 7/51 History of the Training Section of SOE Chapter X p. 52 
88
 Ibid p. 52 
89
 TNA HS 4/1 MX/CZ/1393 p. 4 
90
 TNA HS 4/1 MX/CZ/1446 p. 1 
91
 TNA HS 7/51 History of the Training Section of SOE Chapter X p. 52 
61 
 
Holding Schools was subsequently run on an ad hoc basis.
92
 With the introduction of 
the SAB in 1943, SOE reconfigured its training programme. Preliminary Schools, 
which were now surplus to requirements, were combined with the Holding Schools 
to form ‘Operational Holding Schools’. These facilities devised innovative and 
individualistic training courses tailored to students’ requirements.  
 
Specialist Schools 
 
 Before a student could be removed for active duty, they each had to complete 
a specialist course.
93
 To prepare prospective agents for the specific roles identified 
for them by their instructors, SOE established numerous Specialist Schools. Some 
STSs were established primarily to teach industrial sabotage, radio operation, 
organising reception committees and microphotography (Figure 19).
94
 Although not 
every agent despatched by SOE was allocated a specific operational target, they were 
all sent to fill certain roles. The provision of standard training ensured each student 
was fully prepared for life in hostile territory. Specialist instruction, however, 
allowed SOE to embed agents within the resistance who were experts in their 
allotted function.  
 Dispersed to the north of London, SOE’s Specialist STSs were interspersed 
amongst the organisation’s Holding Schools. This distribution was based on the 
principal developed at STS45, Hatherop Castle, whereby students would be 
accommodated at Holding Schools and then sent to specialist facilities for further 
instruction.
95
 On returning to their Holding School, the student would then 
‘consolidate the knowledge they had gained and to integrate it into their general plan 
of training’.96 Specialist STS’s proximity to Holding Schools was, therefore, 
favourable. 
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Figure 19: Industrial sabotage and wireless operation were some of the specialist 
topics taught to students at SOE’s STSs. Within the grounds of several of SOE’s 
STSs, railway track was laid so that the students could practice demolition 
techniques.
97
  
 
 SOE’s first specialist school was formed at Station XVII, Brickendonbury, in 
1941.
98
 Originally established by Section D, SOE converted this facility into one 
which purely taught industrial sabotage and renamed it STS17. At this time, ‘no 
previous experience was available on which instruction could be based. It was 
necessary, therefore, to start from scratch and first develop suitable methods of 
sabotage and then to devise a suitable training programme’.99 One of the greatest 
challenges faced by the new instructors was the limited engineering knowledge of 
their students.
100
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Figure 20: Students receiving training at STS17, Brickendonbury. To increase the 
realism of the instruction, SOE brought in machinery on which students could learn 
the practical skills of sabotage.
101
  
 
 By August 1944, STS17’s instructors had devised three training packages 
which covered all students’ abilities. The basic course was designed for personnel 
with no prior technical experience and lasted three weeks.
102
 It was STS17’s basic 
function to teach prospective agents the most effective way of disabling machinery 
(Figure 20).
103
 For those students who were to focus on a specific branch of 
industrial sabotage, the instructors devised the specialist course which lasted one to 
seven days. In the case of agents who were being prepared for a specific mission, 
instructors would design operational courses which could last between two and 
seven days. Central to all these syllabuses were visits to engineering works, factories 
and installations of strategic importance. Seeing the equipment in situ was invaluable 
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aid to teaching. Despite staffing shortages and the multilingual nature of the courses, 
instruction available at STS17 was regarded as ‘surprisingly good’.104  
 One of the most important members of a resistance network was the wireless 
operator. It was only through direct contact with them that operations could be 
planned, coordinated and initiated by SOE. As one of the most dangerous positions 
available within the resistance, SOE had to be certain that those students they trained 
to be W/T operators were of the right calibre. Early on in the training programme, 
instructors identified those students who demonstrated a ‘combination of 
intelligence, courage and discretion, plus the necessary degree of physical fitness’ to 
attend the wireless schools.
105
 
 SOE were quick to appreciate that ‘[s]ecret signallers are as different from 
ordinary W/T operators as race-horses are from cart-horses’.106 It was, therefore, 
essential that the wireless instruction offered by the organisation was tailored to the 
specific needs of clandestine W/T operators. The course had to create agents who 
were equally adept with radio equipment as evading the elaborate systems of 
direction finding employed by the Germans. As the timeframe available in which to 
provide W/T instruction was limited, it was essential that ‘[c]losest co-ordination … 
be maintained with the MO [Operations] section so that the specific type of duty for 
which the agent is being trained can be constantly borne in mind’.107  
 One technique commonly employed by SOE’s wireless instructors was to 
arrange long distance signalling exercises. During exercise BLUFF, which 
commenced on 21 March 1944, two radio operators were despatched to Birmingham 
and Newcastle. At their safe houses, the pair were each tasked with communicating 
back to base, STS52, and their control station, STS47.
108
 Until 25 April 1944, 
students were dispatched to these ‘safe houses’ on exercises unaccompanied. 
Following this date, the practice ceased. Instead, they were to be sent to Holding 
Schools from where they would communicate with STS52. The commandant of the 
specific school would be informed beforehand so they could arrange for a signal 
officer to supervise the student. This also ensured that the wireless equipment used 
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was safely returned on conclusion of the exercise.
109
 On completing their training, 
students often requested that the equipment they had been instructed on followed 
them into the field.
110
 This ensured the wireless operators did not encounter 
unexpected surprises when they began transmitting from within occupied Europe.  
 
 
Figure 21: RAF Ringway, 1946. This airfield was of a typical design for the Second 
World War.
111
  
 
 Before these agents could begin working from the field, they would have to 
be transported to mainland Europe. From 1942, the main method of infiltrating 
operatives was by air. It was, therefore, essential that SOE provide their students 
with instruction in the art of parachuting. Instead of organising this in-house, the 
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organisation arranged for the RAF’s Parachute Training Squadron based at RAF 
Ringway, Manchester, to provide training on their behalf (Figure 21).
112
 Between 
January and April 1941, the airfield welcomed ‘with open arms the men that SOE 
sent them’.113 With the large numbers of students the organisation dispatched to RAF 
Ringway, allocated accommodation was eventually required. Initially in 1941, 
students were housed in Dunham House, STS51a, and Fulsham Hall, STS51b. By 
March 1945, York House, STS51c, had also been added to SOE’s property 
portfolio.
114
  
 Quickly appreciating the unique conditions under which SOE’s agents would 
have to parachute, instructors at Ringway realised they would have to adapt the 
syllabus. As they would be parachuting into occupied territory alone, agents 
experienced a heightened state of nervous tension prior to jumping. It was, therefore, 
essential that their training focused on raising their confidence and morale. As SOE’s 
sent students to Ringway in multinational groups, it was also necessary for the 
instructors to focus on the development of individualised training packages.
115
 
Unlike the training of Airborne Forces, SOE’s agents required a more flexible 
approach. Training might have to be given at short notice and over a restricted 
timeframe. Between 12 and 16 April 1943 a party of Skiddaws
116
 had ‘already 
undergone a week’s course of training at this school, but had been unable to make 
more than one descent owing to unfavourable weather conditions. [Consequently] 
They returned here [at a later date] to complete their course’.117 Although this 
specialist training was provided by a third party, instructors ensured it was of an 
individualistic, flexible nature, in character with SOE’s training programme.  
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The Nature of SOE’s STSs 
 
 To provide this training, it was essential that SOE acquired a wide range of 
properties in which the STSs could be housed. As has been already been discussed 
(see pp. 5-8), during the post-war destruction of the organisation’s files, those 
documents associated with the acquisition of property were targeted. Although the 
specific factors behind site selection might never be known, certain generalisations 
can be made. Serendipity, access to transportation networks and prior knowledge of 
the facilities were all likely to have played important roles in the development of 
SOE’s STS portfolio.  
 It was, however, common for SOE to establish their schools within large 
private properties and Country Houses (Figure 22). This had the duel benefit of 
providing security and space. By locating within properties of significant size, SOE 
had access to buildings which could be utilised for the accommodation of large 
numbers of students and staff. These structures would also have capacity to support 
greater numbers of students as the organisation expanded their activities.  
 In the case of STS42, Thame Park, Oxfordshire, there were, however, issues 
of accommodation during 1941 despite being a Country House. In August of that 
year, Major THH Grayson expressed concerns with regard to the SCONCES winter 
accommodation.
118
 It was deemed no longer feasible to provide their students with 
tents erected in the estate. As the provision of bunk beds or the conversion of the 
recreation room into barracks was felt impractical, plans were devised to construct a 
hut near the ablution bench.
119
 Although SOE preferred to utilise pre-existing 
structures to billet their students, when necessary they were prepared to provide extra 
accommodation.  
 Within the large buildings requisitioned by SOE, instructors would also have 
access to sufficient space to establish lecture theatres and offices. Associated with all 
these houses were extensive estates. Access to land provided instructors with the 
ideal environment for training students. Located within private property far from 
prying eyes, prospective agents could safely be taught the art of sabotage, practice 
unarmed combat or tackle assault courses.  
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Figure 22: Audley End House, home to STS43.
120
  
 
The Nature of SOE’s Training Facilities 
 
 Within the grounds of the properties which accommodated SOE’s STSs, 
instructors provided students both standardised and specialised facilities (Table 5). In 
order to provide specialised training in clandestine techniques, it was essential that 
the organisation devised pioneering equipment. As SOE’s training was of a reflective 
nature, it was necessary that these facilities could be adapted to meet new 
requirements. They were, therefore, designed to be of a temporary nature which 
could easily be changed. This also ensured that students did not become complacent. 
With constantly changing training equipment, they could regularly be presented with 
new challenges.
121
  
 Analysis of aerial photographs taken of STSs in 1946 failed to identify 
features associated with SOE. The ephemeral and temporary nature of these 
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facilities, combined with the necessity of camouflaging them from enemy 
reconnaissance, meant that when structures were erected, they were often hidden 
(Figure 23). In assessing SOE’s training facilities, this thesis has, therefore, had to 
rely on the organisation’s surviving archives. When possible, this was supported by 
contemporary ground based photography.   
 
School Standardised Training Specialised Training 
Preliminary / SAB Firing Ranges 
Map reading 
PT 
Weapon handling 
Attitude observation 
Psychological Tests 
 
Paramilitary PT 
Survival 
Fieldcraft 
Demolitions 
Map reading 
Weapon handling 
Fighting Houses 
Assault Courses 
Firing Ranges 
Close combat dummies 
Train Tracks 
Finishing Tradecraft 
Breaking and entering 
Counter-intelligence 
Train Tracks 
Holding / Operational Holding   
Specialist W/T 
Industrial Sabotage 
Parachuting 
Propaganda 
Industrial Machinery 
Train Tracks 
Models 
Vehicles 
Table 5: From the beginnings of SOE’s training programme, a series of stages were 
devised to ensure that only the most capable students progressed to further 
instruction. At each stage, training became more specialised and began focusing on 
skills specific to clandestine warfare. For certain aspects of instruction, SOE could 
utilise techniques and equipment developed by the Army. Certain aspects of training, 
however, required innovative equipment.
122
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Figure 23: Aerial photograph of Gorhambury, Hertfordshire, taken in 1946. From 
aerial photographic analysis, it appears that it was uncommon for SOE to construct 
buildings at their STSs. At sites where SOE did erect structures, they appear in 
woodland at a distance from the main property. Further ground based survey is, 
therefore, necessary to determine the extent of SOE’s building programme at 
STSs.
123
  
 
Standardised Training 
 
 Certain aspects of preparing a student to operate within hostile territory were 
ubiquitous with standard military instruction. Physical fitness, survival skills and 
basic weapon handling were essential for both clandestine agents and soldiers alike. 
Due to the universal nature of this instruction, there was little scope for innovation 
and the development of new equipment. For most standardised training, which 
included map reading and fieldcraft, all SOE required was access to open space. It 
was only through repetition and hands-on experience that students could be taught 
these basic military skills.  
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Figure 24: Polish students undergoing rope work exercises at Audley End. This 
piece of equipment consisted entirely of two ropes tied between two trees over the 
River Cam. No traces of this survive to the present.
124
  
 
 One of the main purposes of SOE’s physical training programme was to 
increase their student’s general fitness in preparation for parachute instruction. 
Physical exercises focused on tumbling, rope work, crossing of obstacles and hill 
work (Figure 24). These were designed to make the students supple and strengthen 
their torso and ankles.
125
 During a parachute decent, extreme stresses are placed on 
the body. Without these exercises, a bad landing might lead to a medical discharge 
and a high attrition rate of students. Heightened physical fitness was also essential to 
survival for agents operating in enemy territory.  
 The culmination of the physical training was the assault courses established 
at SOE’s Paramilitary Schools (Figure 25). These comprised of a series of specially 
designed hurdles and topographical obstacles. Incorporated into the course were 
targets which had to be engaged using weapons the students had been instructed in. 
Although there was no standard layout, each course was based on a narrative. Points 
were awarded for time, shooting accuracy and their ability to tackle obstacles. This 
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exercise was valuable as it allowed the instructors to assess the students’ stamina and 
determination.
126
  
 The nature of standardised instruction meant that it could be conducted at any 
STS without leaving a discernible trace. Map reading and survival skills required 
open space whilst a source of firearms was essential for weapons handling. Through 
the utilisation of tried and tested methods, instructors ensured they did not waste 
time and effort on devising new techniques.  
 
 
Figure 25: French Commando troops attempting the assault course at Achnacarry 
House. This free standing structure constructed of locally source timber leaves no 
physical trace.
127
  
                                                          
126
 TNA HS 7/56 I2 p. 1 
127
 IWM H31422 
73 
 
Specialised Training 
 
 Most of the instruction provided by SOE had never formally been taught 
before. It was, therefore, essential that instructors devised brand new syllabuses 
specifically designed for the operational requirements of agents. Incorporated into 
these programmes were highly specialised, innovative and state-of-the-art facilities. 
In order to maintain the security of these techniques developed by SOE, they were 
only taught once students had succeeded in graduating from the preliminary stage of 
training.  
 
 
Figure 26: Trinidad units of the South Caribbean Force undergoing bayonet 
practice. These free standing structures leave no physical evidence.
128
 
 
 The ability of SOE’s operatives to physically protect themselves was vital to 
their safety and the success of operations. As agents operated by themselves or as 
part of small groups, the individual was more highly prized than in other branches of 
                                                          
128
 IWM K7388 
74 
 
the armed services. SOE, therefore, placed a greater emphasis on the 
individualisation of instruction. Although the size of the army negated training at this 
level, the close combat training which was offered was of a dated format and 
avoided in large scale exercises (Figure 26).
129
 In comparison, SOE’s comparatively 
small classes enabled instructors to focus on the individual.  
 
 
Figure 27: SOE’s close combat training often involved students attacking members 
of staff dressed in German uniforms. This heightened the realism and made the 
students more professional and better fighters.
130
  
 
 In order to provide mass close combat bayonet training, the British army had 
to rely on the utilisation of static straw dummies. This was, however, not appropriate 
for SOE’s students. The combat weapon of choice for the organisation’s agents was 
a knife or cosh In order to prepare them for killing, their instructor would suspend a 
dummy from a pulley system. After placing the ‘target’ in a head lock, the dummy 
would be released causing the dead weight of the pair to fall to the ground. The 
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student then had to continue grappling on the floor until their opponent had been 
‘killed’. To increase the realism of the training, on occasion their adversary would be 
a member of staff dressed in a German uniform (Figure 27). As rubber was 
unobtainable, the knives students practised with were constructed from suitably thick 
rope.
131
 
 As fights rarely occur between individuals, instructors taught techniques to 
fend off multiple attackers. In a square with dimensions 10ft x 10ft (3.04m x 3.04m), 
students were presented with six suspended dummies. On entering the space, they 
were expected to use every blow they had been taught at full speed. If undertaken 
successfully, the exercise should only have lasted one minute and left the student 
physically drained. Prior to collapsing from exhaustion, students had to exit the 
arena at pace.
132
 The innovative nature of the equipment SOE designed for close 
combat training demonstrated the value the organisation placed on this skill. In 
enemy territory, an agent’s ability to fight could save their life.  
 SOE’s staff also provided students with instruction in the use of personal 
firearms. Captain William Fairbairn, Assistant Commissioner of the Shanghai 
Municipal Police Reserve and Training Branch, joined SOE in 1941 to instruct in the 
handling of guns.
133
 Whilst in Shanghai, he had devised a more natural way of 
shooting based on the movement of the body. Quick to appreciate the value of 
Fairbairn’s innovative technique, SOE employed him to train their students in firing 
‘instinctively’. On being presented with a threat, students were prepared so that they 
would immediately aim to kill without hesitation.
134
 It was drilled into students that: 
‘a) You will always fire from the crouch position – you will never be in 
an upright position. 
b) You have no time to adopt any fancy stance when killing with speed. 
c) You have no time to use the sights’.135  
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Figure 28: Example of a firing range layout as devised by Fairbairn. To test the 
student’s ability, targets would be mobile and obstructions would be placed on the 
range.
136
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 To provide training in the use of firearms, a series of specialised targets and 
ranges were devised.
137
 Like SOE’s wider syllabus, these were designed for 
individual instruction. As a student gained confidence and experience, the ranges got 
increasingly difficult. The first ‘Recruit Target’ was the size of an adult male, 
painted field grey and with an aiming mark located on the stomach. Placed at a 
distance of 3yds (2.74m), it was impossible to miss. This target allowed instructors 
to correct faults in the students’ technique.138 On graduating from the recruit target, 
they then progressed through a series of ranges with varying layouts (Figure 28). For 
instruction in the use of sub-machine guns, ‘Spray Targets’, which consisted of a 
plain white sheet of canvas 7yds (6.40m) by 5ft (1.52m) with no aiming mark, were 
erected. As adversaries might not always be at eye level, instructors devised the 
‘Gallows Target’. These would be placed on platforms and in trees to provide a more 
realistic scenario. In a further effort to enhance the realism of the training offered, 
mechanisms were developed which meant that the targets were mobile.
139
  
 The layouts of SOE’s firing ranges were not straightforward. Through the 
erection of screens, instructors could create alleyway scenarios in which various 
targets were hidden. These were constructed by erecting posts along both sides of the 
range. Wire was hung between these on which sheets made from split sandbags were 
draped. By staggering these screens, scenarios involving corridors which combined 
obstacles, such as doorframes, could be developed.
140
 Through incorporating 
flexibility into their ranges, SOE’s instructors ensured that their students did not 
become complacent.  
 As these ranges could only be used by a single student at a time, ‘Firing 
Bays’ were constructed nearby to keep the rest of the class occupied whilst awaiting 
their turn. Formed from turf, sleepers or sandbags, the wings were 5yds (4.57m) long 
and targets would appear at awkward angles forcing the student to turn whilst 
engaging.
141
 Although not intended as the primary training equipment, the design of 
their ‘Firing Bays’ demonstrates the desire amongst SOE’s instructors to provide the 
highest quality training.  
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 The most advanced range devised within SOE was the ‘stalk course’. This 
was designed to test the students’ weapons proficiency and their fieldcraft skills. 
Principally this was a firearms course which placed emphasis on speed of attack, 
control of position and the intuitive changing of position to deal with unexpected 
targets.
142
 Ideally, the student ‘should be “frightened” on to a target which hasn’t 
been seen so that he reacts almost without thinking. He must be forced to move fast 
in killing a target and prevented from deliberate aiming’.143 This style of shooting 
was a new concept devised by Fairbairn in Shanghai. The ranges developed by SOE 
were, therefore, unlike any constructed by their contemporaries.  
 
 
Figure 29: Linge Company training in a Fighting House Complex close to Glenmore 
Lodge. Wires connected to the targets are clearly visible. Internally, the partitions 
are moveable which enabled the instructors to constantly change the layout. The 
high vantage point of the camera suggests it was taken from the control tower. From 
these structures, the instructors could provide individual feedback.
144
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 Another training concept Fairbairn brought to SOE was the ‘fighting 
house’.145 The first of these innovative structures was constructed for the Shanghai 
Municipal Police Reserve. Inside the ‘mystery house’, pop-up targets, firecrackers 
and similar hazards were installed to enhance the students’ capabilities.146 By March 
1944, SOE had developed these concepts into a highly sophisticated training 
complex (Figure 29). Due to shortages of material and labour, fighting houses were 
only single storey and were not quite full size.
147
 These structures were constructed 
in positions whereby a control tower or observation point could be erected 
overlooking the complex.
148
 From their vantage point, instructors could observe the 
progress of individual students and tailor feedback related to their performance.  
 
 
Figure 30: Although no plans of a ‘fighting house’ exist, this figure is based on 
instructions produced by STS103. Internally, the layout could be adapted to vary the 
training scenario. Through incorporating furniture and obstacles, a heightened 
sense of realism could be created. The red dots indicate the position of targets.
149
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 These structures were specifically designed to enhance a student’s skills at 
instinctively firing whilst under stress. To ensure individuals did not become 
complacent, ‘fighting houses’ were designed so that mobile partitions could be 
installed. Internally, the position of furniture and the moving of targets could also 
change the layout. This provided the instructors opportunity to devise a wide range 
of training scenarios. The textbook design was for three ‘fighting houses’ to be 
grouped together within a single complex. Through the integration of fences, lamp 
posts, pavements and garden arrangements, a heightened sense of realism could be 
achieved (Figure 30).
150
  
 On entering the complex, the students were immediately on guard: threats 
might appear from anywhere. Targets, which were connected to pulleys and weights, 
were operated by a series of levers situated in the ‘control tower’ or automatically by 
hidden triggers. These might cause dummies to ‘run’ between buildings, appear at 
windows or be waiting outside a cleared building. Whilst exploring the structures, 
sound effects would be employed to give the sense of people moving around the 
interior.
151
 Although one ‘fighting house’ had previously been constructed before 
Fairbairn joined SOE, the organisation turned his concept into a state-of-the-art 
facility.  
 The sense of realism which was embedded into the ‘fighting house’ was 
common throughout SOE’s syllabus. To train students in the art of demolition, 
instructors relocated machinery to their STSs. When this was not practical, models 
were provided (Figure 31). In preparation for one of SOE’s most iconic missions, 
the organisation smuggled the manager of the Vemork Heavy Water Plant out of 
Norway to provide detailed intelligence of the facility.
152
 This enabled a scale model 
of the factory’s equipment to be constructed within the grounds of STS17, 
Brickendonbury.
153
 Not only did this provide the agents with excellent training 
opportunities, it also enabled engineers to design specific explosive charges for the 
operation.
154
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Figure 31: Instruction provided to SOE students on how to sabotage a locomotive 
using a model. Note the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineer (REME) patch of 
the instructor.
155
  
 
 It was also not uncommon for stretches of railway track to be laid in the 
grounds of STSs. These could be used for initial demolition training which would be 
followed up with ‘attacks’ on local railway stations (Figure 19).156 At STS43, 
Audley End, Essex, the Polish Section even parked a Valentine tank within the 
grounds (Figure 32). This was used by their agents, known as cichociemnis, to 
practise techniques for destroying armoured vehicles.
157
 Through the provision of 
models and actual machinery, SOE ensured their students’ were provided with both a 
theoretical and practical education in clandestine warfare.  
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Figure 32: Valentine Tank in the grounds of Audley End being used for demolition 
practice. As can be observed, the vehicle was parked in woodland which 
camouflaged it from the air.
158
  
 
 The development of innovative, state-of-the-art and distinct training facilities 
designed for individual students reflects the professionalism of SOE. Without highly 
skilled agents, the organisation realised they would have been unable to fulfil their 
role. SOE appreciated that the unique nature of clandestine warfare required 
specialised training facilities.  
 
 
Figure 33: Norwegian armoury at a STS in Scotland.
159
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Miscellaneous Facilities found at STSs 
 
 In order to support the training of students at STSs, certain infrastructure was 
required. As the syllabus extensively involved the handling of firearms, live 
ammunition and explosives, it was essential that SOE provided armouries and 
magazines (Figure 33). At STS63, Warnham Court, Sussex, five purpose built 
explosives stores were constructed. The security of these buildings was, however, 
questionable. Between 8 and 11 May 1945, 700 No. 8 detonators were taken from 
one of these structures.
160
 After a series of investigations, the missing items were 
eventually found in the possession of four local teenagers.
161
 The ease of which the 
group managed to enter the STS and acquire the detonators raises some concerns 
over SOE’s security measures.162   
 
 
Figure 34: Aerial photograph of Frogmore Farm taken in 1945 clearly show the 
presence of two underground structures.
163
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 Although no architectural plans survive of SOE’s magazines, structural 
evidence at Station 18, Frogmore Farm, Hertfordshire, illustrates one potential 
design.
164
 In 1943 this facility began instructing students in the use of Improvised 
Explosive Devices (IEDs).
165
 Within the grounds, two large underground structures 
were built (Figure 34). Nearby, a further five, which were approximately 2m by 20m 
and formed of poured concrete, were constructed within the grounds of Frogmore 
Hall (Figure 35).
166
 Despite the hall being used by the Royal Military Police and the 
92nd (Loyals) Anti-Aircraft Regiment,
167
 their similarity with those at the farm 
suggest they are of SOE origin. Miscellaneous facilities at the STSs were just as 
important as the specialised training equipment. Without these, instruction would 
have been hampered. 
 
 
Figure 35: Entrance to one of the underground structures at Frogmore Hall. These 
structures were approximately 2m by 20m and constructed of poured concrete.
168
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Archaeological Remains 
 
 As this chapter has demonstrated, the equipment utilised by SOE in the 
instruction of their agents was of an ephemeral nature. Due to time constraints and 
the methodological approach adopted by this thesis, limited fieldwork could be 
undertaken. The nature of the archaeological remains which might be encountered 
will, therefore, be briefly discussed.  
 Documentary analysis indicates that SOE’s training equipment was of a 
lightweight construction often manufactured from wood, presumably locally 
sourced. Timber was used in building the assault courses, erecting frames for the 
close combat dummies and constructing the fighting houses. The archaeological 
traces of these training facilities will mainly comprise of postholes. In comparison, 
the purpose built magazines SOE erected at their STSs might be of substantial 
construction. These could be semi-submerged, brick buildings surrounded by earthen 
bunds (see pp. 143-4). Excavations at the STSs will also uncover discreet areas of 
burning with concentrations of shrapnel and shell casings. Fragments of railway 
tracks and industrial machinery will also be encountered (Table 6). 
 
Training Facility Archaeological Remains 
Fighting Houses Postholes, timber structures, shell casings 
Assault Courses Postholes, timber frames, shell casings 
Firing Ranges Shell casings, parallel earthen banks 
Close Combat Dummies Wooden frames, rope fragments, buttons 
Train Tracks Metal fragments, discreet areas of burning 
Industrial Machinery Metal fragments, discreet areas of burning 
Models Metal fragments, discreet areas of burning 
Vehicles Metal fragments, discreet areas of burning 
Magazine Purpose built structures, either above or below ground 
Table 6: Archaeological remains which might identified at SOE’s STSs.169  
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The Legacy of SOE’s Training Facilities 
 
 The training offered by SOE in the UK epitomised continuity, flexibility, 
reflectivity and professionalism: it was state-of-the-art when applicable and always 
driven by intelligence. Despite this, the organisation was still the focus of criticism. 
One of the most vocal opponents of SOE was SIS.
170
 It was not uncommon, 
however, for this organisation to send agents to SOE for training.
171
 SIS also 
requisitioned SOE’s agents for their own operations.172 This demonstrates an 
appreciation of the quality of the organisation’s training regime in preparing agents 
for a clandestine life. Following SOE’s disbandment in 1946, the Training Section 
was absorbed by SIS.
173
 Despite SIS’s vocal criticism of SOE, the actions of the 
organisation demonstrated a high regard for the latter’s training regime.  
 On the formation of SOE in July 1940, almost immediately a training 
programme was devised which, with only minor alterations, survived the duration of 
the war.
174
 The series of ‘sieves’ Davies established were designed to ensure only the 
most capable candidates graduated to become agents. This compartmentalisation also 
acted as a security screen restricting access to information of an operational nature.  
 The greatest change occurred in 1943 when the often criticised Preliminary 
Schools were replaced with a SAB. This reorganisation also saw the replacement of 
the Holding Schools, another source of concern for the Country Sections, with 
Operational Holding Schools. The continuity of the training programme reflected 
SOE’s innovative and forward thinking. Their willingness to adapt the regime also 
reflects a desire not to become entrenched and complacent. This demonstrated a 
degree of reflectivity and self-assessment.  
 Due to the unique nature of SOE’s work and its unpredictable timeframes, 
instruction had to be highly flexible. Despite this, the syllabus was designed to 
ensure that all the basic skills were covered. Modules were not, however, rigidly 
enforced and could be tailored to individual or operational requirements. Feeding 
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into these syllabuses was intelligence gathered from returning agents, sister agencies 
or members of the resistance.  
 Providing this instruction, SOE leaned towards employing staff who lacked a 
traditional ‘military’ schooling. This brought to the organisation fresh thinking and 
innovative ideas. SOE’s preference for employing ‘outsiders’ was inherited from 
MI(R). It was their opinion that regular officers were unsuitable for irregular 
operations. Instead they preferred to commission personnel straight from the ranks or 
directly from civilian life.
175
 The new style of instructor embedded into SOE’s 
training a heightened sense of realism. By preparing for all eventualities under 
pseudo-operational conditions, the organisation was increasing an agent’s probability 
of success.  
 This chapter has demonstrated that over a short timeframe, SOE developed a 
state-of-the-art training programme for a method of warfare which had never 
previously been formally taught. It was not, however, only agents which needed to 
be prepared for operations in enemy occupied territories. To ensure their operatives 
could work effectively, SOE had to develop equipment specifically intended for 
clandestine warfare. The organisation’s Research and Development facilities are the 
subject of the next chapter.  
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Chapter IV 
Research and Development 
 
 The quality of training received by agents was virtually worthless if SOE 
could not provide them with equipment specifically designed for their new and 
unique role. On the disbandment of the organisation in 1946, the ‘gadgets’ they 
designed remained highly classified. Often innovative, state-of-the-art and bespoke, 
this equipment was specifically intended to undermine the moral and efficiency of a 
numerically superior force operating from ‘home’ territory (Figure 36). If these 
designs fell into the hands of communists, anarchists, fascists, terrorists or criminal 
gangs, the implications would be unfathomable. It was, therefore, essential that the 
Secret Services ensured this did not happen. The British Government finally 
published the catalogue of SOE’s equipment in 2008.1  
 
 
Figure 36: An explosive rat designed by SOE. In order to operate effectively, it was 
essential that SOE’s agents had access to bespoke, innovative and state-of-the-art 
equipment.
2
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 The organisation’s Research and Development Section was not, however, 
purely focused on designing new and innovative equipment: an important element of 
their work was devising inventive methods of concealing compromising items.
3
 
Without some form of camouflage, equipment which was essential to an agent’s role 
could undermine their efforts at ‘passing’ in occupied territory.  
 Specialist equipment purposely designed for clandestine operations was vital 
to the activities of agents and resistance organisations worldwide. As weapons had 
been confiscated by the occupying German forces, it was essential that the resistance 
was supplied with new equipment from the UK. Without these supplies, activities 
would have mainly been confined to ‘passive’ resistance.4 This chapter assesses the 
facilities SOE provided their scientists and engineers for the purpose of developing 
innovative equipment for clandestine warfare. By allowing their staff a high degree 
of autonomy, the organisation designed a wide spectrum of items. The organisation 
did, however, maintain the capability of developing bespoke equipment to tight 
deadlines and to a high standard.  
 
The History of SOE’s Research and Development Facilities 
 
 The Research and Development Section of SOE was not static over the 
course of the Second World War. Up until 1941, the department was relatively small. 
The following year, however, saw the section rapidly grow as increasing demands 
were placed on its laboratories. By 1942, all the necessary internal reorganisations 
had been completed and the Research and Development Section had taken its final 
form. From this point until 1944, the department was operating at its maximum 
activity.
5
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Figure 37: Composite map of SOE’s Research and Development facilities during the 
Second World War. The key facility was located at The Frythe. Research conducted 
at the other properties was ad hoc and of a limited capacity.  
 
 On the formation of SOE in July 1940, the organisation inherited a small 
number of facilities associated with early attempts at developing clandestine 
equipment (see pp. 31-8). It was from this core that SOE’s Research and 
Development infrastructure expanded (Figure 37). Unlike other aspects of the 
organisation, Research and Development was not a geographically delimited 
activity: work could occur in isolation assuming SOE provided their staff with 
access to laboratory and engineering facilities onsite. To undertake this research, the 
organisation employed university scholars, members of the armed services and those 
who had previously been employed in the private sector.  
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 Prior to 1939, Section D had already begun developing simple devices for the 
purpose of sabotage. These were to form the basis of SOE’s toolkit. One of the most 
important designs they came up with was the ‘Pencil Time Fuze’ (Figure 38). This 
was to become the standard time delay fuze utilised by the Secret Services 
throughout the war. During this early period, Section D subcontracted research and 
development out to Mr Bailey based at University College London. The organisation 
also placed contracts with the Royal Arsenal, Woolwich, the British Scientific 
Instrumental Research Association, the Royal Society, Imperial Chemical Industries 
and Shell Oil.
6
 This early phase in the development of clandestine equipment laid the 
foundations for later work and provided a number of key items to SOE’s arsenal.  
 
 
Figure 38: Pencil Time Fuze Within this fuze, a striker was held back by a steel wire 
kept under tension. Once a glass amopule was broken, a corroding solution was 
brought into contact with the wire. When the wire broke, the striker was released 
and operated a percussion cap attached to a short Bickford fuse.
7
  
 
 By the time SOE was formed, Section D had already established workshops 
and laboratories at The Frythe and Aston House (Figure 39). Although The Frythe 
had previously focused on wireless research, the high premium for space during the 
early stage of the war meant it rapidly became SOE’s research and development hub. 
It was within this facility that the organisation’s scientists and engineers designed a 
wide range of items including the Welbike,
8
 the Welgun,
9
 the Welrod,
10
 the 
Welbum
11
 and the Welmine (Figure 40).
12
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Figure 39: The Frythe, Station IX, home to SOE’s main research and development 
centre. Within the grounds, the organisation constructed numerous workshops, 
laboratories and testing facilities.
13
  
 
 
Figure 40: Over the course of the Second World War, SOE’s scientists and 
engineers developed a wide range of equipment for clandestine warfare. These 
included explosives, incendiaries, small arms (the photograph is of a Welrod), 
motorcycles, electricity generators, wireless sets, itching powder and stimulants.
14
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 By the end of 1940, production of the devices which had been developed in 
the early stages of the war had reached a considerable scale.
15
 Despite these 
successful designs, work continued on improving them. In keeping with their 
predecessors, SOE was willing to collaborate with external bodies that possessed 
world class expertise. By December 1941, the University of Cambridge were 
undertaking research into incendiaries on behalf of the organisation. This was being 
led by ‘Professor Norrish … [who] is a very practical man and has considerable 
energy. Norrish is satisfied that the substances we are researching are likely to prove 
useful though, of course, like everything else, the research may prove a failure. So 
far, however, the results are promising’.16 Dr Reich of Imperial College was also 
conducting research on behalf of SOE. His endeavours were focused on a new 
volatile compound which potentially had twice the cutting power of any 
contemporary explosive.
17
 
 Over the course of the Second World War, SOE’s Research and 
Development Section changed and adapted as circumstances required. The rapid 
growth of the organisation in 1941 placed increasing demands on their research 
facilities. This resulted in an internal reorganisation. As SOE’s predecessors had 
designed the basic tools of clandestine warfare, the organisation’s laboratories and 
workshops could begin focusing on equipment intended for specific operations. As 
the organisation continued to expand in 1942 and 1943, further reorganisations of the 
department occurred.
18
  
 
The Nature of SOE’s Research and Development Facilities 
 
 To support their scientists in the designing, developing and testing of new 
equipment, it was essential that SOE provided them with sufficient resources and 
facilities. Although a wide range of items were developed (Table 7), this section will 
mainly focus on the facilities developed for certain prestigious ventures. Despite 
being established for specific projects, they provided greater capacity for SOE’s 
                                                          
15
 TNA HS 7/27 History of the Research and Development Section of SOE p. 6 
16
 TNA HS 8/334 Services Directorate and ‘U’ Section ADZ/OR/730 25/12/1941 p. 1 
17
 Ibid p. 1 
18
 TNA HS 7/27 History of the Research and Development Section of SOE pp. 8-9 
94 
 
scientists and engineers. The following section has been arranged so that the nature 
of each facility is assessed separately.  
 
Underwater and Marine Devices 
In Production Developed but not Produced 
Welman (One-man submarine) Welmine (magnetic) 
Sleeping Beauty (underwater canoe) Welmine (jettison-head) 
Silencer for outboard motor Towing container (water) 
Silent power unit canoe with flexible 
drive 
Smoke screen to operate from robot 
motorboat 
Suction-adhesion device for limpets Camouflaged oil drums with depth 
charges 
Nail firing device for charge adhesion to 
steel/wooden ships 
Limpet (stream-lined) 
Small Arms and Other Weapons 
In Production Developed but not Produced 
Sten, Silenced Mk II Welgun 
Welrod Mk IIA Small calibre machine carbine 
Sleeve Gun Machine pistol Type I Mk II 
Silent 9mm Welrod Silent 9mm Machine Gun 
Welsilencer Silent 9mm Luger Pistol 
Blowpipe Welpen (.22 fountain pen pistol) 
Miscellaneous 
In Production Developed but not Produced 
Welbike (folding motocycle) Device for crossing dannert wire fence 
Skeleton Keys 2” mortar grapnel device for mine fields 
Axle box grease gun for use with 
abrasives 
Welbike trailer 
Collapsible bridge Smoke screen to operate from Welbike 
Table 7: Throughout the Second World War, SOE’s Engineering Section developed 
a wide range of equipment. This table is just a selection of their entire catalogue.
19
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Station IX, The Frythe, Welwyn 
 
 On 26 August 1939, the staff of The Frythe Residential Private Hotel were 
informed that the property was being requisitioned by the military. They had until 
20:00 to vacate the building.
20
 Quick to move in, Section D based their Radio 
Communication Division at the facility following the declaration of war in 
September.
21
 This property was also used to store their ‘records (to keep these clear 
of any danger in London), such of the staff as necessary to deal with these records 
and part of the Drawing Office and Planning Department, since these branches must 
have access to all papers’.22 In the event of enemy activities making London no 
longer safe for the organisation, the majority of Section D’s staff were also to be 
evacuated to The Frythe.
23
  
 Over the winter of 1939, Section D’s Radio Communication Division settled 
into their new accommodation.
24
 In July of the following year, The Frythe was 
transferred to the infant SOE. Whilst finding their feet, the organisation maintained 
the status quo. This included upholding the established plan to utilise the property as 
an evacuation centre.
25
 SOE also started to use the site as billets for some of their 
London based staff. Each morning at 07:45, a shuttle bus would leave the property 
destined for the organisation’s London offices. At 17:15 sharp, the bus would begin 
its return journey. During this period, SOE maintained strict working hours and 
expected everyone to have left the office by 17:00.
26
 Every officer and secretary was 
also ‘expected once a week to take a Luncheon from 13.00 to 14.30 hours to enable 
them to see friends, do shopping’.27  
 This state of affairs was maintained until the beginning of 1941, at which 
point, various schemes for the reorganisation of the Research and Development 
Section were considered. One idea involved moving the entire research side of SOE 
to The Frythe.
28
 This would involve relocating the Technical Department from Aston 
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House, Station XII, Hertfordshire, to the property.
29
 Aston House would then focus 
its efforts on production, routine inspection, packing and the despatch of stores. 
Following the appointment of Professor Dudley Newitt MC, formerly of Imperial 
College London, as Director of Scientific Research (DSR) on 9 June 1941, the 
division of work at Aston House was put into effect.
30
  
 
 
Figure 41: The Frythe in 1946.
31
  
 
 To accommodate the arrival of the research sections, ‘temporary’ structures 
were erected in the grounds of The Frythe (Figure 41).
32
 These were single-storey, 
prefabricated, felt-roofed wooden huts and typically measured 35ft x 15ft (10.67m x 
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4.57m) (Figure 42). Internally, the huts were conventionally partitioned into smaller 
workspaces (Figure 43). Typically they were organised into two laboratories, a 
specialist room and two small offices. Heating to these structures was provided by a 
steam boiler plant constructed in the grounds.
33
  
 During this reorganisation, the Wireless Section based at The Frythe was 
assessed to be in urgent need of expansion. On 26 June 1941, the Director of 
Research, Development and Supply (AD/Z) requested that the number of mechanics 
at this facility should be increased. These personnel were required so that trials of the 
‘micro-wave telephonic duplex communication ground-to-air set’ and the ‘D-Phone’ 
could be conducted. As SIS had recently been allocated 18 engineers, AD/Z felt his 
demand for ‘three electrical mechanicians [sic] capable of handling precision bench 
machinery and who could work to drawings and specifications’ was not 
unreasonable.
34
  
 
 
Figure 42: Hut in the grounds of The Frythe. The first structures constructed at this 
facility were single-storey, prefabricated wooden huts roofed with felt.
35
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Figure 43: Interior of the Chemical Laboratory. This structure was well equipped 
with various items which SOE’s scientists might require in their work.36  
 
 With the expansion of SOE in 1941, increasing demands were placed on the 
laboratories and workshops at The Frythe. It was, therefore, deemed essential to 
undertake a further reorganisation of the facility. This resulted in the formation of six 
new sections:  
‘Section 1. Operations (including large scale trials) 
Section 2. Explosives (including fuzes, switches and delays) 
Section 3. Incendiaries, flares, smokes. 
Section 4. Technical Sabotage 
Section 5. Bacteriology and Toxicology 
Section 6. Camouflage (including home-made devices)’.37  
 During this reorganisation, it was necessary ‘to make provision for a possible 
extension of S.O.E. activities should the enemy infringe internal law in the use of 
poisons, gases and bacteria’.38 To support these new sections, machine, carpenters’ 
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and sheet metal shops and a photographic department were all provided onsite.
39
 
Later that year, an Engineering Section was formed with the responsibility of 
servicing the laboratories. Its secondary function was to manufacture small 
mechanisms or devices as and when required. As requests from the laboratories 
fluctuated, the Engineering Shop was also provided the freedom to independently 
develop clandestine equipment.
40
  
 Throughout 1941, the Engineering Section operated from a single small shop 
of a mere 600ft
2
 (55.74m
2
). As the workload of this department gradually increased, 
a substantial expansion in workspace was necessary. SOE, therefore, began 
construction of a large carpenters shop and a new sheet metal shop of 1,200ft
2
 
(111.48m
2
). In 1942, the Engineering Section were provided with a further 2,400ft
2
 
(222.97m
2
) of space at The Frythe. Further facilities were also constructed as and 
when required.  
 
 
Figure 44: A Welman being lifted out of a hangar located in the grounds of The 
Frythe.
41
  
 
                                                          
39
 TNA HS 7/27 History of the Research and Development Section of S.O.E. p. 8 
40
 TNA HS 7/27 Appendix E Research and Development Organisation: Short History of Engineering 
Section Station IX since August, 1941 p. 1 
41
 IWM HU 56768 
100 
 
 Following the entry of the Soviet Union into the war in June 1941, the 
German battleship TIRPITZ, which was stationed in the Baltic, became of increasing 
strategic concern. On reviewing their operational procedures, SOE determined that a 
new approach was required if they wished to remove this threat. The solution, as 
determined by the organisation, was the development of a ‘one-man’ submarine.42 
Following successful trials, SOE began ‘mass production of this device, and as a 
preliminary step it was decided to erect hangars [at The Frythe] giving some 5000 
sq. ft. [464.52m
2
] of space to build the first twenty
43
 and to cover the unavoidable 
delay in obtaining the external mass production’ (Figure 44).44 
 
 
Figure 45: Exterior of the Thermostat Hut at The Frythe. Unlike the wooden, 
prefabricated structures which characterised the early development of the facility, 
this structure was of brick construction.
45
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 Between August 1941 and September 1944, the Engineering Section grew 
from four to 160 personnel. Over the same timeframe, their workshops expanded by 
19,600ft
2
 (1,820.9m
2
).
46
 It is evident that SOE invested significant resources into the 
Research and Development Section’s Engineering Department. This ensured the 
organisation had the capacity to support their staff developing new and innovative 
equipment for their agents abroad.  
 
 
Figure 46: Interior of the Thermostat Hut. The room in the foreground is the 
analytical and plating laboratory, in the background, the thermostat room. The 
laboratory was well equipped with standard equipment which included a physical 
balance, jigs, soldering and glassblowing equipment, inorganic reagents together 
with specially prepared inorganic solutions, organic solvents, fume cupboards, a 
Gallenkemp Oven, a smaller oven and a refrigerator.
47
  
 
 In 1944, the capabilities of The Frythe were further enhanced with the 
construction of a new specialist facility. Known as the ‘Thermostat Hut’, this was 
designed to provide a number of constant-temperature environments (Figure 45). 
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This provided SOE’s scientists the opportunity to research the influence of 
temperature and humidity on their equipment. Unlike the other structures at The 
Frythe, the Thermostat Hut was of a substantial construction.
48
 The external walls 
were 0.36m thick and constructed from bricks and roofed with corrugated asbestos. 
Internally, the five rooms were partitioned by 0.11m brickwork. These rooms 
comprised of a laboratory, which was equipped with compressed air, vacuum, and 
hydrostatic pressure test apparatus, an analytical and plating laboratory, two offices 
and the thermostat room (Figure 46). Within this room, five thermostats were 
installed which provided constant temperature environments between -20
o
C and 
40
o
C (Figure 47).
49
  
 
 
Figure 47: The thermostats within SOE’s Thermostat Hut. These could provide 
SOE’s engineers and scientists a constant temperature environment which could be 
set at between -20
o
C and 40
o
C 
50
  
 
 It was the responsibility of John van Riemsdijk to ensure the apparatus within 
the Thermostat Hut was maintained to a high standard. Before the employment of 
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van Riemsdijk, this task had been neglected. When he first entered the structure, he 
found that ‘much of the apparatus was in a half complete state, and of the usable 
equipment 50% was out of order. There were at that time no wiring diagrams or 
descriptions to guide him in the work of restoring it to its former condition’.51 
Despite SOE providing their staff with specialist equipment, the maintenance of 
these facilities was not always to a professional standard.  
 Essential to any research and development is the trialling of prototypes. 
Within the grounds of The Frythe, various facilities were provided to undertake 
necessary tests.
52
 In order to experiment with maritime equipment, a large tank was 
constructed on the estate (Figure 48). On successfully passing these tests, further 
trials were conducted at Queen Mary’s Reservoir, Staines.  
 
 
Figure 48: A ‘Sleeping Beauty’ being tested in the tank in the grounds of The 
Frythe.
53
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 Facilities were also provided at The Frythe to test designs of air delivery 
mechanisms for aircraft. By 18 February 1945, the fuselage of a Stirling bomber had 
appeared within the grounds. In this aircraft, SOE’s engineers installed a prototype 
conveyor. This was used to investigate methods of increasing the mobility of 
packages on the rollers. The simplest technique was to construct ‘toboggans’ with a 
light wooden framework. This would allow the two despatchers to unload 1,760kg of 
stores in 11 seconds. Concerns were, however, expressed over the security 
implications of scattering toboggans across the drop-zone.
54
 
 Facilities were also provided at The Frythe which allowed staff to experiment 
with explosives. Garden terracing to the south of the main house was excavated to 
create a pit. At one edge, a concrete bunker fitted with bomb-proof windows was 
constructed. This allowed staff to observe the experiments conducted within the 
pit.
55
 By providing their scientists and engineers with testing facilities onsite, SOE 
created a flexible work environment. Trials could be undertaken at short notice 
without having to refer to the formal commissioning process.  
 
 
Figure 49: One of the magazines constructed within the grounds of The Frythe. 
These were constructed from Fletton bricks and roofed with reinforced concrete.
56
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 In order to provide a safe environment in which the explosives could be 
stored, magazines were constructed in the grounds of The Frythe. These facilities 
were of single storey construction built of Fletton bricks and roofed with reinforced 
concrete (Figure 49).
57
 Reached via a sloping concrete ramp, these structures were 
surrounded by a Fletton brick retaining wall.
58
 
 During 1944, there was a desire within SOE to increase the number of army 
and RAF ‘other ranks’ the organisation employed in undertaking research.59 As 
accommodation at The Frythe was at full capacity, SOE began extensive 
improvements to the stable block. On 29 January 1944, fire gutted 75% of this new 
accommodation. It was, therefore, necessary to billet their staff in civilian 
properties.
60
  
 In March 1945, The Frythe was taken over by the Department of 
Miscellaneous Weapon Development (DMWD) of the Admiralty. This was to be for 
the duration of the war with Japan. Although DMWD took over the administration of 
the facility and made use of the workshops, they had no need for the chemical 
laboratories.
61
 It was, therefore, arranged that SOE could continue utilising these 
spaces.
62
 
 
Station VIIc, Allensor’s Joinery Factory, Watford63 
 
 During 1943, SOE began expanding the departments within its Research and 
Development Section. As the spare accommodation at The Frythe could not cope 
with these increases, a decision was taken on 12 August by the Supplies Board to 
relocate the Radio Communication Division (RCD). This would provide the RCD 
with the workspace necessary to meet the anticipated increase in demands for 
equipment associated with Operation OVERLORD. It took the Property Section, 
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however, until 4 October to identify a suitable premise for the department at 
Allensor’s Joinery Works, Watford. Almost immediately, SOE embarked on a 
programme of alterations to this property. When work was completed in January 
1944, the RCD relocated and all radio research ceased at The Frythe.
64
  
 
Polish Military Wireless Research Unit (PMWR), Stanmore 
 
 The development of innovative and state-of-the-art equipment was not 
always kept in-house. One of the closest collaborations established by SOE was with 
the Polish military developing new wireless sets. At an Anglo-Polish meeting held at 
the Hotel Rubens on 29 April 1943,
65
 Colonel Sulislawski, of the Polish Ministry of 
National Defence, presented a draft agreement which was to pave the way for Polish 
led wireless research.
66
 Under this agreement, the Polish General Staff intended to 
transform the existing Military Wireless Research Unit (PMWR), based at Stanmore, 
into a self-reliant organisation with increased research and production capacity. As 
SOE had a vested interest in the PWMR, they declared their willingness to support 
this process.
67
  
 Following this agreement, it was arranged so that the PMWR Board of 
Directors would comprise of six Polish representatives, two SIS personnel, someone 
from the Telecommunications Research Establishment (TRE) and two SOE 
members of staff. The PMWR agreed that all material purchased had to be approved 
by SOE. It was also their responsibility, in conjunction with SIS, to ensure the 
facility was secure.
68
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Figure 50: Wykeham House, home to the Polish Military Wireless Research Unit. 
 
 Once the agreement had been signed, the Ministry of Works (MoW) began 
constructing 10,000 ft
2
 (929.03m
2
) of workshops in the grounds of Wykeham House, 
Gordon Avenue, Stanmore (Figure 50).
69
 Part financed by SOE, the PMWR was 
provided with a yearly budget of £59,580 (Table 8). In parallel to the research 
undertaken at this facility, the staff also managed to manufacture 1,800 wireless sets 
between May 1943 and June 1945 (Table 9).  
 
Expense  Budget 
Wages 12,000 
Material 31,600 
Overhead £8,530 
Research £7,450 
Table 8: Planned budget of the year 1944 to 1945.
70
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 British Poles VI B Poles Military Total 
Transmitting / 
Receiving Sets 
75 1071 117 1263 
Transmitters 35 11 2 48 
Receivers 161 369 35 565 
Table 9: Sets manufactured by the Polish Military Wireless Research Unit between 1 
May 1943 and 8 June 1945.
71
 
 
 By 16 May 1945, the PMWR included a laboratory and general 
administrative offices, two workshops, which included mechanical and electrical 
assembly, inspection facilities and general stores. Within the mechanical workshop 
there were sufficient machine tools to enable the unit to manufacture small runs of 
radio sets. Whilst in the Electrical Assembly Workshop, there were all the 
instruments required to assembly and check the finished products. Between these 
two workshops, an output of 8,000 working hours was achieved monthly. The final 
checks were undertaken by the Inspection Section. They were equipped with all the 
necessary precision instruments required for this task. The responsibility of 
designing prototypes was given to the Laboratory and Research Section. This was 
staffed by scientific and technical officers who had all received a university 
education.
72
 Instead of spreading their resources too thin, SOE’s willingness to 
collaborate with the PMWR increased both organisations’ capacity to develop 
innovative wireless technology.  
 
Station VIII, Queen Mary’s Reservoir, Staines 
 
 As has been previously mentioned, field trials are an essential element of 
research and development. Without testing equipment under realistic conditions, 
design flaws might be overlooked. The vast majority of the equipment developed by 
SOE could be trialled at their pre-existing facilities. With certain ‘statement’ 
projects, this was not always feasible. In 1941, the battleship TIRPITZ became a 
strategic target for the allied forces. To combat this threat, SOE constructed 
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engineering workshops at The Frythe to begin work on a one-man submarine. In 
March 1942, the organisation was allocated £3,000 for this project. Despite 
providing their engineers workspace, the organisation did not have the necessary 
facilities to conduct extensive trials on their ‘Welman’. Eventually a large enough 
body of water was identified at Queen Mary’s Reservoir, Staines, which would be 
ideal for conducting tests. Within SOE, this was to be known as Station VIII. Prior to 
the end of 1942, this facility had become operational and the first trials were held in 
October of that year.
73
  
 
 
Figure 51: Specially constructed ramps and cradles were erected at Queen Mary’s 
Reservoir to enable the miniature submarines to be lowered into the water.
74
  
 
 In order to successfully conduct the trials of the Welman, SOE had to 
construct certain shore facilities. To carefully lower the submarines into the 
reservoir, specially designed cradles were constructed on the shore (Figure 51). In 
order to make alterations onsite, SOE also planned on constructing a series of 
workshops. At this time, the organisation began questioning the security implications 
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of using casual civilian contractors to undertake work on their behalf.
75
 The 
expansion of Station VIII in late 1942 led SOE, ‘with the knowledge and approval of 
the Ministry of Works and War Office, to form a mobile construction until (known 
as M.C.U.77) of R.E.s [Royal Engineers] under D/PROPS Section for the purpose of 
carrying out work of a particularly urgent or secret nature’.76 The establishment of 
the MCU meant that SOE’s future requirements for building work were kept in-
house. This was to have a major impact on the nature of their facilities. No longer 
did the organisation have to use off-the-shelf designs.
77
 By internalising the 
construction process, SOE also reduced the security risks of having to employ 
external contractors.  
 
Station IXc, Great Western Hotel, Pembrokeshire 
 
 By July 1943, SOE required a facility at which open water trials could be 
conducted on their Welmans. The organisation’s first choice was Fishguard in south-
west Wales. Concerns were, however, raised by the Director of Local Defence. This 
harbour was used for searching maritime traffic between Ireland and the Iberian 
Peninsula. As both regions harboured pro-German sympathisers, the enemy would 
have taken an interest in the activities of this port. The Director of Naval Intelligence 
(DNI) also expressed concerns. As Fishguard was not located within a ‘Protected 
Area’, any activity by the water’s edge would have been highly visible to observers. 
As an alternative, the Helford Estuary in Cornwall was suggested. This was 
dismissed by the head of Military Branch II, Naval Intelligence, as the number of 
cross-channel operations they conducted was to intensify. Increased military activity 
in the region would inevitably lead the enemy to take a greater interest.
78
  
 Eventually, the objections to Fishguard were dismissed and the second floor 
of the Great Western Hotel was allocated to SOE. This provided sufficient 
accommodation for 15 officers. The remaining personnel were lodged in the annexe 
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of the hotel and 35 other ranks were billeted in nearby naval huts (Figure 52).
79
 This 
facility was to be known as Station IXc within SOE.  
 
 
Figure 52: The Great Western Hotel, Fishguard, home to SOE’s Station IXc. 
 
 Connected to the railway network, Fishguard possessed a large marshalling 
yard ideal for unloading submarines. As a working harbour, SOE also had access to 
the necessary facilities to move their submersibles to the waterfront (Figure 53). 
Fishguard Bay also provided a sheltered body of water in which the submarines 
could be calibrated prior to entering the Irish Sea (Figure 54). This facility was not, 
however, solely reserved for the trialling of submarines. Direction finders for ships 
as well as free-dropping supplies in conjunction with S-Phone homing sets were 
tested at this location.
80
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Figure 53: A Welfreighter being lifted into Fishguard Bay by cranes on the 
harbour.
81
  
 
 
Figure 54: A ‘Welfrighter’ being tested in Fishguard Harbour. The activities of SOE 
in this small community would have been highly visible.
82
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Miscellaneous Testing Facilities 
 
 Not all equipment developed by SOE required extensive facilities for field 
trials. Until August 1943, although the organisation had employed a Trials Officer 
within the Research Section, there were no strict requirements that all new devices 
had to be inspected. Following this date, a Trials Subsection was established within 
the Operational Research Section. All new equipment now had to pass a series of 
clearly defined tests.
83
 As the operating environment could easily be replicated 
throughout the UK, there were few limitations on where these trials could be 
conducted. SOE, therefore, generally assessed new equipment at their pre-existing 
facilities.  
 Wireless equipment was often trialled between SOE’s STSs and various 
other locations across the UK.
84
 To assess their new ‘Squirt’ transmitters,85 tests 
were conducted between Station 54, Fawley Court, and an undisclosed location in 
Scotland.
86
 In early 1945, Sergeant Creaton, Royal Signals, was tasked with 
evaluating the English Midget Mains Receiver and the Polish Midget Mains 
Transceiver. Creaton was the ideal candidate as he had ‘been responsible, for more 
than a year, for the technical training of all students at S.T.S. 52 and has, 
consequently, a wide knowledge of the ability of the student to handle radio 
equipment, and it was on the understanding that he would review …. from the 
students’ point of view’.87 For these tests, Creaton was sent to Thurso in the Scottish 
Highlands.
88
 
 When SOE wanted to trial air dropped containers, initially they utilised RAF 
Ringway.
89
 Later on, ‘all packing and dropping trials were to be … carried out by 
Station 61 [Gaynes Hall, Cambridgeshire], the Special Parachute Section, Henlow, 
or the operational squadrons [based at RAF Tempsford] … An alternative 
arrangement was, however, made with the Balloon Development Establishment, 
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Cardington, who placed a balloon at our disposal for drop-tests’.90 For the majority 
of SOE’s new equipment, the undertaking of user trials required little specialist 
infrastructure. As long as the field conditions could be replicated, an assessment 
could be made of their limitations.  
SOE’s Research and Development Infrastructure: A Case Study in 
Miniature Submarines  
 
 Prior to the Second World War, research and development into specialist 
equipment designed for clandestine warfare was only ever conducted in a limited 
capacity. In an age of appeasement, there was little political incentive within the UK 
to develop subversive weapons of war. When it became clear that the outbreak of 
hostilities was inevitable, this situation changed. During Section D’s existence, the 
organisation developed some of the basic equipment of clandestine warfare. 
Following the formation of SOE, their scientists and engineers’ could focus their 
endeavours on devices for specific operational requirements.  
 SOE’s greatest investment in research and development infrastructure was 
related to their work on designing miniature submarines. In 1942, the strategic 
necessity of undermining the operational capabilities of the German Bismark-class 
battleship TIRPITZ came to a fore. Stationed deep within the Norwegian fjords, 
TIRPITZ posed a significant threat to the northern convoy routes to the Soviet 
Union.
91
 As Churchill was of the opinion that the successful destruction of her would 
affect the global naval situation, the battleship became a target of the highest 
priority.
92
 With such a high value placed on the TIRPITZ, all branches of the Armed 
Service immediately began investigating methods for her destruction. In an effort to 
gain favour within Whitehall, SOE also joined this race.
93
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 Intelligence suggested that whilst at berth in Norway, the TIRPTIZ was 
protected by various layers of anti-torpedo netting (Figure 55).
94
 Further defensive 
features included patrol vessels, searchlights, both on the shore and on-board, gun 
emplacements, smoke generators and maritime buffer zones.
95
 SOE’s operational 
procedure for attacking comparatively lightly guarded cargo ships from canoes was 
clearly not practical in this situation.  
 
 
Figure 55: The security measures established round the TIRPITZ whilst berthed 
were extensive. These included patrol vessels, searchlights, both on the shore and on 
board, gun emplacements, smoke generators and maritime buffer zones.
96
 
Attempting an attack run from a canoe would have been suicidal.  
 
 The answer to this operational challenge, as determined by SOE, was the 
development of a one-man attack submarine.
97
 This submersible was to become 
known as the ‘Welman’ and was the brainchild of the stubborn Colonel John 
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Dolphin.
98
 SOE’s solutions was, however, not unique. Prior to the summer of 1940, 
the Army had begun work developing a miniature submarine. During July, control of 
the project transferred to the Admiralty. It took them a further two years of 
development before they placed their first order for 12 ‘X-Crafts’.99 Despite the 
Admiralty’s head start, SOE continued work on the Welman as the X-Craft had yet 
proved itself in combat.  
 Within SOE, support for the development of the Welman continued despite 
internal correspondence indicating a growing awareness of its operational 
shortcomings.
100
 It became apparent that during an attack run, there was simply far 
too much for a single person to effectively accomplish. Furthermore, by being alone, 
the operator was denied the moral support of another crew member.
101
 Despite these 
flaws, SOE continued investing heavily in resources and infrastructure necessary for 
the development of the Welman. This reflected an internal desire to provide the 
capabilities of achieving a major strategic objective. The destruction of enemy 
battleships was one of the tasks SOE had no proven operational procedure. It was 
possible that if the organisation could remove the threat of the TIRPITZ, their 
position within Whitehall might have become unassailable.  
 Whilst work was ongoing developing the Welman, SOE began designing a 
submersible capable of delivering supplies to a hostile coastline. In 1942, the 
organisation lost operational control of their maritime link to occupied France. 
Despite initial protests, SOE never attempted to re-establish these networks. This 
was because operational experience had demonstrated the limitations of supplying 
the resistance by sea. The responsibility for shipping agents and supplies was 
transferred to a reluctant RAF.
102
 SOE, therefore, lost its independence and had to 
rely on a third party for their transportation arrangements.  
 Although there were clear operational advantages of using aircraft, the 
development of the ‘Welfreighter’ represented a desire to regain operational 
freedom. SOE’s designed a submarine which had a surface range of 400 miles 
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travelling at 7 knots and 20 miles submerged at 3 knots. The vessel could 
accommodate two passengers and carry 1,000lbs
103
 (453.6kg) of freight.
104
 There 
were, however, concerns raised within SOE over whether a Welfreighter has ‘any 
advantages … over an M.G.B. [Motor Gun Boat] with dinghy’.105 
 Despite the operational limitations of all of SOE’s attempts at designing 
miniature submarines, their determination to continue pursuing these avenues 
reflects a desire to expand their maritime capabilities. The development of these 
submersibles also established a close working relationship with the Admiralty.
106
 If 
the organisation had perfected the designs, they would have also been in a position to 
increase the operational capabilities of the Royal Navy.  
 Although certain ‘statement’ projects received heavy investment, the 
facilities and expertise necessary for their development could be utilised by other 
research clusters. By providing their scientists and engineers with specialist 
infrastructure and flexible trialling facilities, SOE created a milieu in which they had 
the freedom to innovate and speculate. Heavy investment in research and 
development by the organisation reflects the value they placed on state-of-the-art 
equipment specifically designed for clandestine warfare. Not only would the 
provision of sub-standard supplies to the resistance undermine SOE’s authority, it 
might also compromise active operations. As the organisation inherited a number of 
‘basic’ items from their predecessors, they could invest more time and resources into 
devices designed for specific operational requirements. By the end of the war, SOE 
had accumulated an extensive catalogue of clandestine equipment.  
 
SOE’s Material Culture 
 
 The nature of SOE’s research and development facilities meant that they are 
often indistinguishable from other similar sites. Workshops, laboratories and testing 
facilities are ubiquitous as they require standardised equipment to operate 
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effectively. What was unique to the organisation was the new form of military 
artefacts they created. One of the greatest considerations SOE’s scientists and 
engineers had to contemplate was the size of the equipment they were designing. It 
was essential that all supplies sent to the resistance were as compact as possible. This 
had the duel benefit of increasing the number of stores which could be transported 
during each resupply mission, whilst also allowing the resistance to easily conceal 
the items. Unlike the military who were mainly concerned with efficiency and the 
destructive nature of their equipment, SOE had to combine these with effectively 
shrinking their size.  
 Another consideration which had to be taken into account was the ability of 
these items to be camouflaged.
107
 The new equipment had to incorporate a degree of 
flexibility which enabled them to be disguised as commonplace items. This duality 
of SOE’s material cultural meant outwardly the equipment appeared as everyday 
ubiquitous objects, whilst in fact they were of a highly sophisticated nature. To be 
truly effective, they had to function as both.  
 
Archaeological Remains 
 
 In March 1945, SOE’s main Research and Development facility at The 
Frythe was taken over by the Admiralty’s DMWD.108 When this organisation 
vacated the property it was then operated by Unilever followed by GlaxSmithKline. 
Under these two companies, the facilities at The Frythe underwent dramatic 
alterations (Figure 56). The extensive remodelling of the site has potentially 
impacted the survival of traces of SOE’s Station XII. In 2011, two of the 
organisation’s magazines were still extant within the grounds of The Frythe.109 By 
2015, the site was in the possession of a company planning on developing the site 
into a housing estate.
110
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Figure 56: Google Earth image of The Frythe. The later redevelopment of the site 
has potentially impacted the survival of remains associated with SOE’s Station XII. 
 
 There is, however, the possibility of surviving infrastructure associated with 
SOE’s trials of maritime equipment at both Queen Mary Reservoir and Fishguard. 
Traces of the organisation may survive as ramps, slipways and workshops: graffiti 
and arborglyphs may also be present.  
 This chapter has demonstrated the value SOE placed on developing 
innovative equipment intended for clandestine warfare. By investing in workshops 
and laboratories, the organisation gained the capacity to design a wide range of 
military hardware. The next chapter will examine the infrastructure and facilities 
developed by SOE to manufacture and prepare these items ready for despatch to the 
field.  
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CHAPTER V 
Supply 
 
 Once new equipment had passed SOE’s user and field trials, it was essential 
that the organisation could manufacture and prepare these items for delivery to the 
field. Without an efficient and reliable supply chain, the organisation could not have 
armed resistance groups.
1
 Certain ‘standard’ equipment could be obtained through 
Army, Royal Navy or RAF channels. As SOE’s role was new and unique, these 
supply networks could not, however, always provide the necessary items. In these 
circumstances, the designs developed by their Research and Development Section 
would either be manufactured in-house or subcontracted to an external organisation. 
These supplies were then stock piled at various facilities across the UK in advance of 
requests for equipment from the field.  
 To ensure the items were delivered in a useable condition, SOE invested in 
developing containers in which stores could be safely transported to mainland 
Europe. It was also necessary for the organisation to investigate methods of packing 
items to ensure they were not damaged in transit. As the war progressed, SOE 
devised various standardised content lists. This allowed the organisation to shorten 
the time between a request being received and stores being delivered.  
 Although supply chains are a relatively dry subject seemingly far removed 
from operations, this aspect of SOE represented a considerable achievement that says 
much about the ability of the organisation as a whole. It will be demonstrated that 
during 1942, SOE’s supply chain underwent a substantial expansion and a 
geographical realignment. Without the supply infrastructure the organisation 
developed in the UK, the European Resistance would have been unable to function 
effectively.  
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SOE’s Supply Chain 
 
 Before supplies could be delivered to the resistance in the field, they had had 
to pass through an extensive and complex infrastructure established by SOE in the 
UK (Figure 57). Despite the mundane nature of logistics, this was an essential 
element of SOE which underpinned the organisation’s operational capabilities. The 
development of their supply chain was reflective of SOE’s increasing competence as 
the war progressed.  
 
 
Figure 57: Distribution of SOE’s supply facilities within the UK. The greatest 
influence on the network was the Great North Road and the Great Northern 
Railway. These ran between London and Edinburgh passing The Thatched Barn and 
Gaynes Hall on route.  
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 On the formation of SOE in July 1940, the organisation inherited a virtually 
non-existent supply infrastructure. Supporting active resistance networks with 
equipment was unprecedented before the war. Until April 1940, although the 
combatants were at war, neither side launched a major land offensive. During this 
phase, the resistance had not yet formed in the majority of Europe. Those networks 
which had developed in countries overrun by Germany were often of a fragmented 
and embryonic form. These groups, such as those established in Poland, were also 
located beyond the range of contemporary aircraft. It was, therefore, neither feasible 
nor desirable to supply them with equipment.  
 The first stage in a successful supply chain is always the primary producers. 
Scattered throughout the UK, the Empire and the United States, SOE was dependent 
on private businesses to provide them with raw material and, occasionally, 
manufactured equipment. Without their support, it ‘would have been impossible [for 
the organisation] to carry on’.2 It was common for SOE to issue contracts to those 
companies their staff had relations with prior to the war.
3
 These personal 
acquaintances ensured the quality of their work could be guaranteed. Prior 
relationships also meant the organisations asked fewer questions with regard to their 
contracts. Throughout the war, SOE found that their suppliers undertook the work 
with ‘great enthusiasm’.4  
 It was inevitable that not all equipment required by their agents could be 
subcontracted to private companies to produce. One of the most secretive aspects of 
the manufacturing process was camouflaging the equipment so that it might ‘pass’ in 
occupied Europe. In November 1941, SOE employed the services of a camouflage 
expert. As it rapidly became apparent that advice alone was insufficient, a small 
facility was established in the grounds of The Frythe in January 1942. The following 
month, the expanding department took over larger workshops in the Victoria and 
Albert Museum, Kensington.
 5
 It was their responsibility to ‘produce concealment 
devices for the transportation and use of arms, explosives, operational money, codes, 
documents, radio transmitters and receivers, together with special stores for the 
equipment of Agents in the Field’.6 In June 1942, the Camouflage Section once more 
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relocated. This time they moved to a larger property which provided them sufficient 
capacity to expand to meet increasing operational requirements. Situated on the 
Barnett bypass, the Thatched Barn became known as Station XV and dealt with all 
large scale production (Figure 58). This left the staff at the Victoria and Albert 
Museum responsible for producing prototypes and providing personal contact with 
agents.
7
  
 
 
Figure 58: The Thatched Barn, located on the Barnett bypass. In June 1942, SOE 
relocated their Camouflage Section from the Victoria and Albert Museum to this new 
accommodation. 
 
 Once equipment had been camouflaged, it was necessary to store it prior to 
being despatched to the field. Prior to SOE’s formation, the facilities operated by her 
predecessors were characteristically multifunctional. Section D constructed a small 
magazine for the storage of explosives and incendiaries at Bletchley Park, Station X. 
This site was also being used by the Government Code and Cypher School (GCCS). 
Due to the influx of their personnel following the outbreak of war, Section D’s 
experimental section took up permanent residence at Aston House, Hertfordshire, in 
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November 1939.
8
 The allocation of properties to the Secret Services was normally 
the responsibility of other organisations. If the Ministry of Works had no vacant 
properties which were suitable, SOE ‘would approach the W.O. [War Office] to 
ascertain whether they had any … houses which they could transfer to the Ministry 
of Works for I.S.R.B. [Inter Services Research Bureau, cover name for SOE], or 
failing this, whether the W.O. could release any suitable earmarked houses in favour 
of the Ministry of Works’.9 Although the allocation of Aston House to Section D 
might have been out of the organisation’s hands, in June 1941, it became SOE’s 
primary storage facility.
10
  
 SOE’s storage capacity increased further in July 1942 when the organisation 
managed to arrange for a significant part of the 84 Command Ammunition Depot, 
Sandy, Bedfordshire, to be transferred over to their control.
11
 This facility was 
ideally suited for SOE’s requirements as it was located on the Great Northern Axis. 
The axis comprised of the Great North Road, which was one of Britain’s principal 
highways, and the Great Northern Railway,
12
 which offered a high-speed train 
service between London and Edinburgh.
13
 As the war progressed, this pre-existing 
logistics network was to play an increasingly important role in SOE’s supply chain. 
 In close proximity to Aston House was The Frythe. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, this property, which SOE also inherited from Section D, was to 
become their key centre for research and development. In December 1940, whilst the 
facility still only housed the wireless research section, plans were afoot to construct 
an armoury in the grounds. Pending completion of this work, the North Road 
Garage, Welwyn, was requisitioned to act as a temporary solution. By February 
1941, this facility had developed the capability to be able to send a single 
consignment of 20 tons of arms to Norway.
14
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 Despite this capacity, the armoury at the North Road Garage was deemed 
insufficient by SOE. In July 1941, a move to a new property by the Small Arms 
Section was planned. SOE’s new armoury was to be located at Bride Hall, 
Hertfordshire (Figure 59). As there was a perceived threat from the ‘Fifth Column’, 
‘secrecy was of paramount importance, and with the house situated “miles from 
anywhere”, it made the perfect secret service “hide-out”’.15  
 
 
Figure 59: Bride Hall, Station VI, home to SOE’s Small Arms Section. This facility 
was ideal for the organisation as it was isolated and had extensive storage capacity 
in the two medieval barns.  
 
 With the development of officially sanctioned clandestine warfare, a disparity 
in the requirements of supplying frontline troops and supporting networks operating 
in enemy territory arose. With the resistance, there were no rear echelons to directly 
supply them. All equipment, therefore, had to be transported beyond the frontline by 
air or sea.
16
 Before the supplies could be ‘shipped’ to mainland Europe, they would 
have to be packed into containers to protect them during transit.  
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 During 1940, SOE acquired space within RAF Henlow which they utilised 
for the modification and packing of parachutes and the filling of packages.
17
 
Although this airfield was one of Britain’s busiest, it was home to the RAF’s Special 
Parachute Section.
18
 As the art of parachuting was still in its infancy, by establishing 
a facility at RAF Henlow, SOE ensured they had access to experts in this specialist 
field. It was fortuitous for SOE that this airfield was also located on the ‘Great 
Northern Axis’.  
 
 
Figure 60: Richmond Terrace, London. This road is in the centre of Whitehall and 
surrounded by government buildings. The establishment of a parachute packing and 
storing facility within this structure by SOE would have restricted the organisation’s 
capacity to meet increasing operational demands.  
 
 On 5 June 1941, representatives of SOE and the RAF met to discuss 
coordinating the two organisation’s future parachute requirements. It was decided 
that it would be advantageous to relocate the storing and packing of ‘these special 
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parachutes in London. At present these are stored and maintained at Henlow, and a 
good deal of time and petrol is wasted through representatives of both organisations 
having to travel to and from Henlow to collect the appropriate parachutes … [It was 
proposed that] Room 1 and 2 at No. 1 Richmond Terrace or Room 101 at No. 4, 
Richmond Terrace would be well suited for this purpose’ (Figure 60).19 Located at 
the heart of government, Richmond Terrace was highly unsuitable for the 
establishment of a parachute and packing facility. The limited capacity of the rooms 
would have restricted the organisation’s ability to expand to meet the growing 
demands for supplies from the field. This move never materialised and SOE 
maintained a presence at RAF Henlow for the remainder of the war.  
 
 
Figure 61: The stable block of Audley End House. This was used by SOE from 1941 
until 1942 when the Packing Section relocated to Gaynes Hall.
20
  
 
 On 2 October 1941, four months after this meeting, SOE established their 
first station dedicated to packing supplies for Europe. This facility was housed in the 
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stable block of Audley End House, Essex (Figure 61). At the time, this property was 
also being used as a training facility for Polish agents. The finite space available, 
combined with the dual function of the site, meant that almost immediately the 
building proved inadequate for SOE’s expanding operational requirements.21 It 
became apparent that a new property would have to be acquired for the packing 
section.  
 Six months after SOE established their first packing facility at Audley End, 
the group relocated to a property purposely assigned to their section.
22
 The allocation 
of Gaynes Hall, Huntingdonshire, represented an important development in SOE’s 
supply chain (Figure 62). Here was a facility which offered the organisation ample 
capacity to expand to meet increasing operational requirements. Situated on the 
Great Northern Axis, the move of the packing section to Gaynes Hall consolidated 
the importance of this pre-existing transportation network to SOE’s supply chain.  
 
 
Figure 62: Gaynes Hall, Huntingdonshire. In 1942, SOE relocated their Packing 
Section from the stable block at Audley End to this property. This new facility offered 
SOE ample space to expand their capacity to meet changing operational 
requirements.  
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 In November 1943, SOE realised that Gaynes Hall did not have sufficient 
capacity to develop a container reserve for the upcoming invasion of mainland 
Europe.
23
 The organisation, therefore, sent one of their most experienced packers to 
‘Messrs. Carpet trades Ltd. Of Kidderminster … His duty was to instruct the 
employees, nearly all women, in the packing of Sten, Bren and Rifle containers 
(these three types being chosen owning to the great demand and unskilled labour 
could perform the task of packing)’.24 The first order placed by SOE with this 
company was for 4,000 containers. This was to be eventually increased to 18,500.
25
 
As Messrs. Carpet Trades was producing a stockpile of containers, its geographical 
isolation from the rest of SOE’s supply chain is understandable: there was no 
immediate urgency for the completion of the order.  
 In 1942, a reluctant RAF caved in under increasing political pressure and 
allocated an airfield to the Secret Services.
26
 By 11 April 1942, both Special Duty 
squadrons had relocated to RAF Tempsford.
27
 Although it was the RAF’s decision to 
allocate this ‘substandard’ airfield to ‘special duties’, it was fortuitous that it was 
located on the Great Northern Axis. The dedication of RAF Tempsford to support 
the Secret Services cemented the importance of this pre-existing logistics network to 
SOE’s supply chain. Through a combination of conscious planning and serendipity, 
the pre-existing Great Northern Axis became a central feature to the organisation’s 
logistics. This provided SOE an efficient transportation system to move personnel 
and equipment rapidly around the country.  
 By July 1944, any request submitted to SOE’s Section E (Supplies) was 
expected to be delivered within days.
28
 The organisation had developed a reputation 
by then whereby ‘a telephone call from M.O.1.(S.P.) [one of SOE’s cover names] 
meant a store was required in the quickest possible time’.29 On receiving an order, 
the department would enlist the assistance of the War Office transport branch and 
arrange for the delivery to be made by road. It was common for SOE to organise the 
movement of thousands of tons of stores through the War Office.
30
 On one occasion 
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when ‘1,600 tons of ammunition were urgently required, two special ammunition 
trains were laid on’.31 It was because SOE utilised a pre- transportation network that 
movement of supplies of this magnitude was feasible.  
 The exploitation of the rail network could, however, be problematic. The 
organisation quickly learnt that supplies despatched ‘by passenger train to a London 
terminus was not a good idea as so many parcels and cases arrived at the same time 
that it took Railway staff a considerable time to locate packages intended for us’.32  
 SOE’s UK based supply chain was not necessarily always intended to 
directly support the European Resistance. To function effectively, the organisation 
also required supplies. In order to support their UK based facilities, SOE established 
a storage facility in the Knoll School, Camberley, Surrey.
33
 Known as the Camberley 
Reception Depot (CRD), it was the responsibility of this facility to store and 
distribute equipment requested by SOE’s departments based within the UK.34 As the 
organisation was spread across the width and breadth of the country, Camberley was 
ideally located on a major railway line. From there, equipment could easily be 
shipped to their intended destination.  
 
The Nature of SOE’s Supply Chain 
 
 Central to an efficient supply chain are professional depots and reliable 
manpower. No matter how proficient a logistics network appeared, it could not 
function without capably run facilities. SOE’s supply chain consisted of primary 
supplies through storage deports to their packing stations. Although these facilities 
commonly had multiple functions, the nature of these sites were not necessarily 
unique. The real test of SOE’s efficiency was their ability to manufacture, pack and 
deliver equipment requested from the field to RAF Tempsford ready for transit.  
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SOE’s Manufacturing Facilities 
 
 Although the unique role of SOE’s agents meant a certain degree of 
specialised equipment was required, the organisation was dependent on the War 
Office to supply standardised items. The head of the organisation, CD, arranged with 
the armed services that any requests for supplies originating from within SOE would 
be met with no questions. It was also agreed that all costs would be written off. To 
ensure supplies would be delivered on time, it was necessary for the heads of 
departments to provide an indication of upcoming operations to allow for the 
prioritisation of equipment allocation.
35
  
 
 
Figure 63: Aston House, Hertfordshire, home to SOE’s main supply facility. Within 
the grounds, workshops enabled the small scale production of equipment.  
 
 The unique role of SOE’s agents inevitably meant a certain degree of 
specialised equipment was required. As these could not be obtained through pre-
existing military channels, SOE had to design them from scratch.
36
 Once new designs 
had been approved, it was the responsibility of the organisation’s Section E to 
arrange for their production. In order to bulk manufacture these items, SOE often 
                                                          
35
 TNA HS 7/46 Appendix A p. 1 
36
 See p. 88 
132 
 
approached private companies. As the request came from the War Office, producers 
were often willing to cooperate. On account of security precautions, SOE had to take 
great care when requesting items which were out of the ordinary.
37
 Occasionally, 
companies were reluctant to ‘supply any goods, even to the War Office and when 
operational necessity was hinted at, unless they still bore their trade name. In course 
of time, however, these difficulties were gradually overcome as the firms with which 
we dealt came to know us better’.38  
 
 
Figure 64: Bontex Knitting Mills, Wembley, Station VIIa. SOE took over this factory 
for the purpose of manufacturing wireless equipment.
39
 
 
 For small scale batch production and the manufacturing of prototypes, SOE 
made facilities available at The Frythe and Aston House (Figure 63). As this was 
neither of their primary functions, the capacity of these facilities to produce 
equipment was limited. To facilitate the manufacturing process, SOE constructed 
machine and carpenters’ shops in the grounds of Aston House. Within the estate, a 
miniature filling factory was also erected. In this structure, SOE could assemble and 
pack high explosive demolition charges in accordance with contemporary magazine 
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regulations.
40
 In preparation for Operation OVERLORD, SOE managed to arrange 
for part of the Royal Ordnance Factory (ROF) Elstow, Bedfordshire, to be transferred 
over to their control.
41
 This increased the organisation’s capacity to produce 
specialist charges in anticipation of a more active resistance following the invasion.  
 The production of certain state-of-the-art equipment was, inevitably, kept in-
house. In June 1942, SOE’s Wireless Production Unit relocated their manufacturing 
process from The Frythe to the Bontex Knitting Mills, Wembley (Figure 64).
42
 As 
the organisation was developing innovative wireless sets, the security of these 
designs was paramount. By keeping the manufacturing process in-house, SOE 
ensured that their equipment was not compromised. Production of these wireless sets 
was not always for internal consumption. Over the course of the war, the organisation 
also received hundreds of thousands of pounds worth of contracts placed by the 
Ministry of Supply (Figure 65).  
 
 
Figure 65: Graph showing the value of Ministry of Supply contracts placed with 
Station VIIb.
43
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 It was also not practical for SOE to subcontract the production of forged 
documentation. Although fighting a ‘total war’, acknowledgment of certain 
clandestine activities could have potential political implications. It was, therefore, 
necessary for SOE to establish an in-house forgery department. Accommodation for 
this section was found within Station XIV located at Briggins, Essex (Figure 66). 
Initially, the forgers shared the premises with STS38. This had been established to 
prepare Polish agents for life within hostile territory. By 1 April 1942, the students 
from Briggens had relocated to Audley End. This move allowed the printing works 
to substantially expand. At its peak, the Forgery Section employed 50 members of 
staff, the majority of whom were ex-convicts. Over its operational life, this 
department produced in excess of 275,000 documents.
44
  
 
 
Figure 66: Briggins, Essex, Station XIV. Before being completely taken over by the 
Forgery Section, this facility was also home to STS38 which was a training 
establishment of the Polish Section.  
 
 As it was not practical to internalise their entire manufacturing process, SOE 
awarded the majority of their contracts for equipment to private companies. It was 
not uncommon during the war for the armed services to utilise business in support of 
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the war effort. The employment of experienced workforces and pre-existing 
manufacturing infrastructure was an efficient method of producing vital equipment. 
On 28 August 1942, SOE placed an order for 153 Welman hulls with the Pressed 
Steel Company, Cowley, Oxfordshire. As prior to the war they had manufactured car 
panels, they were ideally suited to this task. To protect the security of this new 
submarine, the manufacturing process was compartmentalised. The order was also 
placed under the name ‘floats, sweeps, Mk III’ to hide its true identity.45 
 
 
Figure 67: Aerial photographic transcription of The Thatched Barn. This facility 
was SOE’s main centre for camouflaging equipment destined for occupied Europe.46  
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Figure 68: The metal workshop (top) and props shop (bottom) in the grounds of the 
Thatched barn. On the wall of the prop shop is Buster Keaton’s quote ‘Silence is of 
the Gods; only monkeys chatter’.47  
 
 Once certain equipment had been manufactured, whether in-house or 
externally, it required a degree of camouflaging before it could ‘pass’ in occupied 
Europe. Outgrowing their workshop in the Victoria and Albert Museum, the 
Camouflage Section relocated to the Thatched Barn in June 1942 (Figure 67).
48
 It 
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was the responsibility of this department to undertake the final stage of equipment 
processing. This can be regarded as the most important stage in the production of 
supplies. Any indication that equipment was manufacture in the UK, or the devices 
true nature, would expose an agent during a routine search.  
 In order to camouflage equipment, SOE constructed a prop shop, a textile 
shop, a carpenters shop, a printing room, an art department, a compositors section, a 
plasterers shop, a paint shop, a paint spraying shop and a metal workers shop in the 
grounds of the Thatched Barn.
49
 Magazines were also erected within a compound to 
the north of the workshops in order to store explosives onsite (Figure 68).  
 
Item Quantity 
Tyre Burster 185,813 
Incendiary Cigarette 43,700 
Explosive Wood 700 
Explosive Bicycle Pump 138 
Explosive Oil Can 106 
Explosive Rats 100 
Protective Incendiary Briefcase (electrical) 81 
Explosive Torch 50 
Protective Incendiary Attaché Case (electrical) 39 
Explosive Clogs 36 pairs 
Protective Incendiary Suitcase (electrical) 30 
Explosive Food Tin 24 
Protective Incendiary Tobacco Tin (mechanical) 19 
Incendiary Deed Box 11 
Protective Incendiary Cigarette Box (mechanical) 6 
Protective Incendiary Lady’s Work Box (mechanical) 6 
Explosive Coal 3.5 tons 
Table 10: The quantity of equipment adapted and manufactured at The Thatched 
Barn, Station XV, prior to December 1944.
50
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 The relocation of SOE’s Camouflage Section to the Thatched Barn provided 
the department space to expand. Eventually, they developed the capacity to adapt 
over 30 tons of arms and ammunition per month for a single Country Section (Table 
10).
51
 It was only through the direct investment in facilities at the Thatched Barn that 
SOE could camouflage material on this scale.  
 
Storage Facilities 
 
 Once equipment had been manufactured, it was essential to store it until it 
was required in the field. Until June 1941, the storage of equipment by SOE occurred 
on an ad hoc basis. Items were kept at Aston House, a property inherited by the 
organisation from Section D. It was, however, the responsibility of this facility to 
undertake research, development and manufacture of sabotage equipment whilst also 
providing training in the handling of explosives.
52
  
 Until February 1941, the operational demands for supplies were limited. 
During this month, however, the Auxiliary Units placed an order with Aston House 
for 1,000 ‘mixed parcels’ (Table 11).53 The stores required for these packages were 
kept in a variety of small structures in close proximity to the main house at Aston. At 
the time, the segregation of explosive groups was only occasionally implemented. 
The organisation also kept some of their incendiaries in an unreliable condition and 
had yet to execute the regulations for the safe storage of dangerous material.
54
 
Despite these issues, SOE soon accumulated a floating stock of several tons of high 
explosives, incendiaries and other equipment at Aston House.
55
 Until July 1942, all 
stores shipped from here were sent in plain or commercial cover packages. 
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Following this date, SOE managed to obtain official classifications from the 
Explosives Storage and Transport Committee for all of their devices.
56
 
 
Item Quantity 
Copper Tube Igniters 24 
Striker Boards 6 
Pocket Tins Incendiaries 12 
1hr Lead Delays / 3hr Lead Delays 20/50 
Instantaneous Fuze 50 
Cordtax 240ft (73.15m) 
Detonators No. 8 or 27 100 
Explosives 20lbs (9.07kg) 
Safety Fuze Mk II Bickford 48ft (14.63m) 
CE Primers 20 
Tubes, Fuzes, Sealing 24 
Crimping Tool 1 
Tube Vaseline 1 
Spool Trip Wire 0.32” (0.81cm) / 0.14” (0.36cm) 1/3 
Coils Tape 8 
Pull Switch / Pressure Switch 6/3 
Table 11: Contents of the Auxiliary Unit Mark II. Although this was a list produced 
in July 1944, it illustrates the type of equipment allocated to the Auxiliary Units.
57
  
 
 On 9 June 1941, Professor Dudley Newitt was appointment Director of 
Scientific Research (DSR). This triggered a major reorganisation of the functions of 
Aston House and The Frythe. Research and Development was relocated to The 
Frythe whilst Aston House was tasked with production, supplies and stores.
58
 This 
arrangement survived for the remainder of the war. Following this reorganisation, 
Aston House began the process of becoming a more professional depot.  
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 Aston House’s disregard for contemporary magazine safety precautions came 
to a fore on 2 January 1942.
59
 Whilst the staff from this facility were attending a 
New Year’s party at the nearby Frythe, the incendiary magazines caught fire.60 In the 
aftermath of this disaster, SOE undertook a reassessment of the nature of the storage 
facilities at Aston House. As an immediate response, surplus stores were removed 
from the premises and relocated to STS41, Fawley Court, Oxfordshire. To improve 
the segregation of the remaining equipment at Aston House, a number of elephant 
shelters were erected in the grounds (Figure 69).  
 
 
Figure 69: Aston House from the west. The large elephant shelters to the right of the 
picture housed general stores. Clustered around the main house were numerous 
workshops and testing facilities. To the left of the picture was the camp 
accommodation for the staff based at the facility. These were separated into men’s 
and women’s camps. A NAAFI and entertainment facilities were also provided by 
SOE at this site.
61
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Figure 70: Site plan of Aston House based on aerial photography transcription. 
Following the fire at the facility, a substantial building programme was instigated. 
In order to limit the damage of another disaster, the new facilities were 
compartmentalised. Magazines were separated from incendiary stores at the 
periphery of the site. This ensured any damage was confined. In order to provide 
safe accommodation for their staff, the camps were constructed at the other end of 
the facility to the high explosives.
62
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 The fire coincided with a period when it became apparent that a substantial 
expansion of the facilities at Aston House was required.
63
 By this time, political 
support for SOE was more forthcoming. There was, consequently, the incentive to 
expand the organisations capacity to meet the potential increases in future 
operational requirements. Under the directions of ‘Colonel F.T. Davies, plans were 
made for an extensive building programme comprising general stores, incendiary 
and explosive storage, accommodation for explosive filling and also a light 
engineering workshop’ (Figure 70).64 By early 1943, this programme of work was 
nearing completion. At this point a considerable and progressive increase in the 
staffing levels at this facility took place. By early 1945, a maximum of 
approximately 600 people were working on site.
65
  
 
 
Figure 71: Storage facilities at Aston House. Located to the south-west of the main 
house, these structures are believed to be for the storage of incendiary devices. In 
the background, an overhead hot steam pipe can be observed. Heat was produced in 
the generator building and then piped round the facility.
66
  
 
 This period of expansion saw SOE obtain the services of personnel from the 
Royal Army Ordnance Corps (RAOC). The arrival of the RAOC to Aston House 
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saw the introduction of a proper system of stores accounting. Although this was 
based on the standard ordnance procedure, some modifications to this system had to 
be introduced due to SOE’s special circumstances. The RAOC also ensured that the 
explosives on site were segregated into their various groups and that the proper 
safety distances were maintained (Figure 71).
67
 
 The period of expansion at Aston House completely altered the nature of the 
facility. Through the compartmentalisation of the site and the redistribution of stores, 
SOE limited the potential disaster which might ensue following an accident or 
enemy action. Magazines were also constructed to ensure explosives were stored in a 
safe fashion.  
 
 
Figure 72: During the period of expansion at Aston House, the MCU constructed 
four distinct types of magazines. These were of unusual design as access to this was 
via a ramp which lorries delivering stores would drive down. Earthen bunds were 
also constructed up to the walls of the magazines. 
 
 Coinciding with the building programme at Aston House, SOE established 
the MCU to internalise the construction process. Aspects of the new facilities at this 
site reflect this practice. Contemporary magazines were designed to contain and 
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divert the force of an explosion thereby limiting collateral damage. This was 
achieved by building the structures at ground level, surrounding them with earthen 
bunds and limiting their overhead cover.
68
 Although SOE’s magazines at Aston 
House had similarities with standard designs, there were certain peculiarities. The 
MCU erected the structures below ground level, which had to be accessed via ramps, 
and built the earthen bunds right up to the external walls (Figure 72). Despite the 
non-standard nature of these facilities, contemporaries regarded the structures as 
‘high-class’.69  
 
 
Figure 73: Bride Hall, Station VI, home to SOE’s Small Arms Section. Within the 
two barns, workshops, stores and armourers were accommodated. In front of the 
barn is the petrol pump installed during the Second World War. SOE also 
constructed a firing range within the grounds of Bride Hall so that weapons could be 
tested before being despatched to the field.
70
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 Although SOE’s main storage facility was at Aston House, the organisation 
maintained separate facilities for the upkeep of small arms. By July 1941, the North 
Road Garage and at space made available at The Frythe, which included one hut and 
the dining room, were no longer sufficient for the organisation’s requirements. The 
following month, SOE, therefore, planned to move their small arms to the nearby 
Brides Hall (Figure 73).
71
  
 
 
Figure 74: A selection of the Army supplies issued by SOE between March and 
October 1944. This graph shows that there was a significant peak in the number of 
submachine guns, rifles and mortor bombs in July 1944, the month after Operation 
OVERLORD. The peak in the number of battledresses issued did not occur until 
September 1944.
72
 
 
 The two spacious barns at Bride Hall were ideally suited for SOE’s armoury 
requirements. On receipt of weapons, the Small Arms Section was responsible for 
their repairing, servicing and testing.
73
 To facilitate this, a 30yds (27.43m) range was 
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constructed in the grounds. Over the operational life of Bride Hall, it is estimated 
that 100,000 pistols passed through this facility destined for the resistance in Europe 
(Figure 74).
74
  
 
Item Quantity 
Explosive Plastic and 808 4,000 tons 
Fuse, Cordex and Primacord 45,000,000ft (13,716m) 
Grenades No. 36 (Mills) 5,000,000 
SMG Stens 650,000 
Ammunition 9mm 415,000,000 rounds 
LMG Brens 68,000 
Mortars 3” 3,000 
Mines A/T Mk. V 100,000 
Table 12: A selection of the Army supplies issued by SOE from 1940 to 1945.
75
  
 
Item Yearly Issue to Country 
Sections/Missions 
Food (Chocolate, coffee, tea, milk and 
sugar) 
180,000lbs (81,646.6kg) 
Tobacco 30,000lbs (13,607.8kg) 
Cigarettes 2,000,000 
Spine Pads 5,000 
Heel Pads 5,000 pairs 
Ankle Bandages 5,000 pairs 
Sleeping Bags 1,000 
Bicycle Tyres 2,500 sets 
Table 13: Main trade stores issued by SOE.
76
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 Over the course of the war, SOE’s storage facilities underwent dramatic 
changes. The expansion of the organisation’s capacity to handle stores in 1942 
enabled vast quantities of equipment to pass through SOE (Table 12, Table 13 and 
Table 14). Without this capability, the activities of the resistance within Europe 
would have been curtailed. All weapons received by the resistance ‘were most 
gratefully received … [and when food was sent,] that was just too wonderful for 
words’.77 
 
Item Quantity 
Bows (Arrows) 2 (24) 
Bird Calls of 6 Birds 6 each 
Dart Boards 4 
Insulin 24 doses 
Belly of Pork ½ lb 
USSR Flag 1 
Sea Fishing Lines and Hooks 4 
Lighter Flints 7 grs 
Cylinders of Oxygen 6 
Table 14: Some of the varied Trade items SOE supplied to the resistance throughout 
the Second World War.
78
  
 
Packing Facilities 
 
 Before supplies could be transported to the field, it was essential they were 
packed into containers to protect them during transit (Figure 75). The delivery of 
equipment within containers also allowed SOE to efficiently combine items into a 
single consignment. Between October 1941 and April 1942, this important task was 
undertaken from the stable block of Audley End House.
79
 This ad hoc arrangement 
was potentially detrimental to the reputation of the organisation within the resistance. 
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If SOE could not guarantee the safe delivery of supplies requested by the field, their 
authority to coordinate the resistance networks could have been undermined.  
 
 
Figure 75: The Type ‘C’ container, as shown at the Office of Strategic Service’s 
(OSS) packing facility at Holmewood, was of a cylindrical shape formed from 
reinforced sheet metal. Split into two, the container was secured with three latches 
which once unlocked allowed it to open fully along its length.
80
  
 
 In early 1942, SOE took the decision to relocate their Packing Section to the 
spacious Gaynes Hall. Despite this move, concerns were raised over the quality of 
the packers’ work. On 9 February 1943, Colonel Chichaeff of the Soviet Armed 
Forces complained about the ‘inefficient work at Station 61 [Gaynes Hall] in an 
alleged mixing up on one occasion of containers for agents destined for Holland and 
Belgium respectively’.81 The Court of Enquiry determined that the mistake, which 
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had occurred in 1942, was the result of ‘labels on the containers must have become 
detached and been substituted either between the packing office and the aerodrome 
or at the aerodrome itself … [Consequently,] the whole procedure in respect of 
despatch of containers was overhauled and there now exists no possibility of such a 
substitution occurring in the future’.82  
 
 
Figure 76: Gaynes Hall, Station 61, home to SOE’s Packing Section from 1942. In 
the summer of 1943 a decision was taken to substantially increase the facilities 
capacity.
83
  
 
 It was the availability of space at Gaynes Hall which drew SOE to the 
property. This provided the organisation ample capacity to expand their packing 
capabilities when necessary. Within a year of the move, the facilities at Gaynes Hall 
were determined to be inadequate. In the summer of 1943, SOE took the decision to 
rectify this and initiated a programme of building work. This saw the construction of 
six large packing sheds, two magazines, one assembly-shed, two container stores and 
a new camp (Figure 76).
84
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Year Total containers packed at Station 61 % increase 
1942 2,176 - 
1943 13,435 517 
1944 56,464 320 
1945 4,334 -92 
Total 76,504  
Table 15: The number of containers packed at Gaynes Hall. Between 192 and 1943, 
the capacity of Gaynes Hall to pack containers substantially increased. 
85
  
 
 In June 1942, prior to the start of the major building programme at Gaynes 
Hall, SOE introduced a series of standardised container contents.
86
 This provided the 
resistance with predetermined combinations of supplies from which they could 
order. The development of fixed contents inevitably resulted in a more proficient 
packing procedure. This, combined with the new efficient site layout, allowed the 
packers at Gaynes Hall to increase their annual output by 2,494.8% between 1942 
and 1944 (Table 15). Whilst only increasing their staffing figures by 1,400% over 
the same timeframe (Table 16). Over the operational life of this facility, over 10,000 
tons of equipment was packed into containers destined for the resistance operating 
within Europe.
87
  
 
Date Staff % increase 
On formation 10 - 
September 1942 30 200 
April 1943 80 167 
September 1943 130 63 
March 1944 150 15 
Table 16: The changing staffing levels at SOE’s packing facility at Gaynes Hall. As 
the war progressed, the number of staff at Station 61 gradually increased.
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 In 1944, two years after the USA entered the war, the Office of Strategic 
Services (OSS) began packing supplies destined for the resistance in Europe.
89
 To 
prepare the organisation for this complex task, officers and NCOs from the OSS 
were attached to Gaynes Hall in February 1944 to observe SOE’s procedures. Within 
a month, SOE deemed their ‘students’ capable of independent work. The OSS, 
subsequently, moved into their new packing facility known as ‘Area H’ located at 
Holme, Peterborough (Figure 77).
90
  
 
 
Figure 77: Area H, Holme, home to the OSS’s packing facility. The footprint of the 
structures erected at the American packing station, known as Area H, were identical 
to the 1943 expansion at Station 61.
91
 The containers packed at this site were 
transported to the resistance from RAF Harrington.
92
  
 
 OSS’s Area H displayed similarities with Gaynes Hall in its site morphology 
and structural typology (Figure 78). This is indicative of either the construction of 
the facility occurring under the close supervision of SOE or the work being 
undertaken by the MCU. With three years of experience in packing containers, SOE 
had optimised the flow of equipment through the facility. By supporting the OSS in 
their development, SOE ensured that they were starting from a position of strength. 
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The guarantee that the OSS could provide a professional service was of strategic 
value to SOE. If the resistance observed the delivery of substandard supplies, the 
organisations legitimacy to control these disparate groups might have been 
undermined. Consequently, ‘all special containers continued to be packed at Station 
61, the only reason being that years of experience counted in the packing of specials, 
the most difficult task being to get the correct centre-of-gravity and still ensure the 
maximum pay-load’.93 The OSS was only trusted to pack the easiest containers.94 
Arrangements were also made so that if the OSS ‘ran into any snags and run into 
them they did, one of St. 61’s [Gaynes Hall] Officers would go over to Area H 
[Holme] and help to put them on the right road again’.95  
 
 
Figure 78: One of the magazines at Area H. Since the end of the Second World War, 
all of SOE’s structures at Gaynes Hall have been demolished and replaced with a 
prison. As nothing survives there, Area H is a valuable analogy for visualising 
SOE’s facility.96  
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 For certain items, the best form of transportation was in panniers not in 
containers. These were made up at a packing station SOE had formed at the heart of 
RAF Henlow. During 1940, the work was conducted from a small office, 9ft x 8ft 
(2.74m x 2.43m), under extreme security. Over the duration of the war, SOE’s 
workspace at this airfield expanded to 8,000ft
2
 (743.22 m
2
). Between May 1942 and 
January 1945, the output of this facility totalled 19,863 packages, 10,900 harnesses 
manufactured and 27,980 parachutes modified and packed. This was all done under 
strict secrecy at the centre of one of Britain’s busiest RAF stations.97  
 In advance of Operation OVERLORD, SOE began contemplating the 
challenges of providing the French Resistance with a greater quantity of medical 
supplies. These would be essential for the networks following the invasion. The 
organisation had been advised that during the French campaign, 50,000 casualties 
were to be expected. Immediately, SOE requested the War Office supply the 
organisation with 102 special ‘Medical Units’. These would have been sufficient to 
treat 15,000 casualties. Arrangements were then made with the Deputy Assistant 
Director of Medical Services of the Airborne Division for additional medical 
equipment. By August, SOE had placed an order for a further 100 tons of medical 
stores. To pack this vast quantity of supplies, it was necessary for the organisation to 
establish a Medical Supplies Packing Station which became known as ME10.
98
 By 
the following month, the facility was already in a position to take their first delivery 
of supplies.
99
  
 The careful packing of equipment into containers was an essential 
aspect of SOE’s supply chain. Without some form of protection, vital 
supplies might get damaged in transit. Through trial and error, SOE 
identified the optimal method of packing the wide variety of equipment with 
which they supplied the resistance.  
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Archaeological Remains 
 
 Following the end of the Second World War, SOE’s packing facility 
at Gaynes Hall was converted into HMP Littlehey (Figure 79). This 
redevelopment was likely to have had implications for the survival of 
archaeological remains associated with the packing of supplies. In the open 
spaces within the prison compound, traces of SOE’s facility might endure 
beneath the surface. Artefacts associated with the packing of containers 
could also be uncovered during archaeological excavations. In contrast, a 
significant proportion of the OSS’s Area H survives above ground (Figure 
78). 
 
 
Figure 79: Google Earth image of Gaynes Hall, now HMP Littlehey. The 
redevelopment of the site has potentially impacted the survival of remains associated 
with SOE’s Station 61.  
 
 Following the end of hostilities, SOE’s storage facility at Aston 
House was also demolished. The site was subsequently converted into a golf 
course. There is, therefore, a high probability that remains, including the 
foundation of buildings, submerged magazines and artefacts, survive buried 
beneath the ground.  
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SOE’s Supply Chain: Equipping the Resistance 
 
 Throughout the Second World War, supplies from the UK were vital to the 
resistance within Europe.
100
 Following the occupation of a country by the German 
invaders, items which were deemed to threaten their control were confiscated.
101
 
Without access to military hardware, the resistance could not have functioned 
effectively. Stockpiles, therefore, had to be re-established. Failure to provide the 
resistance with effective and reliable equipment would have undermined SOE’s 
authority. Dispersed groups might have continued operating in isolation as there was 
little incentive to come under the control of the Allies.
102
  
 Prior to 1942, the production, storage and packing of supplies destined for 
the resistance in occupied Europe was undertaken on an ad hoc basis by SOE. 
Equipment, which was manufactured on behalf of the organisation, was kept in 
unsuitable structures in the grounds of Aston House. Small arms, however, were 
stored in the dining room of The Frythe and in the North Road Garage. These would 
then be despatched to the stable block at Audley End to be packed into containers. 
As this coincided with a period in which the resistance was in its infancy, there was 
little incentive to invest scarce resources in developing a proficient supply chain.  
 In 1942, SOE’s supply infrastructure started to evolve, develop and become 
more professional. The packing of containers relocated from Audley End to Gaynes 
Halls, the armoury transferred to Brides Hall and a substantial building programme 
was initiated at Aston House. During this year, the Camouflage Section also acquired 
the Thatched Barn whilst the Forgery Section expanded into the whole of Briggins.   
 SOE’s supply chain was reliant on the pre-existing transportation system 
formed from the Great North Road and Great Northern Railway. This provided the 
organisation access to an efficient and comprehensive logistics network. Proximity 
to these public highways, however, had potential security implications. As SOE’s 
supply chain integrated itself into a public transportation system, the organisation 
became more visible within the landscape. In 1942, the Camouflage Section 
relocated to the Thatched Barn which was located on a major intersection. In 
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contrast, the previous year SOE had relocated their armoury to Bride Hall, ‘miles 
from anywhere’.103 As the war progressed, the need for an efficient supply chain 
trumped security.  
 Over time, as the resistance gained experience and members, requests for 
supplies increased. It was the responsibility of Aston House and Section E to ensure 
that these demands were met.
104
 Although certain specialist items had to be 
manufactured in-house, SOE subcontracted the majority of their manufacturing 
process. The organisation, however, also needed standard military hardware to 
function. These could be obtained through the War Office and by September 1942 
‘were large enough to be considered in competition with other users’.105 
 SOE’s capacity to handle the vast quantities of supplies required by the 
resistance was only possible through the expansion of Aston House and Gaynes Hall. 
This infrastructure allowed SOE to pack 56,464 containers in a single year. Without 
this equipment, the capacity of the resistance would have been discernibly curtailed. 
The next stage in SOE’s logistic network was to transport the supplies to the field, 
this is the subject of the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER VI 
Transportation 
 
 Once equipment had been packed into containers, it was ready for delivery to 
mainland Europe. It was essential for SOE’s reputation that provisions could be 
reliably and efficiently transported to the field when requested.
1
 Although supplies 
were vital to the resistance, the RAF, Royal Navy and SIS initially obstructed SOE’s 
efforts to establish links with occupied Europe. As an immediate response to the Fall 
of France, the organisation established a maritime network with the Brittany coast. 
Operational control of this link was, however, transferred to the Admiralty’s Naval 
Intelligence Division (NID) in 1942. The only connection with Europe which 
remained under the control of SOE throughout the war was, consequently, the 
‘Shetland Bus’. As the organisation gained operational experience, it became 
apparent that aircraft were better suited to their specific needs. It was not, however, 
until the end of 1941 that a reluctant RAF began increasing the number of aeroplanes 
available for ‘special duties’. Without the support of the RAF, SOE would have been 
unable to function.  
 Although the exploits of the aircrews and ships establishments have been 
covered in detail elsewhere, the transportation hubs have received little, if any, 
attention.
2
 This chapter will address this oversight. Through an analysis of SOE’s 
transportation hubs, light will be shed on the organisation’s relationships with the 
Royal Navy, the RAF and SIS.  
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The Nature of SOE’s Transportation Hubs 
 
 
Figure 80: SOE’s transportation hubs were spread across the UK. It was not until 
1942 that the organisation lost operational control of the Helford Flotilla and began 
focusing on airborne links to the continent. The lack of transportation hubs is a 
distinguishing feature of this distribution. As ships were to quickly prove 
inappropriate, SOE’s focus turned to aircraft. These were not constrained to specific 
routes and could refuel at satellite airfields on route. It was, therefore, possible to 
centralise the two squadrons allocated to the Secret Service at a single airfield.  
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Maritime Operations 
 
 To reach those groups resisting German occupation throughout Europe, SOE 
had to establish and maintain maritime and airborne transportation networks (Figure 
80). The organisation’s seaborne links to the continent were operated from two hubs 
within the UK. These links were known as the ‘Helford Flotilla’ and the ‘Shetland 
Bus’. Until 1942, SOE was contemplating opening a further connection to the 
continent from Leigh-on-Sea, Essex.
3
 Although never coming to fruition, this debate 
coincided with a marked decline in SOE’s utilisation of seaborne transportation.  
 
The ‘Helford Flotilla’ 
 
 Following the Fall of France in June 1940, SIS came under increasing 
pressure from the Directors of Naval, Military and Air Intelligence to provide a 
minimum of 72 hours warning of a German invasion. In order to achieve this 
objective, it was essential that the organisation could transport agents and 
intelligence to and from occupied Europe. The task of establishing SIS’s link befell 
Commander Frank Slocum of the Operations Section. As the Battle of France and 
the Battle of Britain were undermining the RAF’s spare operational capacity, Slocum 
focused his efforts on establishing a maritime link with Europe. Initially, these were 
maintained on an ad hoc basis utilising any fast surface craft he could borrow. 
Despite increasing pressure to undertake more operations, between 20 June and 12 
October 1940 Slocum’s section only managed 16 attempts to the north coast of 
France, five to the Channel Islands, six to Belgium and six to the Netherlands.
4
 
 Slocum also faced internal competitors within SIS who were also trying to 
establish links with the continent. On 20 June 1940, Leslie Humphreys, who had 
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been assigned to Section D, escaped from France on a warship.
5
 On returning to the 
UK, he was tasked with establishing a link back to occupied France. By the 
following month, Humphreys was already in a position to attempt to land three 
agents by sea. As his section was part of SIS, he was, however, reliant on Slocum to 
provide transportation. As his Operations Section was beset by demands, Slocum 
classed Section D as a low priority. This lack of support forced Humphreys to seek 
alternative forms of transportation under Section D’s exclusive control.6 
 Section D, therefore, commissioned Captain John Dolphin to locate a suitable 
small vessel in order to establish a line of communication with occupied Europe. 
Identifying a Belgium motor yacht at Newlyn, Cornwall, the ship was requisitioned, 
fitted out and renamed No. 77. Section D now had the capabilities of attempting to 
infiltrate agents into France by sea. The first operation did not occur, however, until 
after the formation of SOE. On 1 August 1940, the crew of No. 77 left the UK with 
three agents and Captain Gerry Holdsworth of the Intelligence Corps aboard.
7
 The 
operation, however, was abandoned after coming into contact with a German patrol 
vessel. Following this failed attempt, SOE had to rely on Slocum for the next 10 
operations, all of which were abandoned before reaching France. The failure of SIS’s 
Operations Section strengthened SOE’s resolve to establish independent 
transportation links with the continent.
8
  
 In the autumn of 1940, Holdsworth, now a Commander, was reassigned by 
SOE to Newlyn, Cornwall.
9
 Unofficially, he was tasked with establishing a facility 
from which a maritime link with France could be operated. In October, this 
assignment became officially endorsed when financial support to equip and run the 
base was obtained.
10
  
 After investigating suitable locations, Holdsworth decided the Helford 
Estuary, Cornwall, was ideal for SOE’s requirements. The lack of military 
infrastructure in the vicinity of this secluded natural harbour ensured the 
establishment of a clandestine fleet would pass relatively unnoticed. On 5 November 
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1940, he approached the Naval Office-in-Charge at Falmouth, Cornwall, to obtain 
permission to form a base on the Helford Estuary.
11
 Authorisation was duly received 
for this venture.  
 
 
Figure 81: The Helford Estuary was identified by Commander Holdsworth in 1940 
as the most suitable location for the establishment of a maritime hub linking the UK 
to France. Numerous buildings were requisitioned along the estuary to support the 
activities of the Helford Flotilla. The physical geography of the western coast of 
France made it ideally suited to clandestine activities. This composite map of the 
number of maritime operations undertaken by the Helford Flotilla over the course of 
the Second World War clearly indicates the importance of the north Brittany coast.
12
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 The strategic location of Helford Estuary was ideal for Holdsworth’s 
intended area of operations. Shortly after being tasked with establishing a maritime 
link with France, he had identified the Brittany coast as ideally suited for clandestine 
rendezvous (Figure 81).
13
 Home to smugglers across the centuries, this rugged coast 
consisted of coves, inlets and uninhabited offshore islands.
14
 This provided 
numerous locations where vessels could unload and stockpile stores hidden from 
enemy sentries. The rocky nature of the Brittany coastline also meant it was 
unsuitable for an amphibious invasion force. Defensive military installations were, 
therefore, small in number and widely spaced.
15
 Although other harbours existed in 
south-west England from which SOE could choose, minefields, journey times and 
routes to the operational area made these sites unsuitable.   
 
 
Figure 82: Ridifarne, home to the shore establishment of the Helford Flotilla. 
Located next to a pool in the estuary, this location allowed SOE’s ships to remain 
afloat at all tides.  
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 The first property requisitioned by Holdsworth on the Helford was at 
Helston. This was, however, to prove inconvenient as it was located too far upstream 
which meant vessels could only access it at high water. SOE’s base was shortly, 
thereafter, relocated to Ridifarne on the north bank above the Helford Passage 
(Figure 82). Situated next to a pool in the estuary, boats anchored here could remain 
afloat at all tides.
16
  
 
 
Figure 83: A comparison of the number of operations undertaken by the Helford 
Flotilla on behalf of SOE and SIS. Despite control of this facility being transferred to 
NID in 1942, the number of missions undertaken for SOE remained relatively 
constant.
17
 Over the course of the war, the number of operations undertaken by the 
Helford Flotilla would not have coped with the sheer volume of SOE’s supplies for 
the resistance.  
 
 Early in 1942, Slocum was attached to Rear-Admiral John Godfrey’s NID 
and was allocated the position of NID (Clandestine). This coincided with an 
Admiralty directive which placed all SOE vessels at Helford under the operational 
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control of NID. Justification for this was based on the desire to ensure that there 
would be no clashes in operational schedules. Too much activity in the English 
Channel would inevitably lead to a greater German presence. This would 
compromise the security of all missions, clandestine or otherwise. The issuing of this 
directive nullified SOE’s independent maritime link to occupied France.18 Despite 
losing the operational control of the Helford Flotilla, the number of missions 
undertaken on their behalf remained relatively constant throughout the war (Figure 
83). 
 The physical nature of SOE’s facility on the Helford Estuary to support their 
clandestine fleet is unknown. It is known, however, that their staff were 
accommodated in a number of pre-existing buildings. To ensure the reliability of 
their ships, it would have been necessary for the organisation to provide engineering 
facilities. The establishment of SOE’s shore facility on the Helford was the direct 
result of operational necessity. Slocum’s reluctance to support SOE during 1940, 
combined with the lack of available aircraft, limited the organisation’s capacity to 
undertake missions. Necessity, therefore, forced SOE to establish an independent 
maritime link with occupied France.  
 
The ‘Shetland Bus’ 
 
 Throughout the Second World War, the Shetland Islands were an important 
link between occupied Norway and the UK. Their close proximity, cultural and 
historical connections and sparse population made them ideal for sheltering a 
clandestine fleet working with Scandinavia.
19
 As early as 1940, plans were discussed 
to establish a shore facility base from which Norwegian fishing boats could operate. 
Initially conceived as a joint facility with SIS, this establishment became a purely 
SOE operation (Figure 84).
20
 By the end of 1941, it had been decided that a 
supplementary base on the Scottish mainland was necessary. Burghead, on the 
Moray Firth, was chosen to accommodate this new shore facility. Under the 
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commander of Captain H Marks, this base was brought into operation by the close of 
the season.
21
  
 
 
Figure 84: The Shetland Islands, home to the Shetland Bus. As the organisation’s 
activities became common knowledge amongst the local population, they could no 
longer be regarded as clandestine. Physical segregation was, therefore, no longer a 
determining factor in siting their facilities. The shore establishment, therefore, 
relocated to Scalloway.  
 
 SOE’s first shore establishment on the Shetland Islands was located at Lunna 
House on Lunna Voe (Figure 85). The physical isolation of this site was intended to 
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restrict the number of people who were aware of the activities of the Norwegian 
sailors.
22
 Lunna Voe also offered SOE a natural harbour sheltered from both the 
Atlantic Ocean and the North Sea.  
 
 
Figure 85: Lunna Voe, the first home of the Shetland Bus. It was from here that 
Norwegian fishermen crossed the North Sea to deliver agents and supplies and bring 
back refugees. 
 
 Overtime, the security provided by Lunna Voe’s isolation proved 
counterproductive and began impacting the flotilla’s operational efficiency. The 
Shetland’s small population meant that the activities of the crews rapidly became 
public. Their operations also became common knowledge within Norway by both 
Norwegians and Germans alike.
23
 Eventually being christened the ‘Shetland Bus’, 
physical isolation was no longer a necessary security precaution. It was now only 
essential to protect knowledge of the nature and destination of operations.
24
 If these 
were compromised, the success of missions and the safety of SOE’s agents could be 
undermined.  
 It soon became apparent that the physical isolation of the shore facility was 
having a negative impact on SOE’s operations. Access to the site was only possible 
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by a single road constructed on peat. Over the winter months, this was prone to 
subside under the weight of the lorries resupplying the facility. Lunna Voe’s 
isolation also impacted the opportunities for rest and relaxation.
25
 Without the ability 
to keep the crews occupied, entertained and relaxed whilst off duty, the operational 
efficiency of the establishment would deteriorate with a decline in morale.   
 Physical isolation also restricted the capability of SOE’s shipwrights to 
access the islands’ engineering facilities. If ships were to be maintained and repaired 
at Lunna Voe, the organisation would have to be willing to provide the necessary 
infrastructure. The engineers would still, however, require a stockpile of equipment 
and materials essential to their work. Construction of workshops would have also 
made the facility more conspicuous to aerial reconnaissance.
26
  
 In 1942, following a visit to Lunna Voe by Colonel John Wilson, head of the 
Norwegian Section, it was finally agreed that the ‘advanced operational Base had 
proved [too] remote’.27 Whilst the main activities of the Shetland Bus were to be 
relocated, accommodation at Lunna Voe was retained for the most secret type of 
operations.
28
 SOE’s shortlist of sites included Lerwick on the east coast and 
Scalloway on the west. Although security was no longer a primary factor, Lerwick 
was deemed too ‘cosmopolitan’. The harbour and engineering facilities were also 
being fully utilised by the Royal Navy. SOE’s final choice of Scalloway was also 
swayed by a maritime engineering firm offering them access to their workshops in 
the settlement.
29
  
 In order to conserve scarce resources, SOE preferred to utilise pre-existing 
structures. This also helped to conceal their activities from enemy reconnaissance. In 
order to operate efficiently, numerous buildings in Scalloway had to be 
requisitioned. Shipwrights’ workshops, storage facilities, a sergeants’ mess and a 
radio workshop were accommodated in two condemned houses, a disused coal store, 
an old weaving shed and a herring-curing station. To billet the staff, an old net 
factory was converted into barracks and four Nissen huts were constructed. The 
cipher staff and intelligence records were located in a rented property on the main 
street. Behind the settlement, SOE acquired a range of wooden huts which were used 
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to accommodate the British staff and an officers’ mess. As the number of Norwegian 
officers started to increase, an empty hotel was used for their accommodation. 
Further properties also housed the Motor Transport (MT) workshop, the armourer 
and storage facilities.
30
 
 At the time the Shetland Bus moved from Lunna Voe to Scalloway, only one 
slipway existed on the islands. As this was regularly employed by the Royal Navy, it 
proved difficult for SOE to arrange access to this facility. To overcome this issue, 
SOE decided to construct a second slipway. Initially, it was intended that the 
Admiralty would build this new facility on their behalf. When it became obvious that 
construction would not start before the winter, SOE sought permission to undertake 
the work themselves. Agreement was duly received and £750 was allocated to the 
task.
31
 This internalisation of building work mirrored the establishment of the MCU 
on the mainland.  
 
 
Figure 86: Prince Olav’s slipway (to the right of the pier), named after the Crown 
Prince of Norway, Scalloway, Shetland. Constructed by the inexperienced staff of the 
Shetland Bus, the slipway is still in use today by fishing boats. 
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 One of the main challenges faced by the Shetland Bus was their lack of 
experience constructing slipways. They were also reluctant to ask for any additional 
resources. In an effort to keep costs down, material and resources were scavenged.
32
 
Once all the necessary equipment was collected, Royal Navy divers were employed 
to install the concrete ramp which descended 170ft (51.82m). Completed in just two 
months, the ‘Prince Olav’ Slipway had the capabilities to winch vessels of 110ft 
(33.53m) length and with a dead weight of 120 tons (Figure 86).
33
 Despite the 
Admiralty’s initial reluctance to construct the slipway, without their support this 
structure could not have been built.  
 On completion of the Prince Olav Slipway, work began on the next 
engineering project, construction of a new pier. This structure was also erected with 
limited resources and no previous experience. To install the foundations, a pile-
driver was manufactured from a disused army water tower. In an effort to speed up 
construction, the decision was taken to weld the pier together.
34
 Admiralty approval 
for the building of a slipway and pier reflected the senior service’s tolerance of SOE 
operations within the North Sea. The extent of the operational area ensured that the 
activities of the Shetland Bus were unlikely to impact the Royal Navy. Operations by 
a clandestine fleet within the North Sea would most likely be combated by coastal 
patrols. As these would not extend far into open water, the ships of the Royal Navy 
could continue with their missions unimpeded. Conflict between SOE and the other 
services normally occurred when their clandestine activities were seen to have a 
negative impact on the latter’s operational capabilities.  
 In the small community of the Shetland Islands, the activities of SOE could 
not be shielded from public knowledge. As the organisation could no longer be 
classified as clandestine within this landscape, physical isolation was no longer 
relevant. It was, however, essential that certain operational information remained 
concealed from the general public.  
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34
 David Howarth, The Shetland Bus pp. 95-6. At the time, it was probably the only welded pier in 
existence. Similarly to Prince Olav Slipway, this structure still survives and is in daily use by local 
fishermen. 
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The Operational Challenges of Clandestine Flotillas 
 
 The very nature of maritime links with the continent impacted SOE’s 
operational capabilities. Supplies and agents could only be delivered to an unguarded 
stretch of shoreline. Although the rugged nature of the Brittany coast was ideal for 
clandestine activities, it was not safe to beach SOE’s ships. It was, therefore, 
necessary to transfer stores to purposely designed surf-boats.
35
 This procedure could 
take in excess of one and a half hours to complete which increased their risk of 
discovery.
36
  
 It also became apparent that supplying the resistance within Europe from the 
Brittany coast was impractical. Stores, often of a bulkly and compromising nature, 
would have to be transported across enemy controlled country to their intended 
destination. Patrols, curfews and checkpoints exacerbated the unnecessary risk faced 
by those tasked with moving the supplies.
37
 Further restrictions to clandestine 
maritime activities occurred on 23 March 1942 when Hitler issued the 
Kustenverteidigung, Coastal Defence Directive 40. This Directive gave rise to the 
Atlantic Wall and the increasing militarisation of the north European coastline.
38
 It 
soon became apparent that SOE required a form of transportation which could 
deliver material to pinpoint locations deep within occupied Europe (Figure 87). The 
obvious solution was the RAF.  
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Figure 87: This map is a composite of the locations of drop zones (DZs) the RAF 
delivered supplies to between 26 February 1943 and 22 June 1943. Unlike the 
Helford Flotilla, the RAF could transport SOE’s stores and agents deep into the 
heart of occupied Europe. This meant that equipment arrived at its intended field of 
operation without having to be moved across enemy control territory.
39
  
 
Airborne Operations 
 
 Following the Fall of France in June 1940, the spare capacity of the poorly 
equipped RAF was severely impacted.
40
 Support for clandestine activities was, 
therefore, not forthcoming. Air Marshal Arthur ‘Bomber’ Harris, of Bomber 
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 Immediately following the Fall of France, the RAF was fighting for survival in the Battle of Britain. 
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Command, was of the belief that the war could only be won through strategic 
bombing.
41
 This command regarded clandestine warfare as ‘unethical’42 and felt that 
it was ‘an unworthy and inexcusable travesty of our conduct of the war to suggest 
that our policy is determined [by SOE]’.43 Harris also viewed SOE’s parent ministry, 
the Ministry for Economic Warfare (MEW), as ‘amateurish, ignorant, irresponsible 
and mendacious’.44  
 On 21 August 1940, the RAF reluctantly released aircraft to form 419 
(Special Duties) Flight at North Weald airfield, Essex.
45
 The following year on 1 
March, the RAF disbanded the flight and it was reformed as 1419 (Special Duties) 
Flight at RAF Stradishall, Suffolk.
46
 Two months later, on 16 May, Harris 
complained that ‘only a short while ago strenuous political manoeuvres took place 
which resulted in our being bullied, quite unnecessarily, into raising the 
establishment of this flight in aircraft and crews’.47 Under this pressure, further 
aircraft were provided and on 25 August 1941, 1419 (Special Duties) Flight was 
disbanded and reformed as 138 Squadron.
48
 On 15 February 1942, the number of 
aircraft allotted to the Secret Services increased further with the formation of 161 
Squadron.
49
  
 Despite the RAF giving into political pressure, Harris remained vocal in his 
objections.
50
 Believing that the ‘present system of specialising squadrons in 
extraordinarily wasteful and diametrically opposed to our theory of versatility and 
economy … I [Harris] will, accordingly, if these squadrons are returned to me or 
traded off in lieu of other of my squadrons to Coastal Command, undertake all 
reasonable requirements now undertaken or foreshadowed by 138, provided they are 
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reasonable’.51 In exchange for the disbandment of the Special Duty Squadrons, 
Harris offered to provide the Secret Services transportation on the understanding that 
he retained authority to refuse missions. Despite the RAF’s reluctance to support 
clandestine activities, from January 1941 the number of supply operations conducted 
by aircraft far exceeded those by ships (Figure 88). The loss of the Helford Flotilla 
in 1942 would, therefore, have had little impact on SOE’s operational capacity.  
 
 
Figure 88: Comparison of the number of sorties undertaken for SOE by air and sea 
networks from July 1940 to December 1944. The data clearly shows that maritime 
links played an insignificant role in SOE’s supply chain from January 1941. This 
comparison only takes into account the Helford Flotilla, the operations undertaken 
by the Shetland Bus are not included. These operations would, however, have little 
impact on the data comparison.
52
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Figure 89: RAF Tempsford was located on a low-lying marsh land which was liable 
to flood. This was a far from an ideal location to locate an airfield. To the south-east 
and north-east, topographical ridges restricted the ability of fully loaded bombers 
from taking off. The airfield was also overlooked to the west by the main railway line 
between London and Edinburgh and to the east the Great North Road 
 
 With the increasing number of aircraft available to the Secret from 1942, it 
was deemed appropriate that these units should be provided with their own airfield.
53
 
Eventually the RAF settled on accommodating 138 and 161 Squadrons at RAF 
Tempsford. Despite operated in support of the Secret Services, this facility retained 
the capacity to undertake bombing missions. An important factor in the allocation of 
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this airfield to 138 and 161 Squadrons was its ‘substandard’ nature.54 Contemporary 
airfields were constructed in areas taking into account soil type, drainage, 
obstructions to flying and access to local hardcore and brick supplies.
55
 Although not 
all criteria could be met, ‘[t]o the greatest extent possible, the location and design for 
a facility must provide the best response to all requirements’.56  
 Located in the bottom of a valley on heavy soils, RAF Tempsford was prone 
to flooding and fog (Figure 89). To the south-east and north-east of the airfield, high 
ground restricted the approach of aircraft. Contemporaries had also raised concerns 
that some of the runways were unserviceable to fully laden bombers during take-
off.
57
 Questions began to be broached as to whether 138 Squadron should move to 
the airfield after the RAF had ‘condemned Tempsford as far as their own Squadrons 
are concerned’.58 Overall, the facility was regarded as a ‘poor airfield’.59 
 Political pressure from the end of 1941 ‘bullied’ the RAF into increasing 
their capacity to support the Secret Services. From the prospect of the RAF, 
Tempsford was the ideal airfield to allocate to 138 and 161 Squadrons. By assigning 
this facility to support the clandestine war effort, they managed to meet their 
obligations whilst limiting the impact on their operational capabilities. 
 
The Nature of RAF Tempsford
60
 
 
 Despite SOE’s objections to RAF Tempsford, 138 Squadron relocated there 
on 11 March 1942 followed by 161 Squadron in April.
61
 During construction, 
allocation of this facility to the two Special Duties Squadrons had yet to be agreed. 
Tempsford was, therefore, designed as a standard bomber airfield. Initially 
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constructed with four T2 type hangars,
62
 by the end of 1942 a further B1 type hangar 
had been erected to the south of the site. In 1943, another two T2 hangars were 
constructed to the north.
63
 The airfield was also provided with 47 pan hardstandings 
and four Blister hangars.
64
  
 
 
Figure 90: RAF Tempsford in September 1942.
65
  
 
 Although the extensive infrastructure at RAF Tempford was atypical, it was 
not uncommon for contemporary bomber airfields. For the date of construction, the 
presence of four T2 type hangars was in keeping with Air Ministry policy. Following 
its allocation as a Special Duties airfield, the number of large hangars increased to 
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seven. At the time, only airfields which had been appointed a unique function 
displayed uncharacteristic infrastructure.
66
   
 In an attempt to disguise RAF Temspford, an unusual and potentially 
counterproductive camouflage scheme was devised. This was developed by Major 
Jasper Maskeyne and the Royal Engineers’ Camouflage Experimental Station. In 
order to disguise the airfield, roof slates were removed from buildings, windows 
were deliberately broken, curtains were replaced with sacks and buildings were clad 
in wood to make them resemble stables.
67
 In keeping with contemporary camouflage 
schemes, paint was used to break up the outline of the runway (Figure 90). The 
overall effect of this scheme was to give RAF Tempsford the appearance of a 
disused airfield.
68
 On arriving at this facility for the first time in 1942, Jack Tickell 
records that:  
‘this must be some elaborate leg-pull for, at a glance, the whole 
place looked derelict. There was a huddle of buildings roughly the 
shape and size of Nissen huts but they looked like cowsheds, but I 
didn’t know that until much later. They were grouped round a farm. 
Its name was Gibraltar Farm. … There were some hangars, so 
superbly camouflaged that it took me quite a time to realise that 
they were hangars … There were runways, strangely narrow ones 
channelled out of fields of vegetables. You hardly noticed them. 
The whole place was odd. Not exactly up to standard … Gibraltar 
was a real farm. No doubt about that. But instead of land-girls … 
there were more guards hanging around the muckyards and there 
was a duck-pond’.69 
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Figure 91: Running along the western edge of RAF Tempsford was the Great 
Northern Railway line. This was the main link between London and Edinburgh. All 
passengers travelling along this line would potentially have been aware of the active 
airfield at Tempsford.
70
  
 
 The extent and attention to detail of RAF Tempsford’s camouflage scheme 
appears superfluous. At the height at which the Luftwaffe reconnaissance pilots were 
flying, Maskeyne’s minor architectural features would have been invisible. As the 
airfield was active, there would have been unavoidable signs of human occupation. 
Pathways, tyre marks and aircraft on hardstandings would have been identified by 
aerial photographic interpreters.
71
 The scheme was, therefore, designed for another 
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target audience. Tickell’s impression of RAF Tempsford illustrates that the 
camouflage was designed to disguise the airfield from ground based 
reconnaissance.
72
  
 Disguising RAF Tempsford from the ground was a necessary requirement. 
Running along the western boundary of the airfield was the Great Northern Railway. 
This was the main line connecting London to Edinburgh (Figure 91). It was possible 
that any passenger travelling this route could briefly observe the airfield. In 1942, the 
Officer Commanding ‘A’ Flight of 161 Squadron was on the train and overheard a 
‘Small boy [say] to [his] mother: “Oh, look Mummy. There’s a torpedo on that black 
Lysander”. Young man: “That’s not a torpedo. That is a long range petrol tank. I 
wonder what they use them for”. In view of this conversation, and the possibility of 
an enemy agent being a passenger in one of the 300 trains which pass each day, I 
thought it advisable to bring this to your attention’.73 Camouflage was, therefore, 
essential at RAF Tempsford. The overt nature of the scheme at the airfield was partly 
designed to hide the daily activities of the facility from passengers on the train.  
 
 
Figure 92: Gibraltar Farm, Tempsford, home to SOE’s operational centre. In order 
to camouflage the airfield, it was made to look like a disused facility which had 
reverted back to agricultural uses.
74
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 Whilst the airfield at Tempsford was being constructed, it was decided to 
retain the pre-existing farm buildings located within the perimeter track. Although 
this was atypical, it was not uncommon.
75
 On the 1944 plan of the site, this complex, 
known as Gibraltar Farm, was allocated to ‘special duties’.76 The function of these 
buildings was to act as SOE’s control centre on the airfield (Figure 92). Here, the 
organisation stored its maps, plans and records of operations.
77
  
 
 
Figure 93: Inside Gibraltar Barn, agents would undergo a series of rigorous final 
checks to ensure they were not carrying any compromising material on their person.  
 
 Within this complex was Gibraltar Barn. Inside this timber framed structure, 
brick shelving was constructed on which agents’ equipment could be stored (Figure 
93). On arriving at the airfield in a blacked out car, agents would be driven to the 
barn for final checks. It was here that they ensured that they had all their equipment 
and any compromising material had been removed from their person. As the 
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activities which occurred in this barn were highly secret, only a select group of 
personnel were allowed within this structure.
78
  
 
 
Figure 94: The monthly number of sorties conducted by 138 and 161 Squadrons and 
their predecessors.
79
 From January 1942 there is a clear expansion in the RAF’s 
capacity in supporting the Secret Services. This gradually increases until Operation 
OVERLORD.  
 
 SOE’s utilisation of Gibraltar Farm reflected their relationship with the RAF. 
By 1942, all discussion between SOE and the Air Ministry had to be conducted 
through the latter’s Intelligence Directorate, AI2(c).80 All plans made by SOE had to 
be ‘submitted at a monthly conference with D.D.I.2 [Deputy Director of Intelligence 
responsible for Europe], at which the O/C. [Officer Commanding] 138 Squadron is 
present. In practice it is the Squadron who decide whether a specific operation can be 
undertaken or not … [On the day of the sortie the] Squadron decide which operations 
are possible on the 12 o’clock (and sometimes even the 2 o’clock) Met. Reports’.81 
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The late decision inevitably meant there was little time available for SOE to prepare 
agents and equipment ready for despatch.
82
 Sorties from RAF Tempsford were 
clearly not collaboratively planned. Despite sharing the same airfield, the two 
organisations appear to have operated in isolation. This was reflected by the physical 
segregation of their personnel on site.  
 The two Special Duties Squadrons based at RAF Tempsford also undertook 
mission on behalf of SIS (Figure 94). It was, therefore, essential that this 
organisation was provided with facilities at the site. Located on the airfield’s 
perimeter track, was another complex of buildings classified as ‘special duties’ on 
the 1944 site plan. It is likely that these structures accommodated SIS personnel 
(Figure 95). The segregation of SOE, SIS and the RAF on the same airfield could 
only have led to mutual distrust.  
 
 
Figure 95: The pre-existing structure to the east of RAF Tempsford was probably 
used by SIS. To increase the space of this facility, four nissen huts were also 
constructed.
83
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 The physical security of RAF Tempsford, in common with other facilities 
operated by SOE, was of secondary importance. Sites were often protected by not 
drawing attention to themselves. If SOE’s facilities could blend into the wider 
militarised landscape, fewer questions might be asked by the local population. This 
meant access to the airfield was relatively unimpeded (Figure 90). It is recorded 
locally that a group of teenagers managed to enter the facility through woodland. 
They were only apprehended after they had climbed into the cockpits of several 
aircraft.
84
 By not establishing excessive security measures, it was hoped that the 
nature of the airfield could be disguised.  
 
 
Figure 96: RAF Tempsford’s bomb dump. This facility was standard infrastructure 
for any bomber airfield during the Second World War.
85
  
 
 To the west of the site, the RAF established a bomb dump (Figure 96). 
Construction of this complex was completed in April 1942 at approximately the 
same time the airfield welcomed 161 Squadron.
86
 By providing RAF Tempsford 
with a bomb dump, the two Special Duties Squadrons maintained an operational 
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capability to undertake strategic bombing. Despite providing the necessary 
infrastructure for raids, these squadrons could have undertaken more operations if 
the agreement procedure ‘for these two units were less cumbersome’.87 
 
 16/03/42 – 
14/04/42 
15/04/42 – 
14/05/42 
15/05/42 – 
14/06/42 
15/06/42 – 
13/07/42 
Passengers – 
down 
50 41 23 21 
Passengers – up 4 3 4 - 
Packages – down 15 33 14 7 
Packages – up - - 7 - 
Containers – 
down 
44 74 74 68 
Pigeons – down 25 71 136 196 
Nicklels – down 
(leaflets) 
20,000 660,000 7,690,000 7,700,000 
Bombs – down 
(lbs) 
- 10,500 27,500 44,000 
Incendiaries – 
down (lbs) 
- - - 8,640 
Sorties – 
Halifaxes 
8 11 12 11 
Sorties – Whitleys 32 34 47 47 
Sorties – 
Lysanders 
2 3 3 19 
Total Operational 
Hours Flown 
314 401.35 325.55 374.40 
Table 17: Summary of work carried out by 138 and 161 Squadrons during the moon 
periods between March 1942 and July 1942.
88
 Over this period, the greatest number 
of sorties were undertaken by the squadrons Whitleys. These aircraft were of inter-
war vintage and were being withdrawn from front line service. It is also clear that 
bombing missions and the dropping of leaflets were important secondary tasks of 
these two specialist squadrons. 
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 On ‘several occasions [prior to July 1942] a considerable number of aircraft 
[at RAF Tempsford] were ready to bomb and had been loaded with their bombs, but 
owing to the difficulties met by O.C. Tempsford in obtaining approval from the 
Group and Command, the operations had to be cancelled’.89 Between March 1942 
and July 1942, only 82,000lbs of bombs were dropped by aircraft operating from 
RAF Tempsford (Table 17). This was equivalent to six fully loaded Halifaxes.
90
 The 
greatest barrier to these missions was Bomber Command who wanted ‘to know the 
intentions with regard to targets by 0930 hours in the morning [However] O.C. 
Tempsford does not necessarily know until later in the day whether or not he will 
have surplus aircraft available for bombing’.91  
 DDI2 and the Officer Commanding RAF Tempsford were keen that 138 and 
161 Squadrons were employed on bombing operations outside of the moon period
92
 
although agreeing to this in principle, SOE’s Air Liaison Officer envisaged that the 
aircrews would specialise in low-level, pinpoint hit-and-run missions. These would 
suit their extensive experience of navigating by dead reckoning. SOE, however, 
expressed concerns that targets should be carefully selected to reduce the risk of 
aircraft loss. The organisation had, after all, invested heavily in the training of these 
aircrews.
93
  
 The allocation of RAF Tempsford to 138 and 161 Squadrons reflected the 
RAF’s reluctance in 1941 to support activities which impacted their strategic 
bombing objectives. Despite the compartmentalisation of the airfield and the 
restrictions this placed on collaborations, SOE were willing to allow the two Special 
Duties Squadrons to undertake pinpoint bombing raids. It was, however, the RAF’s 
inflexibility which limited the number of operations these aircrews flew outside of 
the moon period.  
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SOE’s Transportation Infrastructure: a European Lifeline 
 
 Over the course of the Second World War, SOE’s transportation 
arrangements transformed from an ill-conceived response to an immediate problem 
to a highly professional service. Following the Fall of France in June 1940, the 
reestablishment of lines of communication with the country was of strategic 
importance to the Secret Services. On realising SIS regarded clandestine warfare as a 
low priority, SOE established an independent link with the Brittany coast. At the 
time, only ‘two methods of transporting personnel and equipment to the field are 
open, by air or by sea’ 94 As the RAF did not have the resources, or the inclination, to 
support SOE, a clandestine flotilla was the only option. Experience, combined with 
increasing political support, led the organisation to end its reliance on maritime links 
following the loss of the Helford Flotilla in 1942.
95
 
 Despite the operational advantages of using aircraft to transport agents and 
supplies, Harris and the RAF were reluctant to divert their scarce resources away 
from strategic bombing. It was only through political bullying that the number of 
aircraft available to the Secret Services increased. By 24 March 1943, however, the 
total strength ‘in crews of four engine aircraft is 15 for 138 Squadron and 5 in 161 
Squadron, that is 20 complete crews for 18 establishment aircraft. This is the 
equivalent of a normal operational Squadron’.96 Initially, the aircraft released by 
Bomber Command were of an inter-war vintage which were being withdrawn from 
front line squadrons.
97
  
 Although political pressure directly led to an increase in the number of 
aircraft available to the Secret Services, SOE were not initially the intended recipient 
of this greater operational capacity. At the 287th War Cabinet meeting held on 14 
August 1941, the Committee decided that ‘sabotage should be generally directed in 
accordance with the bombing aim policy’.98 More importantly, it was agreed that in 
view of the ‘paramount importance of good intelligence, the provision of sorties for 
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SO2 should not be allowed to interfere with the requirements of SIS’.99 By the 
summer of 1941, Whitehall clearly still regarded the capabilities of SOE as 
secondary to the other services: the organisation had yet to demonstrate its strategic 
worth.  
 In order to support the activities of 138 and the newly formed 161 Squadrons, 
it was necessary to provide them with a dedicated airfield. The ideal solution, from 
the stance of the RAF, was to allocate them the ‘condemned’ airfield at Tempsford. 
Badly sited and prone to flooding, a number of runways could also not be used by 
fully laden bombers. By assigning this airfield to 138 and 161 Squadrons, the RAF 
pacified Whitehall whilst not impacting their strategic bombing campaign. 
Following 138 Squadrons move to RAF Tempsford in March 1942, Air Chief 
Marshall Sir Wilfred Freeman KCB DSO MC, Vice Chief of the Air Staff, berated 
Harris that his ‘command still does not seem to realise …[the] great importance [of 
subversive warfare]’.100  
 On 16 April 1942, Freeman reiterated to Harris that ‘H.M. Government 
attach the greatest importance to political and subversive warfare, for the successful 
conduct of which the co-operation of your Command is essential. The importance 
both of propaganda and subversive activities has recently been re-emphasised by the 
Defence Committee and the Chiefs of Staff Committee’.101 Between August 1941 
and March 1942 there occurred a sea-change within the British political landscape: 
no longer was SOE to be merely ‘encouraged’, but actively supported. This change 
in emphasis from SIS to SOE was reflected in the number of sorties undertaken by 
the RAF for both organisations. By 15 July 1943, only 10% of the operations flown 
by 138 and 161 Squadrons were on behalf of SIS.
102
  
 Within a changing political environment, the number of sorties flown by 138 
and 161 Squadrons on behalf of SIS were declining from early 1942 (Figure 94). As 
their agents were not being transported by air, and few missions were undertaken by 
sea (Figure 83), presumably SIS relied on local amateur sources for their 
intelligence. These ‘agents’ might have conflicting loyalties, in the pay of the 
Germans or unknowingly compromise the security of their handlers. By not relying 
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on ‘professionals’, SIS’s intelligence gathering from mainland Europe was 
potentially questionable.  
 Coinciding with a reluctant RAF’s increasing support for SOE was an 
altercation over operational control of the Helford Flotilla. In January 1942, the 
disagreement between SOE and SIS was settled by an Admiralty directive which 
transferred the base over to the NID. Although met with displeasure from the crews, 
this decision was to have little impact on SOE’s operational capabilities. The nature 
of maritime transportation meant that it would never have been feasible to handle the 
sheer volume of traffic required to supply the resistance. It was, therefore, inevitable 
that SOE never tried to re-establish this link. Plans to upgrade the function of the 
facility at Leigh-on-Sea into a maritime hub were shelved shortly thereafter. Internal 
discussions were also initiated with regard to the continuation of para-naval training. 
The year 1942 marked a change in SOE’s attitudes towards certain aspects of their 
maritime activities.  
 The sea-change in Whitehall’s attitude in early 1942 towards clandestine 
warfare had a remarkable effect on SOE’s transportation infrastructure. Through 
political ‘bullying’, the RAF increased the material support available to the 
organisation. Without these resources, the activities of SOE would have been 
severely curtailed. In order to successfully transport agents and supplies to where 
they were needed, it was essential that the organisation had reliable communications 
to the field. SOE’s wireless facilities are, therefore, the focus of the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER VII 
Communications 
 
 To arrange for the necessary supplies to be transported to the field, it was 
essential that there existed a reliable and efficient communication system back to 
headquarters in London. Without this link, SOE’s agents and the wider resistance 
would have been isolated in hostile territory. Communications were also vital for 
reporting enemy activities, arranging for the extraction of personnel, coordinating 
operations and organising missions.
1
 Without direct contact with the resistance, SOE 
would have been unable to ‘set Europe ablaze’. This two-way traffic was highly 
valued amongst the resistance in Europe.
2
 Wireless communications were so 
important to the organisation that they invested heavily in providing state-of-the-art 
infrastructure.  
 Despite the value placed on wireless communications by SOE, their networks 
were not always under the direct control of the organisation. In an agreement made 
in September 1940, all traffic originating within SOE was handled by SIS. Under 
this arrangement, the head of SIS, C, maintained the right to reject any message 
deemed compromising to his organisation’s security.3 This situation was far from 
ideal for SOE. SIS could also not claim to be experts in the field of clandestine 
communications. At the time this agreement was signed, the organisation had only 
limited experience with wireless technology.  
 Although the Royal Navy had first installed wireless sets on HMS Juro and 
HMS Europa in 1899,
4
 it was not until the spring of 1912 that Commander 
Mansfield Cummings, the first C, began contemplating using the technology.
5
 By 
utilising radios, he saw the potential to obtain intelligence during periods of political 
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tension which might signal a threat to British interests. It took another 26 years, 
however, until SIS finally established a communications group, Section VIII, under 
Captain Richard Gambier-Parry. As commercial technology had proved unsuitable 
for his requirements, one of Gambier-Parry’s most difficult and urgent challenges 
was providing SIS’s agents with wireless sets.6 By the time the agreement between 
SOE and SIS was reached in September 1940, this unit had only two years 
experience.  
 By March 1942, SOE were noticing that their messages were not being 
handled in the appropriate manner, despite being marked of the highest priority. 
Internal investigations determined that it took SIS four days to deliver a telegram 
from SOE’s Balkans or Middle East missions back to the UK. Of greater concern, 
however, was the ability of C to impose a form of ‘inquisitive censorship over the 
whole of our [SOE’s] activities’.7 
 SIS’s control over SOE’s wireless traffic also had the potential to impact the 
organisation’s capacity to send agents abroad. It was SIS’s opinion that they had the 
authority to limit the number of agents SOE handled to ‘the capacity of the receiving 
scheme … [and] by the fact that to increase the number to any extent will constitute 
a menace to security’.8 By April 1941, SOE was in the process of training between 
300 and 400 students. This, however, was too great for the ‘necessary arrangements 
made by S.I.S. for the reception of their messages as and when they arrive in the 
countries where it is proposed that they should operate’.9 
 Reluctantly, SIS finally conceded in February 1942 and transferred 
operational control of SOE’s wireless traffic to the organisation. There remained, 
however, the caveat that SOE had to ensure that all necessary ‘security requirements 
were met’.10 C also retained the right to reduce the number of channels operated by 
SOE if it was ‘found that interference or embarrassment to S.I.S. communications 
resulted … One more condition … is that it must be clearly understood that S.O.E. 
will not, under any circumstances, undertake any communications for the 
representatives of any Allied Power without reference to me’.11 SOE agreed to these 
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conditions on 27 March.
12
 By 1 June 1942, the organisation’s officially separated 
from SIS.
13
 Following this transfer, SOE developed a highly professional, state-of-
the-art system of wireless communications with their agents operating within enemy 
occupied Europe. 
 
 
Figure 97: SOE controlled their wireless networks from three Home Stations 
established in Buckinghamshire. Contemporary wireless technology required 
transmitters and receivers to be located in separate locations to enable them to 
operate efficiently. If they were badly positioned, the two facilities could interfere 
causing unnecessary noise within the signal.  
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SOE’s Network of Home Stations 
 
 Following C reluctantly agreeing to transfer wireless control to SOE, the 
organisation set about establishing independent facilities. Eventually, these three 
‘Home Stations’, which comprised a separate transmitting and receiving site, were 
established between Bicester and Bletchley Park (Figure 97).  
 Within four months of the agreement between SOE and SIS being reached, 
the former were already operating a single Home Station. The receiver for this 
station was located at Grendon Underwood, Buckinghamshire, and named Station 
53a,
14
 whilst the transmitter was at Charndon, Buckinghamshire.
15
 The establishment 
of SOE’s first receiver at Grendon Underwood did not, however, occur without 
incident. Despite protracted discussions which identified this site as the 
organisation’s preferred choice, Gambier-Parry began protesting in April 1942 that 
he had only just been informed of this decision.
16
 He was concerned that as Grendon 
was only 10 miles from one of his most important receiving stations, there was a 
strong possibility that interference will result as both organisations worked within 
the same frequency band.
17
 Gambier-Parry, therefore, hoped that SOE had not 
involved themselves ‘in a lot of constructional work until the possibilities of 
interference have been thoroughly explored’.18 It had, however, been Gambier-Parry 
who had suggested that SOE establish their new receiving station at Grendon 
Underwood.
19
 By 13 April 1942, he was of the opinion that: 
‘it would be much better if we went into the matter now between 
our two selves and settled any possible causes of future 
disagreement before they arise, rather than wait until we have to 
take them formally to the W/T Board, should your detailed 
proposals be of a nature likely to cause embarrassment to existing 
services. As you will remember, there is a clause in “C”s letter to 
C.D. covering this particular point, and reserving to him the right to 
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ask you to curtail your activities should they result in interference 
with existing services. It therefore makes it obviously desirable that 
we should start right and not get into a position where friction 
might result. 
I imagine that with the establishments your organisation possesses 
up and down the country, there should be no difficulty in finding a 
place for your W/T centre which could not possible involve “C” in 
having to fall back on his rights in the matter’.20  
 At a Communications Committee Meeting held on 19 August 1942, the 
possibility of establishing an additional Home Station was raised. This new facility 
would lighten the increasing demands being placed on Grendon Underwood.
21
 
Although the date of the decision is unknown, Colonel William ‘Wild Bill’ 
Donovan, CDs opposite number in the OSS, was informed on 14 December 1942 
that the second station had been constructed. He was also advised that plans for a 
third Home Station were being discussed.
22
 When all three were completed, Station 
53a, Grendon Underwood and Charndon, would only communicate with South 
Western Europe, Station 53b, Poundon and Godington, would handle all traffic to 
Central Europe, whilst Station 53c would deal with Scandinavia.
23
  
 In January 1943, SOE proposed that the third Home Station should be built, 
equipped, staffed and operated by the OSS. Remaining under the control of the 
Officer Commanding Station 53, a British Chief Signal Master would also be 
permanently based there to ensure the facility cooperated with Stations 53a and 53b. 
It was estimated that once operational, it would take at least six months before it 
could be fully staffed by Americans. In the meantime, SOE would supply the 
necessary personnel. Once the Home Station had been transferred to the OSS, SOE 
planned on retaining control of all enciphering and deciphering of messages.
24
 The 
transmitter for Station 53c was located at Twyford, Buckinghamshire, whilst the 
receiver was at Poundon. 
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The Nature of SOE’s Communication Facilities 
 
 The facilities associated with SOE’s first foray into wireless communications 
were of a primitive nature. At Grendon Underwood, the first Signal Office was 
established in a downstairs room of the main house. This was rapidly proved of 
insufficient capacity to handle SOE’s increasing traffic volume (Figure 98). The 
station’s transmitters were located nearby at Charndon in a building measuring 20ft 
(6.1m) by 12ft (3.66m). Connected to the receiver by a 20-pair cable, the 18 250w 
transmitters could be operated by remote control (Figure 99). This facility also 
became rapidly overcrowded as SOE’s needs grew. Inevitably, this resulted in 
considerable loss of efficiency and flexibility.
25
 
 
 
Figure 98: Grendon Underwood, home to SOE’s first receiver. This was initially 
located in a downstairs room, but relocated to a hut in the grounds after this proved 
to be insufficient. After the Second World War, this site was converted into a prison. 
The structures erected by SOE have, inevitably, been destroyed.  
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Figure 99: SOE’s first transmitter at Charndon. The structure to the left was the first 
transmitter building; the extension to the right was a later addition. Structural 
analysis indicates that there was at least three phases of construction.
26
  
 
 In October 1942, to alleviate the overcrowding at Grendon Underwood, SOE 
began constructing a new Signal Office within the estate (Figure 100). This structure 
was to prove a considerable improvement over ad hoc facilities in the main house. 
Within the new Signal Office, 18 operating positions were installed, four of which 
were equipped for automatic sending. The new superintendent’s desk had the 
capabilities of connecting any position to any transmitter and also monitoring all 
receivers. In parallel to this building programme, the transmitter complex at 
Charndon also underwent an expansion. The new extension measured 35ft (10.67m) 
by 18ft (5.49m) into which SOE installed six 250w transmitters.
27
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Figure 100: SOE’s facilities at Grendon Underwood. Prior to it becoming a wireless 
facility, it taught agents the skills necessary to be radio operators. The location of 
the aerial farm could not be determined from aerial photographs.
28
  
 
 These building programmes, however, only provided SOE with a temporary 
respite. Gradually, demand once more outstripped capacity. It was eventually 
decided that the solution was a new purpose built facility instead of ad hoc additions 
to existing sites. On 14 December 1942, six months after gaining operational control 
of their wireless networks, SOE began constructing a purpose built Home Station.
29
 
The receiver for this new complex was located at Poundon, Oxfordshire (Figure 
101) and the transmitter at Godington, Oxfordshire.
30
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Figure 101: (centre) The receiver of SOE’s first purpose built Home Station, Station 
53b. Originally, the structure was square which indicates that an expansion of this 
facility occurred sometime after construction. This probably coincided with the two 
phases of construction at Godington.
31
  
 
 The new receiving station constructed by SOE at Poundon was substantially 
larger than the organisation’s first attempt at Grendon Underwood. Measuring 40ft 
(12.19m) by 40ft (12.19m) by 12ft (3.66m), the building contained 40 operating 
positions of which over half were adapted for automatic sending. In order to 
economise on antennae, SOE installed new Wide Band Receiving Amplifiers at this 
facility. This technique allowed the organisation to operate as many as 50 receivers 
simultaneously from each amplifier (Figure 102).
32
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Figure 102: The aerial farm at SOE’s Station 53b.33  
 
 
Figure 103: The transmitter building of SOE’s Station 53b at Godington. Structural 
evidence indicates that the complex was constructed in two phases.
34
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 The transmitter for Station 53b was located nearby at Godington (Figure 103 
and Figure 104).
35
 It was here that SOE constructed a building 100ft (30.48m) by 
24ft (7.32m) which incorporated features allowing open wire feeder routes. Into the 
structure, 34 250w transmitters, together with their remote control apparatus were 
installed. To connect up these sets, over 6,000ft (1,828.8m) of lead covered wire was 
required. In order to replace malfunctioning equipment quickly, all the transmitters 
were mounted on platforms (Figure 105). The messages sent from Godington would 
be transmitter from one of the 32 di-poles or two rhombic antennae erected nearby 
(Figure 106).
36
 These required over 10,000ft (3,048m) of wire and 3,000 spreaders 
in the down leads.
37
  
 
 
Figure 104: Architectural survey of Station 53b transmitter, Godington. 
Architectural evidence indicates the generator building came first. The transmitter 
building was constructed at the same time as the storage extension.
38
  
 
 Owing to the clandestine nature of SOE’s wireless traffic, it was highly 
desirable that an operator could change frequency on any transmitter with great 
speed. This restricted the German interceptors’ ability to transcribe messages in their 
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entirety. Contemporary 250w transmitters required an average of four to five minutes 
to accomplish this accurately. SOE, therefore, began researching a solution to this 
problem. The result was the development of a Wide Band Transmitting Amplifier 
working with a three wire rhombic antennae. This provided a good signal over a 
wide area combined with the ability to transmit on 12 channels simultaneously.
39
 
More importantly, it enabled an average operator to change frequency in as little as 
30 seconds.
40
 
 
 
Figure 105: The interior of Station 53b transmitter at Godington. To ensure that 
equipment could be replaced quickly, the transmitters were mounted on platforms.
41
  
 
 On completion of Station 53b’s transmitter at Godington, SOE’s wireless 
demands still outstripped capacity. It was, therefore, decided to incorporate Wide 
Band Receiving Amplifiers at Stations 53a’s transmitter at Charndon.42 Instead of 
installing these in the pre-existing structure, a new building was constructed based 
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on the design of Godington (Figure 107).
43
 This allowed for the centralisation of all 
equipment into a single building whilst also providing sufficient space for the 
number of transmitters to be increased. Within this structure, SOE also installed a 
new ‘trouble-free’ remote control system which required over 3,000m of twin lead 
covered wire to operate. Transmission occurred over 35 dipoles and two rhombic 
antennae formed from 16,000ft (4,876.8m) of wire and five 120ft (36.58m), 12 100ft 
(30.48m), four 80ft (24.38m) and two 60ft (18.29m) masts. The feeder route also 
required 100,000ft (30,480m) of copper wiring.
44
 
 
 
Figure 106: The aerial farm at Godington. This comprised of 32 di-poles and two 
rhombic antennae. The remains of some of these antennae were later used to create 
a lean-to against the transmitter building.
45
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 The nature of SOE’s wireless facilities demonstrates an organisational 
appreciation of the value of reliable and efficient communications to clandestine 
warfare. Although initially, SOE’s wireless traffic was handled at ad hoc facilities, it 
only took six months before the organisation decided to construct a state-of-the-art 
Home Station. SOE continued to expand their network by both upgrading existing 
facilities and constructing new Home Stations.  
 
 
Figure 107: Station 53a’s new transmitter at Charndon. Based on the design of 
Godington, this facility was constructed to enable SOE to keep up with increasing 
operational demands for wireless communications.
46
  
 
SOE’s Home Stations Compared against Contemporary Wireless 
Facilities 
 
 In order to comprehensively assess the nature of SOE’s Home Stations, it is 
essential that a comparison is made with contemporary facilities. By evaluating these 
sites against the organisation’s peers, SOE’s appreciation of the value of wireless 
communications can be demonstrated. Although the organisation internalised the 
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construction process in 1942, the architectural and technological nature of their 
Home Stations were in keeping with contemporary facilities.  
 Within the UK, the greatest expertise in wireless broadcasting at the time lay 
with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). Twenty years before the outbreak 
of the Second World War, the corporation had determined that the majority of 
broadcasting ‘shut downs’ had been caused by failings in the National Grid. To 
overcome this when they were establishing a regional scheme of twin wireless 
transmitting stations, each facility was provided with a self-contained generating 
plant. These provided the BBC with a more reliable service and the ability to 
fluctuate voltage.
47
  
 Once the decision was taken to provide independent power to broadcasting 
facilities, the impact generators might have on service became an important issue. If 
the engineers did not carefully consider the positioning of this equipment, the noise 
and vibrations from these machines could affect the delicate wireless sets. It was 
essential that silence prevailed in the transmitter room for the comfort of the 
technicians operating the equipment. This also made it easier to locate faults caused 
by arcing and sparking.
48
 At the General Post Office (GPO) short-wave receiving 
station they on the Hoo Peninsular, Kent, the generator room was completely 
isolated from the rest of the site.
49
 
 In certain facilities it was not possible to physically segregate the generating 
machinery. It was, therefore, essential that it was isolated to negate its negative 
impact. At the WRC broadcasting station located in an office building on 14th Street 
and Park Road, Washington, engineers mounted the generator on a steel bed atop a 
0.08m cork mat.
50
  
 During the construction of SOE’s transmitter at Godington, the organisation 
adhered to contemporary design standards for wireless facilities (Figure 108).
51
 In 
order to limit the impact the generator might have on the delicate wireless 
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equipment, SOE installed the machinery in a separate building. For practical reasons 
it also had to be bolted to a concrete bed inset into the floor of the structure. This 
further shielded the transmitting equipment from vibrations.  
 
 
Figure 108: Station 53b’s generator building at Godington. To limit the negative 
impact on the delicate equipment, the building was isolated from the transmitter 
building.
52
  
 
 Other contemporary design standards were also adhered to by SOE during 
the designing of the new transmitter building at Godington. At the 50kw frequency-
modulation transmitter in the Helderberg Mountains, New York, the facility was 
arranged to allow for the maximum accessibility to components for inspection and 
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maintenance.
53
 In stations operated by the BBC, this was achieved by arranging 
transmitters either side of the room whilst keeping the rest of the structure free from 
clutter.
54
 At Godington, the same principle was applied by SOE when they 
constructed a large airy room with equipment arranged along both walls. Despite the 
internalisation of the construction process from the end of 1942,
55
 SOE demonstrated 
a high level of professionalism, knowledge and competence relating to contemporary 
design standards.  
 The quality of SOE’s wireless facilities can be further demonstrated by 
comparing them with the equivalent sites operated by SIS. At the outbreak of the 
war, SIS’s Section VIII was responsible for communicating with their agents 
abroad.
56
 Initially, this was conducted from rooms within the main house at 
Bletchley Park. As this was to rapidly prove insufficient for their requirements, 
Section VIII had begun the process of relocating to Whaddon Hall, 
Buckinghamshire, prior to the close of 1939 (Figure 109).
57
  
 
 
Figure 109: Whaddon Hall home to SIS’s Main Line Station. The corrugated iron 
building in the background housed the wireless equipment.
58
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 This property was to become SIS’s new ‘Main Line’ station. It was this 
facilities responsibility for handling the organisation’s traffic originating from 
embassies and overseas missions, covert stations on the continent and occasionally 
to communicate directly with agents. Over the course of the war, SIS was also to 
establish facilities at Dower House, Buckinghamshire, Windy Ridge, 
Buckinghamshire, Tattenhoe Barn, Buckinghamshire and Creslow Manor, 
Buckinghamshire.
59
 
 
 
Figure 110: Inside of SIS’s wireless facility at Upper Weald. This arrangement is 
relatively basic and cramped.
60
 The basic wood construction of this station meant 
the conditions inside were not conducive to work.  
 
 It was not until May 1940, however, that SIS began constructing their first 
purposely designated wireless facility for handling just agents’ traffic. By the autumn 
of that year, work constructing the new receiving station at Nash, Buckinghamshire, 
was completed. The corresponding transmitter was located at Manor Farm, 
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Calverton, Buckinghamshire. At a later date, SIS opened a further receiving station 
at Upper Weald, Buckinghamshire, which also worked with Manor Farm.
61
  
 At Nash, SIS constructed a shed to accommodate their receiving equipment 
and a brick built generator building with an attached battery store. Its sister station at 
Upper Weald was slightly larger as two sheds were provided alongside the brick 
built generator and battery store (Figure 110).
62
 Compared to the facilities operated 
by SOE (Figure 111), it is SIS that looks unprofessional.  
 
 
Figure 111: The interior of one of SOE’s receiving facilities.63 The automatic control 
of the transmitters meant that the radio operators were based at the receiver. 
Compared to SIS’s facilities, this is light, airy, spacious and conducive to efficient 
and effective wireless communications.  
 
 Throughout the war, SIS’s facility at Nash had an establishment of nine men 
operating a three-watch system. One of these was Jack White who recalls that the 
station had access to eight receivers: seven HROs, manufactured by the National 
Radio Company, and his personal battery operated AR88.
64
 At SIS’s Manor Farm 
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facility, the transmitters comprised of various American 750w and British 100w and 
30w sets.
65
 To ensure the American equipment was maintained effectively, the 
organisation accommodated four engineers from the US Civilian Technical Corps at 
this facility.
66
 To receive the messages, Upper Weald erected semi-vertical wires 
suspended from relatively low cantilever wires. It took SIS until 1944 to arrange for 
a crew of aerial erectors to improve this ad hoc receiving system.
67
  
 Throughout the war, a clear disparity existed between the wireless facilities 
operated by SOE and SIS. There was even a feeling amongst SIS’s Section VIII’s 
radio operators that the organisation viewed communicating with their agents as a 
lower priority than intercepting enemy transmissions.
68
 In contrast, SOE recognised 
the importance of these networks and invested significant resources in providing 
state-of-the-art wireless facilities. The rapid development and expansion of their 
Home Stations quickly provided the organisation with a superior wireless network to 
SIS. This professionalism was recognised by the wider armed services and 
demonstrated by the number of frequencies allocated to the organisation for 
Operation OVELORD (Figure 112).  
 In preparation for Operation OVERLORD, SOE was allocated 200 
frequencies for clandestine activities and a further 66 for joint military operations.
69
 
Combined, these were equivalent to 13% of all the total frequencies allotted for the 
invasion. This put the organisation’s allocation behind the army and RAF, but ahead 
of the Royal Navy. By providing SOE such a large number of frequencies, the armed 
services were demonstrating a faith in the professionalism of the organisation. In 
addition, the War Office requested that SOE supply all Special Forces involved with 
the invasion with one time pads,
70
 further demonstrating the faith placed in the 
organisation’s wireless capabilities.  
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Figure 112: Number of frequencies allocated to the various services for Operation 
OVERLORD. Those allocated to SOE far exceed those of the Royal Navy. In total, 
SOE were allocated approximately 13% of all frequencies intended for the invasion 
of Europe.
71
  
 
The Role of SOE’s Wireless Facilities in Operation NORDPOL  
 
 At this point, it is worth discussing the episode that has been partly 
responsible for tarnishing SOE’s reputation. The disaster which was to blemish the 
organisation’s legacy befell the Dutch Section during the German run Operation 
NORDPOL.
72
 This counterintelligence mission had its origins in the arrest of Huub 
Lauwers in The Hague on 6 March 1942.
73
 Under intensive interrogation, Lauwers 
inevitably broke and agreed to turn double agent. On 12 March 1942, he began 
transmitting to London on behalf of his jailers. Despite identifying that he had been 
capture by omitting his security checks, Lauwers was shocked to be informed of the 
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imminent arrival of Lieutenant Arnold Baatsen.
74
 On the night of 27 March, this 
agent parachuted into the Netherlands and was immediately arrested. The Abwehr 
now had a solid foundation on which an elaborate deception could be built. This saw 
them capture over 50 wireless operators of the Dutch resistance and persuade them 
to communicate with London on their behalf.
75
 
 In post-war assessments, the centrality of SOE to the disaster of Operation 
NORDPOL has rarely been challenged. It was not until 2006 that the fact SOE did 
not gain operational control of their wireless networks until June 1942 was first 
raised in academia:
76
 this was three months after the first radio play-back from the 
Netherlands.
77
 It will be argued here, however, that complete transfer of operational 
control of SOE’s wireless networks did not occur until much later in 1942.  
 Whilst SIS and SOE were discussing this transfer, SOE’s Captain Chalk 
recorded on 17 December 1941 that with the ‘present section [of personal at 
Grendon Underwood] and the possible opening of the [wireless] station in March, I 
feel that I shall almost be forced to attempt to operate almost every channel myself 
during the first month or two’.78 In Chalk’s opinion, the operators’ work was ‘bad 
even for army standards. It will be quite impossible for any of them to be good 
enough for their proposed job for some months after their arrival at the station’.79 By 
10 June 1942, SOE were only just ‘now starting to run our own wireless 
communications’.80 This is indicative of a slow transfer of operational control of 
networks from SIS to SOE, instead of an instantaneous event.  
 Combined with these staffing issues, SOE was also initially beset by 
equipment shortages. On 28 June 1942, the organisation expressed concern that the 
‘manufacturers have not yet been able to supply the R.A.F., and in turn us, with the 
quantity [of receivers] that we require for working’.81 By the time SOE was meant to 
have taken over the operation of their wireless networks, they still had yet been 
issued with a full complement of receivers and were understaffed. Things had hardly 
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improved by the start of 1943 when their Home Station was still an ‘administrative 
and technical mess… [whose staff were] ill trained and many were psychologically 
unsuited to the emotional stress imposed by clandestine Signals’.82 
 SOE’s capacity to handle agents’ traffic was severely hampered by these 
initial limitations on equipment and qualified staff. On the night of 22 August 1943, 
Yvonne Cormeau parachuted into France to work as Lieutenant Colonel George 
Starr’s radio operator. Over the following 13 months she transmitted 400 messages 
back to London at an average of 30 per month. On 11 April 1944, Lieutenant Denis 
Parsons joined Starr’s network as a second wireless operator. In a 72 day period, he 
transmitted 84 messages, the equivalent to 42 per month. It has been estimated that 
during July 1943, SOE was receiving 120 messages per day from representatives of 
the French Resistance.
83
 Figures for Station 53, however, indicate that only a fraction 
of these were handled by SOE.  
 Between 17 July and 28 August 1942, it was recorded that a total of 423 
messages were received at Station 53 from SOE’s agents in the field.84 Over this 43 
day period, 149 messages arrived from the Fighting French, 128 from other French 
agents, 74 from Belgium, 38 from the Netherlands and 34 from other countries from 
which SOE operated.
85
 These figures indicate that SOE received six messages per 
day from the resistance in France during August 1942, significantly less than the 120 
messages per day they received during July 1943.
86
  
 On 28 August 1942, SOE placed an order for six ‘A’ wireless sets to provide 
their Dutch agents were spare equipment.
87
 If these were SOE’s sole representatives 
in the Netherlands, then they were transmitting, on average, four messages per 
month.
88
 Major Hermann Giskes, the Abwehre officer in charge of Operation 
NORDPOL, recorded that following the arrival of agent ‘RLS’ into the field on 28 
February 1942, the Germans increased the number of messages played back to the 
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UK to several per day.
89
 This rate of transmission far exceeded the number of 
messages handled by Station 53 from the Netherlands between July and August 
1942.  
 Based on the traffic generated by Cormeau and Parons, the reception of 423 
messages over a 43 day period at Station 53 was uncharacteristically low. The 
disparity between these figures is suggestive of an organisation that lacked the 
capacity to operate their entire wireless network. Presumably, SIS continued 
communicating on behalf of SOE whilst the latter expanded their wireless facilities. 
It was not until March 1943, when Station 53b became operational,
90
 that SOE 
gained the capacity to handle the majority of their own traffic. This was a full year 
after SIS supposedly stopped communicating on their behalf.  
 By the end of 1942, the possibility that the Dutch network had been 
compromised was known within SOE’s upper echelons. To confirm his suspicions, 
Leo Marks, the organisation’s code maker, requested the ‘code groups which had 
been received and decoded by C’s wireless station … so that I could establish the 
length of the keys the agents had chosen and see if there’d been any significant 
changes in their coding groups’.91 Before transferring control of SOE’s wireless 
networks to the organisation, it had been the responsibility of SIS to provide their 
agents with coding procedures.
92
 As Marks had to request the code groups, this 
suggests SIS only provided SOE with deciphered, clear text. Without access to the 
raw, encrypted messages, SOE lacked the necessary information to determine 
whether their Dutch network had been compromised. This was compounded by the 
handicap of not controlling their entire communication network until late in 1943.  
 In post-war assessments of SOE, the organisation has regularly been accused 
of incompetence for failing to notice that their Dutch network was being run by the 
Abwehre over a 20 month period.
93
 These criticisms, however, unquestionably 
accept the immediacy of the transfer of wireless control from SIS to SOE in June 
1942. The development of SOE’s wireless facilities indicates that the organisation 
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did not have the capacity to become fully independent until halfway through 
Operation NORDPOL. If blame is to be apportioned anywhere, it is arguable SIS 
that should shoulder some of the burden.  
 In January 1943, Marks finally managed to provide firm evidence that SOE’s 
Dutch networks had been compromised.
94
 Following this confirmation, the 
organisation continued to transport agents to the Netherlands for a further four 
months.
95
 It was not until October 1943, however, that supply missions were finally 
cancelled.
96
 The failure to act on Mark’s intelligence was not an operational 
oversight, but a bureaucratic one. SOE’s turbulent relations with rivals had created a 
situation whereby the organisation felt it necessary to outwardly maintain an image 
of professionalism.
97
 Acknowledgement of a disaster of this magnitude would have 
had potentially catastrophic implications for SOE.  
 
SOE’s Wireless Facilities: A Lifeline to the UK 
 
 The advent of wireless technologies at the turn of the nineteenth century 
brought a new dimension to the battlefield: instantaneous, long distance 
communications. Radios enabled the military to relay real-time information and act 
immediately on their intelligence. Early experiences within SOE also proved that this 
technology was vital to clandestine operations. By having a direct link to the Allies, 
the resistance could organise supplies, coordinate operations and communicate 
intelligence. Radio operators were, therefore, highly prized on the continent.
98
  
 Despite the vital nature of communications to SOE’s operational efficiency, 
SIS’s Colonel Claude Dansey argued that his organisation should retain control of 
SOE’s wireless networks on its formation.99 The head of SIS, C, was also ‘absolutely 
opposed to any other Secret W/T Service being set up in the U.K. I fought long 
enough to try and maintain one Secret Service, and this would be another step in the 
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wrong direction, apart from the unlikelihood of S.O.2 being able to set up anything 
for many months which would give efficient results’.100 
 This situation, which was far from satisfactory for SOE, enabled SIS to read 
and censor all their ‘rivals’ wireless traffic. SOE were under no illusion that ‘C. 
telegrams take complete preference over [ours]’.101 There was, therefore, an 
inevitable delay in SOE’s communications which was only to become exacerbated as 
the organisation grew.
102
 Messages handled by SIS were also not secure as they 
insisted on using poem codes. It was only after wireless control was passed to SOE 
that they could change to one-time pads.  
 As the reliance on SIS to communicate with their agents was having a 
negative impact on the organisation, SOE began presenting their case for the transfer 
of wireless control. It was not until 27 March 1942, however, that an agreement was 
reached between the two organisations.
103
 SOE were finally in a position to begin 
transmitting by 22 May 1942,
104
 the partition did not occur until 1 June.
105
 Complete 
separation did not occur until the following year. 
 Following this transfer of operational control, SOE were concerned that SIS 
were finding alternative ways to read their traffic. On 7 August 1942, they ordered 
an investigation into the possibility of SIS tapping the teleprinters between London 
and Station 53.
106
 Although they determined that the ‘line does not actually run 
through the Broadway Building, it is technically possible for “C” to tap our traffic at 
some point along the route without our being aware of the fact’.107 This level of 
mistrust inevitably led to ‘petty bickering’ between the two organisations which was 
observed by contemporaries.  
 Despite their late arrival in the field of wireless communications, SOE 
quickly outstripped the capacity and capabilities of SIS. Operating from cramped, 
basic facilities with no standardisation of equipment, SIS placed little emphasis on 
efficient and reliable wireless communications. SOE were ‘aware that the 
information which “C” gets from his own direct agents in foreign countries 
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represents what I would call an almost negligible proportion of the total information 
which he receives from wireless intercepts (Order of Battle) from the G.C-in-C.S., 
from Missions abroad’.108 
 SOE’s success in the field of wireless communications proved that the 
organisation was ‘on the whole more hardworking and enthusiastic [than SIS], and 
that we are not afraid of challenging them when they try to double-cross us’.109 This 
contributed to SIS viewing SOE as a ‘very dangerous rivals’.110 Of all the facilities 
operated by SOE in the UK during the Second World War, their Home Stations have 
left the greatest physical legacy. In order to coordinate communications with the 
European Resistance, it was essential that SOE had an effective Command and 
Control network. The nature of this system will be discussed in the following 
chapter.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
Command and Control 
 
 For an organisation to operate effectively, it must have an efficient and 
professional Command and Control infrastructure.
1
 Without this in place, 
management lacks the necessary administration to coordinate internal activities and 
collaborate externally.
2
 Activities associated with the running of an organisation 
require no unique infrastructure: provided headquarters have access to sufficient 
office accommodation and stationary, management could function.  
 Throughout the Second World War, SOE concentrated their Command and 
Control infrastructure within London. This chapter will demonstrate that as a 
security precaution, the organisation compartmentalised their activities within the 
capital. The nature of SOE’s relationship with Whitehall can also be informed by this 
distribution. Within this chapter an in-depth analysis of the organisation’s facility to 
provide ‘food for thought’ is also presented.  
 
 
 
  
                                                          
1
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SOE’s Command and Control Distribution 
 
 
Figure 113: SOE’s Command and Control infrastructure within London. This thesis 
has, for the first time, mapped the organisation’s administrative infrastructure 
within the capital.  
 
 Like many organisations, SOE controlled its operations from a centralised 
locality which was, inevitably, London. Although it is well known that the 
organisation was based at 64 Baker Street, what is not generally appreciated is their 
wider property portfolio (Figure 113). Within the city, SOE’s Command and Control 
was not uniformly or randomly distributed, but rather clusters developed.
3
  
                                                          
3
 Certain restrictions were placed on where SOE could establish office accommodation by competing 
demands for space in central London. Despite the increasing danger, military, governmental and 
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Figure 114: 64 Baker Street, home to SOE’s headquarters throughout the Second 
World War. This road became central to the organisations command and control 
operations. In the immediate vicinity, SOE acquired numerous properties.  
 
 One of the first offices SOE established after gaining their independence was 
located at 64 Baker Street, Marylebone (Figure 114).
4
 As the war progressed, Baker 
                                                                                                                                                                    
private companies still needed access to Whitehall to lobby. These organisations were all competing 
for access to finite real estate. Certain neighbourhoods were also exclusive; for example, St James’ 
Parish, home to four of the most exclusive clubs in the West End, Boodle’s, Brooks’s. White’s and 
Crockford’s (Jane Rendell, ‘The Clubs of St. Jame’s; places of public patriarchy – exclusivity, 
domesticity and secrecy’, The Journal of Architecture, 4.2 (1999) p. 168). At the time, Mayfair was 
one of the most fashionable areas of London (Youssef Cassis, ‘Financial Elites in Three European 
Centres: London, Paris, Berlin, 1880-1930s’, Business History, 33.3 (1991)). Property within 
Belgravia and Pimlico was also highly fashionable. Another region avoided by the Secret Services 
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Studies, 41.9 (2004) p. 1796).  
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Street, and its immediately vicinity, were to become increasingly important for 
running the organisation. Conveniently sited near to Whitehall and with access to the 
London Underground, this location also had the advantage of being isolated from 
SIS’s headquarters at 54 Broadway Building.5 Geographically, SOE were separating 
themselves from their parent organisation.
6
  
 Aside from the various offices centred on Baker Street, SOE established four 
further clusters of accommodation within London which were generally comprised 
of ‘safe houses’.7 These were often single rooms within hotels vetted by SOE which 
could be rented on a nightly basis.
8
 It was inevitable that the greatest concentrations 
of safe houses were located in areas associated with pre-war hospitality (Figure 115). 
These clusters were also sufficiently distant from SOE’s offices on Baker Street. 
This provided the organisation a security barrier by compartmentalising their 
activities within London. To ensure agents did not have to visit their main offices, 
SOE established satellite facilities in proximity to the safe houses. This enabled the 
organisation to hide certain aspects of their activities from the agents.  
 The nature of office accommodation within London meant SOE’s facilities 
were indistinguishable from their surroundings. In an effort to draw attention away 
from the wide variety of activities they were involved in, the organisation adopted a 
number of cover names. One of these was the ‘Inter Services Research Bureau’. This 
provided their staff, who came from all three branches of the armed services, a 
degree of anonymity. One aspect of SOE’s Command and Control operations which 
was, however, unique to the organisation was the utilisation of the Natural History 
Museum as ‘food for thought’.  
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8
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Figure 115: SOE clustered their ‘safe houses’ in areas of London traditionally 
associated with hospitality. ‘Safe houses’ were established in rooms in hotels which 
could be rented on a nightly basis. Nearby, SOE also established office 
accommodation. This ensured that SOE did not have to inform their agents of the 
location of their headquarters. 
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Station XVB, The Natural History Museum 
 
 
Figure 116: The floor plan of Station XVB located within the Natural History 
Museum, Kensington.
9
  
 
 Within SOE, it was decided that in ‘order that the Agent should receive every 
possible help and avail himself of “food for thought”, a Demonstration Room was 
[to be] formed … This exhibition contained not only examples of the many facilities 
available from camouflage, but examples of all the devices produced by the AD/Z 
[Supplies] Directorate’.10 At 17:00 on 8 July 1943, this new facility was opened 
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within the Natural History Museum, Kensington (Figure 116).
11
 For this event, SOE 
had sent invites to Churchill’s Intelligence Advisor Desmond Morton, the Director 
of Military Operations (DMO), the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) and 
Marshall-Cornwall who liaised between SOE and SIS.
12
 This list of dignitaries 
reflects the underlying political motivation of SOE when establishing this facility.  
 
 
Figure 117: Exhibits within SOE’s Demonstration Room were kept behind glass 
restricting the agent’s ability to handle the items. As agents would be operating 
under highly stressful conditions, previous handling of equipment would enable them 
to develop automatic reflexes. By seeing objects behind glass, they would only be 
able to develop a theoretical knowledge of how they work. In an operation scenario 
this would have serious negative implications on the probability of success.
13
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 The nature and layout of SOE’s facility within the Natural History Museum 
indicates that this was intended as more than just simply ‘food for thought’. Most 
evidently, the establishment of a ‘Demonstration Room’ for agents awaiting 
deployment undermined SOE’s proven training regime centred on the STSs. 
Moreover, by placing exhibits behind glass, the agents’ ability to handle and interact 
with the items on display was severely restricted (Figure 117). Within this facility, 
the only space available for teaching was a small lecture theatre (Figure 118). 
Although for certain aspects of instruction this was invaluable, lectures were poor 
substitutes for hands on experience of learning new equipment.  
 
 
Figure 118: View across the lecture hall established in SOE’s Demonstration 
Room.
14
 It was only through the support of Churchill that SOE survived the various 
attempts by other organisations to undermine their authority. By placing Churchill’s 
portrait in an obvious position, the organisation was demonstrating their political 
backing.  
 
 Whilst undergoing final briefings, agents were likely to be in a heightened 
state of nervous tension. Under such mental conditions, providing them with ‘food 
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for thought’ would be counterproductive as they were unlikely to be malleable to 
new equipment. Unlike the STSs, the Demonstration Room was not a practical 
learning environment for this stage of an agent’s career. Station XVB was, therefore, 
established as a cover.  
 
 
Figure 119: Certain items which were on display at the Demonstration Room would 
have been familiar to the agents. If agents were unaware of parachuting equipment 
prior to their final briefing, SOE’s training regime would have been fundamentally 
flawed.
15
  
 
 The nature of the exhibits SOE displayed within Station XVB was also 
unusual (Figure 119). These items should have already been familiar to those agents 
awaiting deployment. If they were still not aware of this basic equipment, the STSs 
would have fundamentally failed in their purpose. Many of the exhibits were simply 
superfluous. Agents destined for France were unlikely to be interested in 
contemporary Norwegian fashion. The dedication of a room to the Far East was also 
entirely irrelevant to those deployed to mainland Europe.
16
 By providing agents with 
an awareness of the wide range of equipment produce by SOE, the organisation was 
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compromising the security of their missions. Captured agents could now provide 
German counterintelligence with details of SOE’s operational procedures (Figure 
120). 
 
 
Figure 120: A security precaution employed by the Secret Services was the 
restriction of knowledge. The establishment of a ‘Demonstration Room’ by SOE 
undermined these security measures. Knowledge of submersible vehicles, for 
example, was not required by the majority of agents. Those who needed to know 
about this equipment had already undergone training.
17
  
 
 The nature of the equipment on display, the creation of dioramas (Figure 121) 
and the grandeur of the Natural History Museum, indicates that the Demonstration 
Room was intended for an audience other than SOE’s agents.18 Despite being located 
in the vicinity of ‘safe houses’, Station XVB was intended as a political tool. It was 
the development of innovative equipment specifically designed for clandestine 
warfare which made SOE distinguishable from other branches of the Secret Services. 
By creating a demonstration room, the organisation was championing tangible items 
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226 
 
which could be solely attributed to SOE (Figure 122). This space provided SOE the 
ability to entertain dignitaries and demonstrate the organisation’s capabilities.19  
 
 
Figure 121: The construction of dioramas within the Demonstration Room was 
superfluous. If this facility was intended for agents, a hands-on approach to the 
exhibits would have been more advantageous.
20
  
 
 Within this chapter, the nature of SOE’s Command and Control infrastructure 
has been discussed. This support structure enabled the organisation to coordinate 
operations and collaborate externally. In the following chapter, all aspects of SOE’s 
UK property portfolio will be drawn together to illustrate how they supported the 
operations of two agents.  
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 In March 1945, Station XVB held a Royal visit when King George V inspected the facility. 
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Figure 122: The overt display of SOE’s achievements at Station XVB was intended 
for a political audience. Data regarding the supplies SOE had shipped to the 
resistance would not have been relevant information for agents awaiting 
deployment.
21
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CHAPTER IX 
SOE’s Agents 
 
 Up to this point, the focus of this thesis has been on SOE’s neglected UK 
based property portfolio. One of the fundamental tenets of this research is that a 
more balanced consensus of SOE’s operations can be gained through analysis of the 
organisation’s infrastructure. Without an appreciation of SOE’s training regime, 
research and development, transportation, communications and command and 
control, assessments of operations cannot be accurately undertaken. The entire 
purpose of SOE’s property portfolio within the UK was to support the activities of 
its agents in the field. In this chapter, the operational life of Albert Robichaud and 
Max Manus will be examined within the context of SOE’s infrastructure. This will 
draw together the various aspects of the organisation’s UK based activities into a 
coherent narrative.  
 
Albert Robichaud 
 
 Born on 18 February 1916 in Cabano, Canada, Albert Robichaud was the son 
of a Canadian father and American mother.
1
 After receiving an excellent education, 
he had become a school master teaching French Literature and Latin by 23. In 1941, 
Robichaud joined the US Army where he was regarded as ‘quiet, unassuming and 
rather colourless and does not appear to have any qualities of leadership’.2  
 Shortly thereafter, Robichaud was recruited into the OSS and trained to work 
as a Jedburgh.
3
 After being seconded to SOE’s Section RF, no suitable role could be 
identified.
4
 Despite this set back, F Section were willing to employ him if he passed 
                                                          
1
 TNA HS 9/1270/2 27FFC OB.102 Pg1. Robichaud had taken American nationality. 
2
 TNA HS 8/176 From D/F 13/01/1944 p. 1 
3
 Jedburgh teams comprised of three men made up of British, American and French personnel who 
infiltrated France prior to Operation OVERLORD to prepare the way for the invading forces. In order 
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4
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French Forces.  
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his medical.
5
 On passing these tests, Captain Benn became responsible for arranging 
his paramilitary training, conducted at STS50 Gorse Hill, parachute instruction at 
RAF Ringway, and lessons in ‘passing’, conducted in Beaulieu (Figure 123).6 
 
 
Figure 123: A map of Albert Robichaud’s operational life with SOE. His first 
mission is mapped in red, his second in blue. The facilities established by SOE 
within the UK were central to the success of Robichaud’s missions. They provided 
him with training, equipment, transportation and communication. All these aspects 
of the support provided by SOE were coordinated by the organisation’s command 
and control infrastructure.  
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French Forces in France. 
6
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 On 16 January 1944, Robichaud arrived at STS50 with group 27FFCOB102 
for paramilitary instruction. During his time there, he was regarded as a ‘cheerful 
and intelligent character who has worked well during the week he has been here. Has 
gone away with a sound knowledge of all subjects … [However, he was] afraid of 
getting wet’.7 By 23 January 1944, he was being billeted in Dunham House in 
preparation for his parachute training at STS51. There he was joined by FANY Heim, 
Lieutenant Fraser and Captain Rees for six days of ground based instruction which 
was provided by Miss Daniels.
8
 Despite being regarded as a ‘rather youthful 
immature student who spent much of his time in the company with the F.A.N.Y’s.’, 
he successfully completed his two jumps and graduated from RAF Ringway.
9
  
 Joining group 27FFC, Robichaud relocated to Beaulieu for his ‘finishing’ 
training. Here he gave the impression of being ‘below the average in intelligence and 
rather more practical than academic. He is slow, rather scatterbrained and lacking in 
shrewdness and cunning … [and] He has no powers of leadership and should be 
employed, if at all, in a very minor capacity under strict supervision’.10 Based on his 
training reports, SOE decided Robichaud could be suitably employed as a ‘guinea 
pig’.11  
 On the night of 21 March 1944, Robichaud, codenamed ROBIN, was 
transported by sea and successfully infiltrated into the north coast of Brittany.
12
 His 
orders were to test the newly established CHERUB Circuit by using this network to 
leave France.
13
 After moving between two safe houses that night, ROBIN left for 
Paris the following day. As his train to Bordeaux did not leave until the evening, he 
managed to fit in some sightseeing. Arriving later than expected at his destination, 
ROBIN was left to his own devices to locate the address of his contact, M Renard. 
When he arrived at the safe house, he was informed that his other contact, Benito, 
had left after he had waited two weeks for his arrival. The following morning Benito 
arrived and his fears that ROBIN was a Gestapo agent were dispelled after he 
                                                          
7
 TNA HS 8/176 Para-Military Report p. 1-2 
8
 TNA HS 8/176 Parachute Training Report – Most Secret p. 1 
9
 Ibid p. 1 
10
 TNA HS 8/176 Finishing Report p. 1 
11
 TNA HS 8/176 From D/FB 08/03/1944 
12
 TNA HS 8/176 DF/REC/5288 20/04/1944. ROBIN was attached to Operation DULVERTON to 
cross the English Channel (TNA HS 8/176 5097 03/04/1944).  
13
 The CHERUB Circuit had been formed to enable the passage of people and messages between 
Bilbag, Spain, and Bordeaux, France, a distance of approximately 339km (TNA HS 8/176 
Operational Orders for Robin 17/03/1944 p. 1).  
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successfully used the agreed passwords.
14
 He was now ready to begin his journey on 
the CHERUB Line.  
 The first section of his journey required ROBIN to catch the midnight train to 
Bayonne that Sunday.
15
 On arriving at his destination, ROBIN and Benito continued 
towards St Jean de Luz by foot. Just outside Biarritz, the pair boarded another train 
for the remainder of the journey to St Jean de Luz. Over the next couple of days, 
ROBIN and Benito were accommodated in various safe houses in the area whilst 
they prepared to cross the Spanish border.
16
  
 Eventually crossing into Spain in the early hours one morning, ROBIN and 
Benito continued their journey cross country to avoid sentries. After travelling 
between safe houses and receiving lifts from local contacts, they eventually reached 
San Sebastian. Staying there for four days whilst arrangements were made, the pair 
finally border a train for Bilbao and at 11:00 on 29 March 1944 reached their 
destination and the end of the CHERUB Line.
17
 
 On successfully completing his first mission, SOE now ordered ROBIN to 
test the CELINI Line which ran from Bilbao to Lisbon, Portugal.
18
 His new guide 
presented himself at a bus stop on 5 April,
19
 but they could not begin their journey 
until new papers and clothing had been acquired. On 11 April they managed to catch 
the 19:00 train to Leon following an altercation with the ticket inspector. After a 
travelling by train, bus and foot they eventually reached Barcencia where George 
Montal, the head of the local network, arranged for the pair to catch the train to 
Lisbon the following evening. Once they reached Lisbon, the British Embassy 
arranged ROBIN’s transportation back to the UK. At 23:00 on 18 April 1944, 
ROBIN boarded a plane destined for Britain using the cover name of Joseph Albery 
Roberts.
20
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 TNA HS /176 Interrogation of Robichaud, Albert @ Robin (Field Name) 29/04/1944 p. 3 
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 Following his arrival back in the UK, Robichaud immediately underwent a 
series of interrogations and debriefings. The intelligence gathered from these was 
used by SOE to plan future operations in the region. Once these were completed, the 
organisation enrolled Robichaud onto further training sessions.
21
  
 Joining party 27.OB at STS39, Wall Hall, Robichaud received training in 
micro-photography where he exhibited a sound knowledge of copying documents, 
using different cameras and films, working under field conditions.
22
 Robichaud was 
also sent on a three day reception committee course at STS40, Howbury Hall.
23
 Here, 
his instructors felt that he worked ‘well and has a very good all round knowledge. He 
should not have any difficulty in organising and controlling this type of operation’.24  
 Based on his instructors’ feedback, SOE decided to send Robichaud to 
France via Spain to be in charge of the JESCHKE Circuit’s carrier pigeon service.25 
For his new assignment, he was issued 100ft (30.48m) of microfilm, two Leica cable 
releases, one reel of cellophane, one pair of scissors, a No. 1 lens and 250,000 
francs.
26
 In order to disguise the equipment, Station XV, The Thatched Barn, was 
ordered to manufacture a custom made seed box in which all the items could be 
concealed.
27
 On 26 June 1944, Robichauld boarded plane UG25 for Gibraltar using 
the cover name of 2nd Lieutenant Stephen Maitland.
28
 His orders were to ‘proceed to 
FRANCE to act as one of JUANITO’s lieutenants, to operate under his orders a mail 
pigeon service from FRANCE to U.K.’.29 
 The day after arriving in Gibraltar, ROBIN travelled to Barcelona by car 
where he was delayed for two weeks as members of the line into France had been 
arrested. On 11 July, ROBIN, joined by fellow agents JUANITO and Lawrence, left 
Barcelona by car accompanied by two guides. After covering 250km they had to 
continue their journey by foot as it was no longer safe to travel by road. During this 
hike, Lawrence fell behind and was lost. The group, however, pressed on and finally 
stopped for a break at 23:00 on 13 July.
30
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 Over the following days, the group had to keep to the top of valleys and the 
mountain routes to avoid sentry posts. When they finally descended, they were met 
by a new guide who had disguised himself as a fisherman.
31
 After following the road 
for some time, they were approached by a car driven by the Maquis who offered to 
give them a lift to a nearby hotel. They then continued their journey to Tarbes by bus 
and car where they were introduced to Edouard who agreed to accompany them to 
Paris.
32
  
 Before they could depart, Edouard identified errors in ROBIN’s papers which 
SOE had supplied. They, therefore, had to wait until the circuit’s documents experts 
could provide new ones. Taking the bus to Toulouse, the group were delayed for 8.5 
hours as a bomb had destroyed the train line to Nimes. As the repairs were predicted 
to take two days, Edouard persuaded the driver of a mail van to take them to 
Avignon. Whilst travelling to this city, they were accompanied by a Gendarme 
whose presence meant they were not searched at checkpoints.
33
 
 Continuing on their journey they reached Lyon where they were forced to 
wait until they could board a train heading north. As they approached the 
demarcation line, a Gestapo checkpoint stopped the carriage to check the passengers’ 
papers. Eventually reaching Gare de Lyon, Paris, they proceeded to Gare 
d’Austerlitz to catch the Metro to Montparnasse. From here they were taken to No. 4 
rue Bertrand. Over the next 13 days, ROBIN was moved between three further safe 
houses.
34
  
 Whilst operating in Paris, ROBIN was provided with a radio which had been 
parachuted into France for use by the circuit. One of the tasks allocated to ROBIN 
was to identify suitable landing grounds and drop zones for a new circuit JUANITO 
was establishing in the region. Despite locating a number of potential sites, ROBIN 
was forced into hiding by the advancing Allied troops.
35
 Over this period, he did, 
however, manage to direct downed airmen through the circuit’s escape routes.36 On 5 
September 1944, ROBIN was finally liberated by the Allied forces.
37
 By the end of 
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the month he had returned back to the UK.
38
 For his actions, Robichaud was 
mentioned in dispatches as he:  
‘not only made the [escape] line safe for evaders, but he broke all 
records for speed by being back in this country in less than a 
fortnight of his departure. The journey across the Pyrenees and 
Estrella Mountains into Portugal entailed great hardship, and it is a 
magnificent tribute to his great powers of endurance and 
determination that Lieut. Robichaud was able to accomplish his 
mission with such outstanding success in so short a space of time. 
Lieutenant Robichaud was sent on a second mission to France in 
June 1944 and although the intervention of D-Day curtailed his 
activities, Lt. Robichaud again showed the same spirit of 
determination by reporting to his organiser in Paris after travelling 
through enemy-held areas’.39 
 
Max Manus, DSO, MC and Bar 
 
 Born on 9 December 1914 in Bergen, Norway, Max Manus was the son of a 
Norwegian father and Danish mother. During his childhood, he was to live in 
Copenhagen and Cuba finally returning to Europe in 1930. When the Winter War 
broke out in January 1940, Manus travelled to Finland and volunteered to fight the 
Russians. He returned to Norway on 15 April 1940, three days after the German 
invasion, with 130 compatriots and formed a guerrilla company which operated in 
Kongesvinge and Brumendal. This unit was disbanded on 15 May 1940.
40
  
 After Norway surrender, Manus, who was operating under Major Helseth, 
began stockpiling weapons. Following a security breach by a member of his network, 
Manus was confronted by the Gestapo on 16 February 1941.
41
 Fearing he knew too 
much, Manus ‘decided to take a risk and, drawing the attention of the six men to 
some sporting trophies in the room, he quickly jumped through the window. His 
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apartment was on the second floor. He remembers no more until he recovered 
consciousness in the ULLEVOL Hospital’.42  
 On getting word of his capture to his network, Manus began planning his 
escape from the hospital. On 13 March 1941, he made his attempt by lowering a 
fishing line out of the window. Waiting at the bottom was a friend who attached a 
rope which Manus pulled up and then climbed down. .
43
 In order to avoid ‘reprisals 
against the nurse, he had arranged with the doctor that the nurse should receive some 
facial injection which would cause her face to swell and, in addition, the doctor 
should discolour the skin in such a way as to make it appear that MANUS had 
overpowered the nurse’.44  
 Following his escape, Manus travelled to the UK via Sweden, Finland, 
Russia, Turkey, Egypt, Cape Town, Trinidad and Canada finally arriving in Belfast 
on 9 December 1941.
45
 During his interrogation, he was regarded as a ‘young 
adventurer, but there is no question at all of his loyalty and one cannot but admire his 
work and the risks he has taken to avoid falling into the hands of the Gestapo. He has 
been commissioned into the Norwegian Army … [and] I recommend that he be 
released to [SOE] Norway House Immediately’.46  
 In January 1942, Manus began his training at STS3, Stodham Park, where he 
was deemed the ‘comedian of the party and very popular with the rest of the crowd. 
He is very keen and intelligent and has also plenty of sound common sense’.47 After 
successfully completing this course, Manus relocated to STS24, Inverie House, 
where he demonstrated an expert knowledge of the weapons and tank traps used in 
the Finno-Russo war.
48
 During his training, he also attended courses at STS51, RAF 
Ringway, STS33, The House on the Shore, and STS26, Inverlochy Castle.
49
 On 28 
February 1943, he began his final stage of instruction by attending the Finishing 
Schools at Beaulieu.
50
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 Whilst stationed in the UK, Manus began planning an operation to destroy 
ships from canoes using specially constructed charges.
51
 On 12 March 1943, Manus 
and Corporal Gregers Gramm were parachuted into Norway, east of Oslo. Almost 
immediately Operation MARDONIUS suffered setbacks as Manus developed a 
severe bout of pneumonia. Initially finding it difficult to enrol volunteers, the 
operation was further delayed as there was a shortage of suitable targets combined 
with a long spell of bright nights. On 28 April 1943, conditions were finally suitable 
for an attempt to be made on sabotaging shipping. Despite the moon illuminating the 
water, the group still managed to place their charges and sink two ships and damage 
a third.
52
  
 Returning to the UK on 24 May 1943, Manus was posted back to STS26 to 
resume his duties of training students in paramilitary skills. Five months later, he 
was billeted at Station 61, Gaynes Hall, prior to his despatch to the field on his next 
operation.
53
 Returning to Oslo on Operation BUNDLE, Manus was ‘charged with 
the dual role of continuing ship sabotage when opportunity offered, and particularly, 
of subverting enemy troops by the distribution of leaflets, posters and other 
clandestine methods’.54 
 During this mission, Manus produced a series of publications which had a 
considerable impact on German morale. He also made several attempts at destroying 
sabotaging ships which came into his area of operation. One target he destroyed was 
the MONTE ROSA to which he attached a string of limpets. This ship sunk as she 
was leaving Oslo with 3,000 German troops aboard. Manus was also involved in 
three attacks on Norwegian employment records, assisted in the destruction of 
aircraft undergoing repairs and was involved in the attack on the Vacuum Oil 
Company storage depot at Sorenga.
55
 For his involvement in Operation BUNDLE, 
Manus was awarded a bar to his Military Cross. 
 One of Manus’ greatest achievements came when he destroyed the transport 
ship DONAU. When she arrived in Oslo harbour on 15 January 1945, it was 
immediately decided that an attempt should be made to sabotage her. Despite ice in 
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the harbour and a search being conducted for a soldier who had fallen into the water, 
it was decided to continue with the plan. To smuggle the cordex past the guards, 
Manus and his colleague Roy Nielsen wrapped 100m of the cord round their 
bodies.
56
 As they approached the checkpoint, a pre-arranged comedy was staged: ‘It 
was slippery with ice, and when he came up to the guard, Nielsen, who is over 6 feet, 
skidded and fell backwards to the great amusement of everyone. As a result the 
examination of papers was of a very cursory nature’.57 The pair then managed to 
attach 11 limpets to the side of the DONAU. As they were leaving, the 
ROLANSECK arrived to which they returned to attach their remaining limpet.
58
  
 At 22:00 that evening, as the DONAU was sailing past the coast of Drobak, 
the charges detonated and she sunk in 25m of water. The explosion destroyed several 
hundred vehicles, 300 horses and killed an unknown number of elite Alpine troops. 
Despite an immediate search of the ROLANSECK being conducted, the limpet was 
not discovered and it later blew a hole in the side of the ship.
59
  
 Escaping Oslo after this mission, Manus arrived in Stockholm on 29 January 
1945 where he remained until 1 March 1945 when he was ordered back to Norway.
60
 
Two months later on 7 May, the German forces in Norway surrendered. On 7 June 
King Haakon VII returned to Oslo and was accompanied by Manus who had 
‘established himself high in the Crown Prince’s favour, who regards the trio Fjeld 
(no.24), Max, and Martin Olsen as the guardians of the Royal Family!’.61 
 The missions of Max Manus and Albert Robichaud are examples of a small 
selection of the wide range of operations undertaken by SOE throughout the Second 
World War. These demonstrate what could be achieved by the organisation’s agents 
when the various components of SOE worked effectively and in unison. In the 
following chapter, themes which have run through this thesis will be drawn together 
in a conclusion.  
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CHAPTER X 
Conclusion 
 
 This thesis has, for the first time, assessed the property portfolio belonging to 
one of Britain’s wartime Secret Services. As access to SOE’s archive is hampered by 
the post-war destruction of files, the organisation’s infrastructure provides a tangible 
resource for reassessing their legacy. This chapter draws together the reoccurring 
themes which have been identified throughout this thesis.  
 
1942, a Changing Political Environment and the Growth of SOE 
 
 In the history of SOE, two years were central to the development of the 
organisation: 1940, the year it was formed, and 1942, when political support was 
more forthcoming. SOE was only established in July 1940, two months after 
Germany had invaded France, by amalgamating Section D, MI(R) and Department 
EH. Prior to this, there was little political incentive to conduct operations of a 
clandestine nature. Those countries which had been occupied were inconveniently 
located for the UK to materially support their emerging resistance networks.
1
  
 Following the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) from 
Dunkirk in May 1940, the Allies’ ability to instigate unrest in occupied Europe 
became a strategic priority. Early attempts by SOE to conduct operations were 
generally of an amateurish nature and the majority inevitably failed. It was a result of 
these failures that the organisation developed a bad name within certain official and 
military circles.
2
 By the end of 1941, however, attitudes within Whitehall towards 
SOE were changing. Political pressure was now being asserted onto organisations 
which had initially been reluctant to support the organisation.
3
 This change in 
emphasis was to have a lasting impact on the nature of SOE.  
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 Before late 1941, SOE was still learning the operational procedures necessary 
to conduct clandestine warfare successfully. Once they had gained this knowledge, 
the organisation still lacked sufficient infrastructural capacity to utilise the European 
Resistance at its full potential. What was required was a political catalyst which 
would trigger the expansion of SOE. This eventually came in the form of Soviet 
Russia.  
 On 22 June 1941, the German military launched Operation BARBAROSSA 
and the invasion of Russia commenced. Once the Politburo accepted that this was 
actually an incursion on their territory, Stalin began demanding that Britain open a 
second front. If Churchill could not provide this, Stalin expected the immediate 
dispatched of aid. For 13 weeks following the invasion, Britain could only provide 
the Soviets with moral support.
4
 At the time, Churchill lacked the spare operational 
capacity necessary to open a second front.
5
 British help was also not forthcoming as 
the Chiefs of Staff Subcommittee of the War Cabinet were unwilling to change 
strategy. There also a general feeling that the Soviets would soon capitulate. By 4 
September 1941, Stalin’s patience was at breaking point. His representatives, 
therefore, began indicating that they would be willing to consider a separate peace 
treaty with Hitler. Within a month, the first convoy of fighter aircraft was on its way 
to Russia.
6
 
 By despatching aid, Britain hoped to pacify their restless ally. As a substitute 
for a second front, Churchill invested in proxy operations. Although the Battle of the 
Atlantic and the North African campaign were impacting the German military, they 
had little influence on its march to Moscow.
7
 Churchill’s greatest symbolic act 
towards the Soviets was the RAF’s strategic bombing campaign.8 The Joint Planning 
Staff were also of the opinion that commando raids on the French and Norwegian 
coast would have an effect on German troop deployment to the Eastern Front.
9
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 What has, however, not previously been considered was the nature of the 
resistance within Europe in Anglo-Soviet relations. Despite the heavy investment of 
resources Britain allocated to the bombing offensive, Stalin still insisted Britain land 
troops in mainland Europe.
10
 By the commencement of Operation BARBAROSSA, 
SOE had begun demonstrating the strategic value of small groups of highly trained 
and determined agents. Following the success of Operation JOSEPHINE B,
11
 Dalton 
informed Churchill that his organisation had proved that ‘industrial targets, 
especially if cover [sic] only a very small area, are more effectively attacked by SOE 
methods than by air bombardment’.12 Contemporary post-strike photographic 
analysis estimated that only 25% of the RAF’s payload landed within five miles of 
the designated target.
13
 In comparison, SOE could achieve better results with only 
three men, one aircraft and some explosive charges. 
 For a country suffering from equipment shortages, SOE offered the British 
Government a cost effective method of engaging German troops in mainland Europe. 
Insurgencies have the capabilities of tying down large numbers of enemy 
combatants.
14
 Although the occupying German forces could impose draconian 
counterinsurgency tactics which require fewer troops, an increase in activities by the 
resistance would, inevitably, lead to a greater military presence in the region. This 
would, therefore, have an impact on the number of troops deployed to the frontline.  
 Insurgents also have a negative impact on the combat effectiveness of enemy 
troops. In war zones, soldiers not only face the imminent danger of loss of life or 
limb, but also witnessing the death and mutilation of their comrades.
15
 In these 
situations, there is a tendency of greater fear towards mines and booby-traps which 
strike without warning and are often designed to maim. The threat of Improvised 
Explosive Devices (IEDs), therefore, leads to higher levels of anxiety amongst 
soldiers even when in the rear echelons.
16
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Figure 124: The effect of fighting on Combat Efficiency.
17
 By increasing levels of 
anxiety and fear amongst German soldiers, SOE could increase combat exhaustion 
which reduced their efficiency.  
 
 The development of camouflaged IEDs by SOE was intended to undermine 
the morale of German soldiers.
18
 Although designed to maim, the comparatively 
small number of devices manufactured meant they would only invalid limited 
numbers of enemy troops. The knowledge of their existence would, however, 
heighten levels of stress and anxiety amongst the German forces. Constant fear of 
booby-traps restricted soldiers’ ability to relax. This can lead to Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD) and an inevitable decrease in combat efficiency (Figure 
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124).
19
 SOE, therefore, had the ability to tie down troops away from the frontline 
whilst also decreasing their fighting capability.  
 By 1942, SOE had demonstrated the effectiveness of small numbers of 
highly trained agents in achieving strategic objectives. With increasing Soviet 
demands for a second front, the organisation offered Whitehall a cost-efficient 
method of engaging enemy troops in mainland Europe. The nature of SOE’s 
operations and its support of civil disobedience were also in keeping with Soviet 
revolutionary ideology. Germany’s invasion of Russia was effectively the trigger 
which led to the growth of the organisation. This expansion, combined with the 
lessons learnt, allowed SOE to grow into a highly capable and competent 
organisation.  
SOE: an Amateurish Organisation? 
 
 One of the most persistent criticisms of SOE was that the organisation was 
‘amateurish’. These accusations tend to focus on SOE’s early history. Churchill was 
of the opinion, however, that it takes a minimum of five to 10 years to successfully 
establish a new Secret Service.
20
 As demonstrated by this thesis, SOE achieved this 
in less than two years. It was also:  
‘never true that those responsible for S.O.E. were complete 
amateurs in secret service work.
21
 C.D. himself worked for the 
S.I.S. in Switzerland from the beginning of the war until July 1940. 
Colonel Taylor worked in the original Section IX of the S.I.S. from 
May 1939 until S.O.E. was formed. Brigadier Gubbins had had 
long periods of service both in Military Intelligence and in the 
special “sabotage” section known as “M.I.R.”, and Colonel Davies 
too, had served in M.I.R’.22  
 One of the greatest advocates for undermining SOE was SIS. Throughout the 
latter’s early life, it had itself been regularly attacked by departmental rivals. In the 
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wake of the Venlo disaster, the reputation of SIS was further tarnished.
23
 By 
removing Section D from SIS, the organisation was once more being threatened. 
There was, within SOE, a concern that SIS felt that if they were ‘not squashed 
quickly … we [SOE] will squash them’.24 By focusing on SOE’s supposedly 
‘amateurish’ nature, SIS was attempting to undermine the former’s legitimacy to 
operate independently. During wartime, an inefficient organisation could not be 
tolerated.  
 Throughout the Cold War, allegations of SOE’s ‘amateurism’ were still 
advocated by those within SIS eager to continue the wartime bureaucratic rivalries. 
The image of SOE as an ‘irresponsible, amateurish, and uncontrollable organisation’, 
consorting with foreign radicals and revolutionaries, became firmly entrenched with 
post-war assessments.
25
 By continuing to undermine their wartime ‘rival’, SIS was 
attempting to legitimise their role as the UK’s premier intelligence agency.  
 In contrast to SIS’s accusations of SOE’s ‘amateurism’, this thesis has 
demonstrated that the organisation’s UK based infrastructure was, when necessary, 
of a high standard, state-of-the-art and reflective. The greatest reflection of this was 
the wireless facilities the organisation constructed to communicate with their agents. 
These stations combined advanced technology with contemporary design standards 
in an attempt to offer a reliable and efficient service. The organisation also invested 
heavily in the development of innovative wireless sets. Combined, these provided 
SOE the ability to effectively coordinate the activities of the resistance across 
Europe.  
 The professionalism of SOE’s infrastructure was also reflected in their STSs. 
Almost immediately following the organisation’s formation, a training programme 
was devised. This system was so forward thinking and fit for purpose that only 
minor alterations occurred throughout the remainder of the war.
26
 To ensure that the 
training was of a high standard, instructors embedded a heightened level of realism 
                                                          
23
 On 9 November 1939, Captain Best and Major Stevens, key figures in SIS’s Dutch network, were 
captured by German Intelligence following fundamental failings in SIS’s operational procedures. This 
‘amateurish’ mistake compromised SIS’s European network (Nigel Jones ‘Introduction’ in The Venlo 
Incident: A True Story of Double-Dealing, Captivity, and a Murderous Nazi Plot, Sigismund Best 
(London, 2009) p. xiv) 
24
 TNA HS 8/321 M/XX/441 10/03/1942 
25
 David Stafford, Britain and European Resistance 1940-1945: A Survey of the Special Operations 
Executive with Documents (London, 1980) p. 5 
26
 The contemporary Special Air Service (SAS) still use a series of ‘sieves’ in their training syllabus 
to ensure only the best candidates graduate. Part of the SAS training programme also includes a 
‘killing house’. This is based on the ‘fighting house’ concept developed within SOE.  
244 
 
into their syllabuses. Central to their courses were models, military equipment, 
industrial machinery and innovative training facilities. Through the combination of 
state-of-the-art techniques and a focus on realism, SOE ensured that their students 
were as thoroughly prepared as practical.  
 Moreover, in addressing the charge of ‘amateurism’, it is significant that 
following the dissolution of SOE in 1946, the organisation’s Research and 
Development Section and Training Section were incorporated into SIS. 
Acknowledged by contemporaries that in the ‘training of underground workers … 
S.O.E. has done pioneer work of value’,27 SIS’s decision to replace their own 
Training Section with that of SOEs reflects an organisation which coveted aspects of 
their rival. SIS’s post-war actions suggest that the organisation’s criticisms of SOE 
were not necessarily driven by operational concerns, but rather the result of inter-
departmental bickering.  
 Early failures by the infant SOE were fundamental in tarnishing the 
organisation with a bad name.
28
 Although quick to demonstrate their strategic 
capabilities, the continuation of criticism towards SOE was advantageous to rival 
organisations. The fact that clandestine warfare had never previously been 
undertaken in an official capacity meant allegations of SOE’s ‘amateurism’ were an 
easy target.  
Inter-Organisational Relations 
 
 Within post-war assessments of SOE, notions that jealous rivals plagued the 
activities of the organisation abound within the literature. These ‘unfriendly 
feeling[s] in Departments with whom SOE has to work obviously leads to 
inefficiency’.29 By focusing on episodes of interdepartmental strife, the complex and 
changing relations between SOE and other organisations is obscured. In July 1942, 
Sir John Hanbury-Williams and Edward Playfair reported to the Minister for 
Economic Warfare that ‘SOE has, of course, day-to-day relations with many 
branches of all three Service Departments, and from all that we have heard they are 
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satisfactory on both sides … We cannot [however] give nearly such a favourable 
account of SOE’s relations with SIS’.30  
 Over SOE’s lifetime, the worst relations the organisation had was with SIS 
who were ‘more at arm’s length than should ever be the case between two 
organisations which must be so closely connected’.31 By 1942, this relationship was 
regarded as so bad that ‘if things do not improve on the S.I.S. side, they are bound to 
get worse on the S.O.E. side:-  
“Cet animal est tres mechant: 
Quand on l’attaque il se defend.” 
These bad relations … lead to inefficiency, wasted effort, some duplication and it 
may be at times danger of life and liberty to devoted men, is not open to doubt’.32 
Through an assessment of SOE’s UK based infrastructure, light can be shed on the 
nature of the organisation’s inter-departmental relationships.  
 Throughout SOE’s property portfolio, there was an observable geographical 
segregation between the organisation and SIS. Within London, the two sister 
organisations physically isolated themselves from one another by establishing office 
accommodation in different districts. Even on shared facilities, such as RAF 
Tempsford, SIS and SOE remained distant. This segregation, combined with the 
unequal relationship between the two organisations,
33
 meant it was inevitable that 
mutual distrust would emerge. In August 1942, this reached a level whereby SOE 
began voicing concerns over the prospect of SIS tapping their phone lines. Although 
this could not be proved, it was still recommended that SOE install Typex 
machines.
34
 
 The nature of SOE’s relations with the RAF and the Royal Navy were also 
reflected in the organisation’s infrastructure. Initially, these two branches of the 
armed services resisted supporting clandestine warfare in situations where it directly 
impacted their operations. Despite political pressure forcing the RAF to increase the 
number of aircraft allocated to Special Duties, they remained fervently opposed to 
supporting the Secret Services. Eventually, the underequipped 138 and 161 
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Squadrons were allocated a substandard airfield. This allocation of resources limited 
the negative impact on the RAF’s strategic bombing campaign. 
 Similarly, the Royal Navy occasionally saw SOE’s activities as detrimental 
to their organisation. The operation of a ‘private navy’ within the English Channel 
by SOE could lead to more aggressive patrolling by the Kriegsmarine. This could 
have serious implications for the security of British warships. In 1942, therefore, the 
command of the Helford Flotilla was transferred from SOE to NID(c). SOE’s 
relations with the Royal Navy, however, were not always hostile. Due to the size of 
the North Sea, the activities of the Shetland Bus were of little concern to the 
Admiralty. Within this sphere, both organisations could operate without impacting 
the others effectiveness. The Royal Navy were, therefore, happy to provide SOE 
with material support to enable them to expand their activities.  
 In an effort to maintain courteous relations with the armed services, SOE 
often collaborated with sister organisations. On a regular basis, the organisation 
supported activities of the Combined Operations Headquarters. Most famously, SOE 
designed the charges used during Operation CLAYMORE.
35
 In an effort to achieve 
the strategic objective of destroying the battleship TIRPITZ, SOE invested heavily in 
designing miniature submarines. This inevitable resulted in a working relationship 
developing with the Royal Navy.  
 As SOE operated globally, it was also essential that the organisation 
developed strong links with foreign bodies. One of the closest collaborations formed 
by SOE was with the OSS. Only established in June 1942, SOE was fundamental in 
coaching their American counterparts in the techniques of clandestine warfare. By 
chaperoning the OSS, SOE ensured the infant organisation could not undermine the 
reputation of the Allies amongst the resistance within occupied Europe. This 
mentoring was reflected in the nature of numerous sites throughout the UK operated 
by the OSS. At both Area H and Station 53c, SOE ensured they maintained a 
presence to oversee the quality of the Americans’ work.  
 Over the duration of the Second World War, SOE’s relations with other 
organisations rarely remained static. Initially, there was a general unwillingness to 
collaborate with the organisation which was based on their early failures. This 
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reluctance continued in areas of operation where the activities of the organisation 
might impact the operations of the other armed services. As SOE gained experience 
and political backing, support from other organisations was more forthcoming.  
 
‘Stately ‘Omes of England’36 
 
 Further criticisms of the organisation have also ‘generally centre[d] on 
S.O.E.’s alleged wastefulness and extravagance’.37 In a further effort to undermine 
SOE, Lieutenant Colonel Claude Dansey from SIS rechristened the organisation with 
the derogatory title of the ‘Stately ‘Omes of England’. This attack on SOE’s property 
portfolio was to invoke notions of irresponsible empire building. By criticising their 
estate, Dansey was drawing attention away from the tangible results of their 
successful operations. This thesis has, however, demonstrated that although the 
organisation’s property portfolio was extensive, it was necessary.38 It was the size of 
their estate which made SOE unique amongst the British Secret Services. Due to the 
nature of their work, facilities were required to train large numbers of agents, supply 
them with purposely designed equipment and to communicate with operatives 
abroad.  
 It was the preference of the Minister for Economic Warfare, Dalton, that SOE 
should only use ‘houses [that had] already [been] requisitioned’.39 In order to obtain 
properties, the organisation had to approach the War Office’s Land Branch. If they 
had nothing suitable, SOE then contacted the Ministry of Works.
40
 Occasionally, if 
circumstances necessitated it, accommodation would be found in local 
advertisements.
41
 In January 1941, SOE established a Properties Section who were 
‘responsible for vetting all demands for premises and land required by S.O.E. in the 
U.K., for checking that such demands had been given the necessary internal approval 
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(including financial sanction) or for obtaining such approval, for acquiring, 
preparing, furnishing and maintaining all such approved requirements, and finally for 
their disposal when no longer required’.42 This section ensured that all requests for 
property had been fully justified.  
 The bureaucratic hurdles SOE had to navigate to procure new properties 
ensured they had valid reasons for the acquisition. During the requisitioning of 
Gaynes Hall in 1942, the disgruntled owner was informed that Queen Elizabeth had 
been ‘satisfied that the desire of the Government Department concerned is neither 
thoughtless nor frivolous, but is founded upon considerations which have a serious 
national justification’.43 
 Although the establishment of a property portfolio was essential to the 
function of SOE’s role, the organisation demonstrated a preference to reallocating 
functions to pre-existing facilities. On gaining operational control of their wireless 
networks in 1942, SOE located their first Home Station at Grendon Underwood. 
This facility had, however, been used as a ‘training centre for some time’.44 By 
adapting and changing the function of properties within their estate, SOE could limit 
the size of their portfolio to the bare essential.  
 SOE’s acceptance to restrict the size of their estate was part of internal 
policy. The organisation ensured that their staff were aware that the ‘reduction of 
building work to a minimum is a matter of greatest National importance, 
Commandants [of Country Establishments] will therefore ensure that requests for 
maintenance and alterations to premises are made only when absolutely essential’.45 
Analysis of aerial photographs indicates that this policy was adhered to by the 
commandants.  
 This thesis has for the first time shown the extent of SOE’s property portfolio 
in the UK during the Second World War. Past accusations of empire building and 
extravagance, typified by Dansey’s derogatory ‘Stately ‘Omes of England’, have 
been demonstrated as falsehoods. Instead, SOE’s property portfolio should be 
regarded as representative of the capacity of the organisation to undertake global 
operations.  
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The Destructive Nature of the Military 
 
 In post-war assessments of military requisitioning, accusations of troops 
blatantly disregarding private property abound within the literature.
46
 These 
generalisations, however, tarnish all organisations operating from Country Houses 
during the Second World War. Those buildings in the care of SOE were actually 
treated with care and consideration.  
 Over the course of the war, the War Office ‘unfortunately got a bad name in 
some districts owing to the damage done to houses by Military Units. It has been 
found that the fact that the Ministry of Works are themselves the custodians of 
Ancient Monuments and that I.S.R.B. [SOE] have been able to convince owners that 
they really do treat houses better than ordinary Military Units do’.47 One benefit of 
maintaining this positive image was that opposition to the organisation requisitioning 
a property was reduced.  
 To ensure that their impact on buildings was kept to a minimum, SOE’s 
‘Properties Section Officers inspected premises periodically. The aim was to inspect 
each premise every 6 months but pressure of more urgent work prevented this target 
being achieved until the summer of 1944 when a Properties Section Officer was 
engaged solely on inspections’.48 In order to protect personal belongings, SOE 
requested that all furniture was removed from the premises before they were taken 
over. Although every effort was made ‘to do this at the time of requisitioning … the 
acute shortage of storage accommodation made it impossible in some cases. Any 
such items left on the premises must be most thoroughly sealed off and regularly 
inspected by the C.O. of the sealed off entrances is necessary in order to ensure that 
any interfrance [sic] is promptly discovered and that immediate remedial action is 
taken’.49 Wood panelling was also erected within properties to cover the original 
structure.
50
 This limited the organisation’s impact on the buildings they occupied. 
 SOE’s respect for the properties they requisitioned is illustrated by the 
survivability of these buildings. The vast majority of the pre-war structures occupied 
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by the organisation remain habitable. As this thesis has demonstrated, SOE restricted 
building work to only that which was required. Those facilities which were expanded 
under the organisation’s tutelage no longer survive. This is mainly because of post-
war change of function. At Aston House, the extensive storage facilities have been 
replaced by a golf course. Whilst the packing station at Gaynes Hall and the Home 
Station at Grendon Underwood are both now prisons. Those sites operated by SOE 
which have survived are all related to the organisation’s wireless communications. 
As this thesis has shown, these facilities were state-of-the-art. In an intelligence 
driven, pseudo-war, radio networks are a vital lynchpin. The survival of SOE’s 
Home Stations may partially be attributed to the post-war environment. By 
maintaining these structures, they could be re-commissioned if required.
51
  
 Throughout the Second World War, SOE went out of their way to protect the 
property they requisitioned. This ensured their good name whilst also limiting 
potential compensation claims following the end of hostilities.
52
 The popular 
generalisation that the military paid little heed to private property is contradicted by 
the activities of SOE.  
 
The Built Infrastructure of the Secret Services: A Theoretical 
Discussion 
 
 Prior to this thesis, no comprehensive scholarly assessment had been made of 
the property portfolio of a branch of the British Secret Services. By combining 
historical and archaeological methodologies, this research has demonstrated the 
value of interdisciplinary approaches to the study of clandestine organisations. This 
approach has the potential to shed new light on clandestine organisations which 
operate both within and outside internal law. The centrality of SOE’s infrastructure 
to this thesis has enabled the discrepancies, gaps and biases found in the 
documentary record to be addressed.  
 To function effectively, clandestine organisations must remain hidden from 
the public and officialdom. It is, therefore, essential that an opaque façade is erected 
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separating ‘us’ from ‘them’. This inevitably leads to negative connotations and 
public hysteria over ‘shadowy’ figures operating outside the law.53 By incorporating 
a non-biased, tangible source into the study of clandestine organisations, light can be 
shed into the murky world of intelligence gathering. Although there are certain 
limitations associated with this infrastructure,
54
 it can provide the public an insight 
into the nature of the operations conducted by the Secret Services.  
 To maintain the security of these organisations, both physical and 
metaphysical barriers have to be erected. The nature of these obstacles often reflects 
public attitudes, external threats and the contemporary geopolitical situation. During 
the Second World War, the nature of security imposed by branches of the Secret 
Service was fundamentally different, for example, to that of the Cold War. As this 
was a ‘total war’, extensive militarisation of the landscape became a common sight. 
The general population became accustomed to the presence of troop movement and 
the requisitioning of property for the armed services. By merging into the 
background and not drawing attention to themselves through extensive physical 
security measures, SOE could operate relatively unimpeded.  
 Through a combination of physical isolation,
55
 hidden non-lethal booby-
traps
56
 and a lack of excessive security precautions, SOE managed to maintain a low 
profile. The lack of physical barriers came to a fore when local youths occasionally 
succeeded in gaining access to their properties.
57
 Fences were only installed at 
facilities which were established to store valuable equipment. This indicates that 
these security precautions were generally intended to deter opportunist thieves rather 
than enemy agents.  
 The security of the Secret Services has, however, undergone a sea-change 
since the end of the Second World War. Following the defeat of Nazi fascism, the 
Cold War was characterised by covert, intelligence driven ‘pseudo’ warfare. Rapid 
developments in technology meant the safeguarding of a nation’s technological 
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secrets was a vital element in maintaining the status quo. In order to identify tactical 
advantages, the adversaries had to rely on their intelligence agencies.  
 As the geopolitical situation and public perceptions became more hostile and 
contested, it was essential that security precautions became more overt. Wire fences, 
‘sterile zones’, crash barriers and watchtowers were required to physically separate 
sensitive spaces from prying eyes.
58
 Once civil liberties are deemed to be eroded by 
increasing the powers of these organisations, security precautions can never regress 
back to those employed by SOE.  
 The combinations of facilities operated by the Secret Services are unique to 
the organisation. Those branches involved in signals intelligence require intercept 
facilities and decoding establishments, whilst those branches which rely on human 
sources need reliable communications. Certain aspects of the work of the Secret 
Services necessitated standardised facilities such as office accommodation and 
training bases. The combination of their infrastructure, however, is distinct to the 
organisation’s role.  
 The highly specialised and unique nature of the various branches of the 
Secret Services means standardised infrastructure cannot be utilised. Equipment 
employed is often state-of-the-art and technologically advanced. This generally 
requires facilities to be designed for a specific purpose. It is, therefore, not feasible to 
develop a standardised categorisation of the infrastructure of the Secret Services. 
Each branch, therefore, has to be studied individually. The infrastructure of SOE, as 
identified by this thesis, cannot be used to assess any other of Britain’s wartime 
Secret Services. GCCS, SIS, MI5 and the Auxiliary Units each require their own 
study.  
 
SOE’s International Legacy 
 
 At the outbreak of the Second World War, officially sanctioned clandestine 
warfare had never occurred on the scale which was to be conducted by SOE. This 
organisation rapidly developed, adapted and perfected procedures essential for 
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subversive activities. Over the six years of SOE’s existence, its operational record 
inevitably means its legacy can still be felt worldwide. Although the focus of this 
thesis was SOE’s UK based infrastructure, the organisation’s international footprint 
cannot be ignored.  
 
 
Figure 125: Camp X, Canada. In order to train students, communication facilities, a 
parachute ‘Jump Tower’, repair shops, a lecture hall, accommodation blocks, mess 
hall, firing range and assault courses were all constructed.
59
  
 
 In order to operate globally, SOE established regional headquarters 
throughout the world. These included facilities in Cairo,
60
 Gibraltar
61
 and 
Singapore.
62
 On 7 September 1941, SOE established the first complex in North 
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America for training agents in subversive warfare (Figure 125).
63
 This was followed 
in November of the subsequent year by the establishment of a ‘forward base for the 
continuation and extension of S.O.E work into Europe’ at the Club des Pins, 
Algeria.
64
 By establishing facilities across the globe, SOE enabled the organisation’s 
agents to acclimatise to their area of operation. This also promoted localised decision 
making which could potentially decrease SOE’s reaction time to changing 
conditions.  
 
 
Figure 126: The bullet scars on the Church of St Cyril and Methodius, Prague, the 
physical legacy of Operation ANTHROPOID. Following the assassination of SS-
Obergruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich, SOE’s agents took refuge in the crypt of this 
church before committing suicide.
65
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 The global legacy of SOE is not, however, restricted to the organisation’s 
facilities. Sites associated with personal sacrifices made by members of the 
resistance have inevitably become focuses of commemoration.
66
 These sites can, 
therefore, act as centres of reconciliation, education and remembrance (Figure 126).  
 SOE has also left an impact on the nature of conflict. With the rise of 
technologically advanced ‘superpowers’ in the wake of the Second World War, SOE 
demonstrated to terrorists, radicals and insurgents the strategic value of clandestine 
warfare.
67
 Mexican drug cartels regularly use miniature submarines to transport their 
products, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) assassinated political leaders, the Stasi 
used plastic surgery to alter the appearance of their agents and the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) planned to send Fidel Castro an exploding cigar. These 
techniques all have their origins within SOE. Although only in existence for six 
years, SOE’s global legacy can still be felt today. The operations conducted by the 
organisation demonstrated the strategic value of small groups of highly trained, 
dedicated and well equipped agents.  
 
Survival of Sites  
 
 This thesis has identified 176 properties associated with SOE’s activities 
within the UK during the Second World War. Of these, 67 were associated with 
training, seven with research and development, 22 with supply, 11 with 
transportation, seven with communication and 62 with command and control. The 
author has located 98% of these to an accuracy of a six-figure grid reference: only 3 
sites could not be located. Due to the state of SOE’s archive (see pp. 5-8), it is 
probable that some sites might have been overlooked. This thesis has, however, 
increased our knowledge of SOE’s property portfolio by approximately 32%.68  
                                                                                                                                                                    
Operations in World War II (London, 2002) p. 49 and Roderick Bailey, Forgotten Voices of the 
Secret War: An Inside History of Special Operations during the Second World War (London, 2008) p. 
116 
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 John Schofield, Combat Archaeology: Material Culture and Modern Conflict (London, 2005) p. 61 
67
 As other organisations have also demonstrated the value of clandestine warfare, SOE was not the 
sole inspiration.   
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 This figure has been calculated by cross checking the gazetteer with the secondary published 
literature. 
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Surviving Sites: HER and English Heritage’s Pastscape Evidence 
 
 In order to identify SOE’s properties which had already been documented, 
the author consulted the HER and Pastscape records available on the Heritage 
Gateway website. Due to practical reasons, only sites located outside of London 
were checked (Table 18).
69
  
 
 Pastscape HER 
Number % Number % 
Reference SOE 3 2 6 3 
No Reference to SOE 77 44 54 31 
Outside of the Geographical 
Scope for the Data 
24 13 44 25 
Sites Outside of London 69 39 69 39 
Unknown Location 3 2 3 2 
Table 18: Pastscape and HER data, which is freely available online at ‘Heritage 
Gateway’, were checked for reference to SOE. The results clearly indicate that prior 
to this study, there was little information relating to the organisation’s facilities 
available within the heritage community.  
 
 Due to a combination of factors, only 46% and 34% of SOE’s facilities were 
covered by Pastscape and HER data. Of the 80 sites Pastscape had data for, only 3 
referenced SOE’s activities. In comparison, of the 60 properties recorded in the 
HERs, 6 referred to the organisation. These figures clearly highlight low level 
recording of sites associated with the Secret Services in both local and national 
archaeological databases. 
 
Future Work 
 
 Following the documentary survey of SOE’s property portfolio presented in 
this thesis, a programme of archaeological field assessment should be initiated. Due 
                                                          
69
 See Appendix D: Miscellaneous Data for a list of the sites which were recorded by the HERs and 
Pastscape on Heritage Gateway by July 2015.  
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to the ephemeral nature of the organisation’s facilities and their willingness to utilise 
pre-existing structures, excavations will be able to provide tangible evidence for the 
nature of SOE’s infrastructure. It has been estimated that there is the possibility of 
surviving physical traces at approximately 86% of the organisation’s non-London 
based properties (see Appendix D: Miscellaneous Data). The combination of 
documentary sources with field data will bring greater rewards to the study of SOE 
than either in isolation.  
 
Cultural Significance 
 
 In studying built heritage, it is important to consider the cultural significance 
of the structures. Places maybe valued for various reasons beyond utility or personal 
association. Value can be attached to a site’s ‘distinct architecture or landscape, the 
story it can tell about its past, its connection with notable people or events, its 
landform, flora and fauna, because they find it beautiful or inspiring, or for its role as 
a focus of a community’.70 In 2008, English Heritage, now Historic England, defined 
significance as the ‘sum of the cultural and natural heritage values of a place’.71 
Cultural values were arranged into four groups: 
‘Evidential value: the potential of a place to field evidence about 
past human activity. 
Historical value: the ways in which past people, events and aspects 
of life can be connected through a place to the present – it tends to 
be illustrative or associative. 
Aesthetic value: the ways in which people draw sensory and 
intellectual stimulation from a place. 
Communal value: the meanings of a place for the people who relate 
to it, or for whom it figures in their collective experience or 
memory.’72 
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 English Heritage, Conservation Principles; Polices and Guidance for the Sustainable Management 
of the Historic Environment (Swindon, 2008) p. 27 
71
 Ibid p. 72 
72
 Ibid p. 7 
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 By understanding and articulating the values and significance of a place, 
informed decisions can be made about the future of a site: ‘[t]he degree of 
significance determines what, if any, protection, including statutory designation, is 
appropriate under law and policy’.73 What follows, therefore, is an assessment of the 
‘cultural values’ of SOE’s property portfolio based on English Heritage’s criteria.  
 
Evidential Value 
 
 As ‘evidential value’ is the potential of a place to yield evidence about the 
past, English Heritage place a strong emphasis on ‘age’, although this is not 
paramount. Evidential value is particularly important in the absence of written 
records. The material record, in particular archaeological deposits, therefore, 
provides a vital source of information.
74
 As approximately 87% of SOE’s archive 
has been destroyed (see p. 9), the organisation’s property portfolio can be regarded 
as having evidential value.  
 
Historical Value 
 
 Historical value, which is derived from ways in which the past can be 
connected to the present through a place, can be regarded as either illustrative or 
associative. Illustrative relates to perceived links between a place’s past and the 
present. The value tends to be greater if the site incorporates the first or only 
surviving example of consequential innovation.
75
 As SOE tended to utilise pre-
existing structures instead of constructing new facilities, the organisation’s property 
portfolio is rarely illustrative of their activities.  
 Places can also have historical value if they have an association with a 
notable family, person, event or movement.
76
 Being the location of something 
momentous can ‘increase and intensify understanding through linking historical 
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accounts of events with the place where they happened – provided, of course, that 
the place still retains some semblance of its appearance at the time’.77  
 Throughout the Second World War, SOE was not only vital in undermining 
the Axis war effort, but also in maintaining the moral of citizens under occupation. 
The organisation’s facilities in the UK are, therefore, of significant associative 
historical value. 
 
Aesthetic Value 
 
 The aesthetic value of a place is associated with either conscious design or a 
sites fortuitously evolution over time. It is, however, more common for a place to 
combine aspects of the two.
78
 Although aesthetic value ‘tend to be specific to a time 
and cultural context … appreciation of them is not culturally exclusive’.79 The 
design value of a place incorporates composition, construction material, planting, 
decoration, detailing and craftsmanship. Values attached to these can also change 
over time as a response to particular cultural frameworks.
80
 Based on English 
Heritage’s definition of aesthetic value, those facilities purposely built by SOE are 
unlikely to be regarded as visually appealing: they were designed to be functional 
rather than attractive.  
 
Communal Value 
 
 Communal value, which can be derived from people associated with a place, 
can be either commemorative or social. Commemorative value ‘reflect the meanings 
of a place for those who draw part of their identify from it, or have emotional links to 
it. The most obvious examples are war and other memorials raised by community 
effort, which consciously evoke past lives and events’.81 SOE’s properties can be 
regarded as important components of our collective memory. These sites were vital 
to supporting the resistance and are also significant places of remembrance.  
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 English Heritage, Conservation Principles p. 29 
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 Ibid p. 30 
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 Ibid p. 30, 31 
81
 Ibid p. 31 
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The Cultural Significance of SOE’s Property Portfolio 
 
 In order to assess the significance of a place, English Heritage compiled a list 
of factors which should be considered. These include the following:
82
 
‘Understanding the fabric and evolution of the place. 
Identify who values the place, and why they do so. 
Relate identified heritage values to the fabric of the place. 
Consider the relative importance of those identified values. 
Consider the contribution of associated objects and collections. 
Consider the contribution made by setting and context. 
Compare the place with other places sharing similar values’.83  
 When assessing SOE’s property portfolio using this cultural significance 
checklist, issues are raised over these criteria when applied to modern military 
heritage. This thesis has provided the necessary understanding of the fabric and 
evolution of SOE’s property portfolio. By itself, however, this does not provide 
‘sufficient understanding of place. The information gained will need to be set in the 
context of knowledge of the social and cultural circumstances that produced the 
place’.84 
 According to English Heritage, in order to provide a sound basis for 
management, it is essential that individuals and communities ‘who are likely to 
attach heritage values to a place should be identified, and the range of those values 
understood and articulated, not just those that may be the focus of convention’.85 
Identifying individuals associated with the Secret Services is, however, problematic. 
On joining these organisations, staff were sworn to secrecy and required to sign the 
Official Secrets Act. Those individuals who have been employed by the Secret 
Services, therefore, rarely talk of their experiences.  
 The nature of the work undertaken by SOE meant that the majority of their 
staff were field agents. Only a select number, therefore, spent extended periods of 
time at SOE’s UK facilities. Those destined to operate as agents only had a fleeting 
experience of the organisation’s support infrastructure. They were also unlikely to 
know the precise location of where they were accommodated. These agents are, 
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therefore, likely to attach significance collectively to SOE’s property portfolio 
instead of individual sites. Only those who spent extended periods at times at 
specific sites, such as at the research and development and wireless hubs, will value 
individual properties.  
 Cultural significance is also related to the heritage value of the fabric of a 
place. This depends on the survival of traces of the past and is only diminished if 
obliterated or concealed.
86
 English Heritage, therefore, inexplicably link a places 
historical value to surviving fabric. As illustrated by this thesis, SOE preferred 
utilising pre-existing structures over erecting purpose built facilities. Historical 
association between a property and its past is often, however, not visible within the 
structure’s fabric. It is, therefore, essential that the heritage value of a place should 
take into account the intangible.  
 When assessing the significance of a place, it is desirable to identify all its 
heritage values.
87
 As SOE occupied pre-existing structures, the organisation’s 
property portfolio is more likely to be classified as ‘significant’ due to tangible 
aspects of the places history. Although Audley End, Essex, for example, was an 
important centre for training Polish agents, it is more highly valued for being one of 
the largest and most opulent houses from Jacobean England. Whilst Gaynes Hall, 
SOE’s packing station, is Grade II* listed because it is an eighteen century country 
house by the architect George Byfield.
88
  
 As SOE had limited physical impact on the landscape, the organisation’s 
properties cannot be classified as ‘significant’ based on English Heritage’s 2008 
criteria. Using these guidelines, only SOE’s communication facilities warrant official 
protection. This thesis has demonstrated that although a place might not contain 
tangible traces of the past, this does not impact its significance. When assessing 
value, consideration should be taken of intangible historical association. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
 Prior to this research, the academic study of SOE has inevitably focused on 
the ‘glamorous’ exploits conducted by the organisation’s Country Sections. These 
studies, therefore, have to rely on a fragmented and chaotic archive.
89
 In order to 
negate the inherent challenges posed by the documentary records of the Secret 
Services, this thesis has focused on SOE’s UK based infrastructure. Although the 
methodology employed has been tried and tested in previous studies, this is the first 
time it has ever been applied to an entire branch of the British Secret Services. By 
incorporating SOE’s infrastructure, which is free from documentary bias, this 
research has provided a more holistic and subjective assessment of the organisation. 
 Through focusing on SOE’s property portfolio, this study has demonstrated 
that at the outbreak of the Second World War there were few facilities within the UK 
dedicated to clandestine warfare. The organisation, therefore, had to rapidly expand 
whilst attempting to initiate global resistance in parallel to developing operational 
procedure. It was inevitable that these early ‘amateurish’ attempts would be plagued 
by failure. This was, however, to have a lasting impact on how SOE’s sister 
organisations viewed clandestine warfare. In 1942, as a result of the German 
invasion of Russia, there was a greater incentive to support indigenous resistance 
movements. Political support for SOE was, therefore, more forthcoming. This 
enabled the organisation to expand their property portfolio which predictably 
allowed them to increase their global activities. By the end of the war, SOE had put 
in place an extensive, yet necessary, infrastructure which incorporated innovation, 
reflectivity and pre-existing facilities.  
 This thesis has, for the first time, determined and mapped the full extent of 
SOE’s property portfolio within the UK. Without an appreciation of the 
organisation’s support infrastructure, an essential element in the evaluation of SOE’s 
operations is missing. Future studies into this wartime branch of the British Secret 
Services now have a stronger foundation on which to build. By producing a gazetteer 
of SOE’s properties, this thesis has undertaken the necessary primary research for 
further archaeological investigation.  
                                                          
89
 Due to the nature of the work undertaken by SIS, the organisation’s archive will never be released 
into the public domain. Some correspondence does, however, appear in the files of organisations they 
had dealings with. As this thesis has, therefore, had to rely on SOE’s archive it is, inevitably, SOE 
centric. 
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 The demonstrable value this thesis has brought to the study of SOE can be 
replicated for certain other branches of the wartime British Secret Services. As this 
primary study relied on identifying sites from SOE’s surviving archive, only those 
clandestine organisations which have deposited documents in the public domain can 
be subjected to a project of this nature. It will, therefore, never be possible to apply 
this methodological approach to SIS as it is their policy never to release files.  
 This thesis has demonstrated the value of material culture in assessing 
clandestine organisations. It has also produced the first comprehensive gazetteer of 
SOE’s UK based infrastructure during the Second World War. This study, however, 
is only a starting point. Further research into SOE and its global infrastructure is 
required to fully comprehend the achievements of this remarkable organisation.  
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HS 8/199: SOE Council minutes 
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HS 8/204: CD's weekly meetings (CD is symbol for Chief of SOE) 
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HS 8/368: Private Office papers: minister's correspondence (drafts) 
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HS 8/782: Transfer of navy section; liaison with Admiralty 
HS 8/783: Liaison with Admiralty 
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HS 8/794: Welman policy: miniature submarines 
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HS 8/801: Welman craft: specifications, drawings and photographs 
HS 8/805: Purchase and fitting out of Dutch yacht 'Zwier' 
HS 8/811: Personnel: casualties and movements 
HS 8/828: SOE sea operations: summaries 
HS 8/830: Helford River base logbook 
HS 8/832: History of security section: 1940-1945; list of personnel 
HS 8/835: Breaches of security: official indications that ISRB (Inter-Services 
Research Bureau) is identical to SO 
HS 8/837: SOE Special Security Panel: minutes and memoranda 
HS 8/839: Administration MO4 
HS 8/840: Security arrangements; War Cabinet reports 
HS 8/842: Internment facilities for special cases 
HS 8/845: Shipping: REIGER 
HS 8/847: Security instructions 
HS 8/849: Security: Great Britain; enemy activities and counter measures 
HS 8/856: Post-war rehabilitation: agents 
HS 8/860: Publicity for SOE activity in occupied countries 
HS 8/868: Classification, transfer and housing of documents 
HS 8/889: Enlistment and training of US recruits 
HS 8/895: Casualties in the field 
HS 8/897: Correspondence with Right Honourable Winston Churchill MP and 
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HS 8/915: Correspondence with Right Honourable Lord Leathers, Minister of War 
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HS 8/917: Correspondence with Right Honourable Sir Kingsley Wood, Chancellor 
of Exchequer 
HS 8/919: Correspondence with Chiefs of Staff, War Cabinet Secretariat and War 
Office officials 
HS 8/920: Correspondence with ministers  
HS 8/921: Correspondence with officers and officials of HM government 
HS 8/924: Correspondence with Major Sir Desmond Morton 
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HS 8/959: Irregular operations; assessments 
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National Monument Record, English Heritage 
 
Enquiry 
Number 
Site Search 
radius (m) 
Centre Point Vertical 
APs 
Oblique 
APs 
64256 Aston House 1500 527100, 222400 164 0 
64405 Poundon 1500 463700, 225100 79 0 
65058 Gaynes Hall 1500 514663, 266220 59 0 
65384 Brickendonbury 1500 533000, 210400 105 29 
65429 The Frythe 1500 522500, 215000 200 9 
65436 Grendon Hall 1500 468200, 222000 32 58 
65865 The Thatched 
Barn 
1500 521143, 196752 119 0 
66489 Hallplace Farm 1500 482173, 182047 82 0 
68132 Bride Hall 1500 519053, 215944 61 42 
68134 Brock Hall 1500 463262, 262667 39 111 
68815 Frogmore Hall 1500 528939, 220722 209 7 
69292 Holmewood 1500 518494, 288106 51 0 
69538 RAF Tempsford 1500 518819, 252676 37 10 
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69840 Stodham Park 1500 477083, 126104 83 1 
69994 Thame Park 1500 471656, 203741 96 28 
70141 Hatherop Castle 1500 415314, 205126 51 62 
70228 Vineyards 1500 438799, 103070 58 64 
Order 70228 also covered Blackridge, Boarmans, Clobb Gorse, Drokes, Harford 
House, Saltmarsh, The House in the Wood, The House on the Shore, The Rings and 
Warren House.  
70396 Chicheley Hall 1500 490558, 245850 43 84 
70492 Dunham House 1500 373494, 387406 90 15 
70588 Winterfold 1500 507316, 141936 61 7 
70658 Roughwood 
Park 
1500 500360, 195389 169 0 
70858 Wanborough 
Manor 
1500 493495, 148933 49 3 
71191 Anderson 
Manor 
1500 388018, 97603 73 31 
71267 Gorhambury 
House 
1500 511374, 207854 87 213 
72102 Charndon 1500 467485, 224763 61 2 
72607 Fulsham Hall 1500 384380, 380079 85 9 
 
The Norwegian Resistance Museum 
 
049113 Photograph 
038003 Photograph 
038004 Photograph 
034018 Photograph 
038028 Photograph 
038035 Photograph 
038040 Photograph 
038046 Photograph 
038065 Photograph 
042008 Photograph 
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049093 Photograph 
049111 Photograph 
 
RAF Museum 
 
Tempsford Record Site Plan DGW 4330/44 
Tempsford Record Site Plan DGW 4331/44 
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